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Due to the globalisation of business and the concept of borderless business 
activities, these new phenomena need business management to be open and 
adopt and practice management’ skills with the international in mind, and give 
good consideration to the circumstances of the internationalisation of the 
business through directors having powers as provided under contract and law. 
The financial crises in previous years have demonstrated the importance of 
directors’ duties to manage the company's affairs properly; these crises were a 
result of many cases of fraud and mismanagement. The directors’ duties in the 
UK and the KSA have been codified to enhance the clarity of the law and make 
it easier for the responsibilities of directors towards the company and others to 
be understood. It also aims to prevent fraud and mismanagement that causes 
corporate collapse. 
This study investigates and analyses the powers, duties and liabilities of the 
directors in Saudi Arabia and the UK in order to demonstrate the extent to which 
these regulation work effectively. This is by a critical evaluation of relevant 
legislation and case law on the subject matter of the study and demonstrating 
practical problems, which may result from some legislation. By doing this, the 
study provides an accurate picture of the directors' powers, duties and liabilities, 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Preamble 
With the growth of global economic activity and the emergence of flagship 
projects requiring huge capital expenditure the company emerged as an 
effective legal form to attract and structure capital investments as a going 
concern. Companies have numerous and varied relationships which enhance 
their positions and display their prominent impact on their surroundings. Thus, 
they affect countries' economies since those countries also depend upon them 
to establish their giant development projects. 
The owners of the majority of companies in modern times authorise a board of 
directors to perform management functions and to conduct its affairs given the 
need for specialisation and experience, which the majority of owners may not 
possess. Directors have overall responsibility for managing the revenue and 
cost elements of a company’s income statement, which is known as profit and 
loss (P & L) responsibility. A director normally oversees most or all of the firm’s 
marketing and sales functions as well as the day- to- day operations of the 
business. Frequently, the director is responsible for effective planning, 
delegating, staffing, and decision making to attain desirable profit making 
results for an organisation.1 In some cases, the director of a business is known 
by a different title or designation. The majority of corporate directors hold the 
titles of chief executive officer (CEO) or president, depending on the company, 
individuals with the title managing director, regional vice president, country 
director, product director, branch director, or segment director may also have 
general management responsibilities; and whereas the director acts as the 
company’s legal representative and the individual having powers as provided 
under contract and law, and is held accountable in cases of exceeding such 
authority. Therefore an urgent need exists to underline the directors’ liability for 
breach of obligations and exceeding their authority. Holding the director fairly 
accountable is considered the greatest motive for him to ensure due care in 
their actions and decisions which determine the fate and future of the company. 
 
1 Sayles, L. (1979). Leadership. New York: McGraw- Hill, Inc.p.6. 
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Since the beginning of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 the world has been 
looking seriously at corporate governance, although the first appearance of the 
term “corporate governance” was apparently in 1976 in Federal Register.2 
Among many problems that emerged during the crisis operations and 
transactions of employees and companies obtaining huge amounts of short-
term debt at the same time as they are keen to not know the members and hide 
these debts through innovative accounting methods and systems, most of the 
loans also were made without checking profitability and returns.3 The events of 
the so-called Enron scandal4 and the ensuing string of corporate 
misstatements,5 the latest of which was the UK economic crisis that served as 
a warning to many cases of fraud and mismanagement.6 These have clearly 
demonstrated the importance of corporate governance even in countries that 
were considered financial markets "close to perfection". Griffin7 mentions that 
Angel Gurrı´a indicated in the 2008 statement of Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), what he considered the causes of the 
global financial crisis. The banks acted rationally in given their position and the 
opportunities in the global market when they responded to investor demand to 
 
2 Federal Register: 41 Fed. Reg. 52977 Dec. 3, 1976. 
3 Tejvan Pettinger, (2017) Asian Financial Crisis 1997, EconomicsHelp, 12 November 2017, 
available at: https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/financial-crisis-asia-1997/ accessed 
on 31 July 2018. 
4 Enron is a US energy company that its executives used the accounting loopholes to look more 
profitable and to hide billions of dollars in debt from failed projects and deals. By 2001, Enron 
had used hundreds of private-purpose entities to hide its debts. The income is calculated as 
the present value of net future cash flows. It was often difficult to estimate the viability of these 
contracts. The income from projects is also recorded, although they may not have received the 
money, thus increasing financial profits on the books. This means that in the following years, 
profits cannot be included, so new and additional income must be included from new projects 
to appease the investors. This contributed to creating a culture of obsession with short-term 
profits, with ignoring the quality of profits and cash flow, and recording accounting results as 
soon as possible to keep up the company's stock price. If the project returns are less than the 
expected, instead of bearing the loss, the company transfers the asset to a company outside 
the books, thus, the loss is not reported. This type of accounting enabled Enron to write off 
unprofitable activities without harming profits. This led to the concealment of losses and made 
the company look more profitable than it actually was. Despite the fact that many of its affiliates 
were losing money. See Dharan, Bala G.; William R. Bufkins (July 2008). "Red Flags in Enron's 
Reporting of Revenues and Key Financial Measures" . Social Science Research Network: 112; 
Healy, Paul, M., and Krishna G. Palepu. 2003. "The Fall of Enron." Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 17 (2): 3-26. DOI: 10.1257/08953300376588840; McLean, Bethany; Peter 
Elkind. Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room. 39–42. ISBN 1-59184-008-2. 
5 "Andersen guilty in Enron case". BBC News. 15 June 2002 available 
at:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2047122.stm> accessed on 31 July 2018.  
6 Arden, M. 'Regulating the Conduct of Directors' (2010) 10(1) J Corp L Stud 1, 1-2. 
7 Griffin, P. (2013). Gendering Global Finance: Crisis, Masculinity, and Responsibility. Men and 
Masculinities, 16(1), 9–34. 10. 
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expand mortgage lending, accordingly, the global financial system would 
collapse due to faltering investor confidence. The financial world is governed 
by assumptions concerning the necessity of capital liquidity, so the only solution 
that lies in the performance improvements that main market actors must make, 
by making informed decisions, is not only to protect themselves but also to 
improve how markets function. In this regard, Campbell8 asserts that the main 
causes of the 2008 US financial crisis were a series of institutional failures in 
how to manage the financial services industry. This can be summed up in three 
reasons. First, the mortgage markets. Second, the financial services industry, 
since the amount of money that companies could borrow to leverage their 
investments increased. As a result of that, the total debt of the US financial 
sector increased from 22% to 117% of GDP between 1981 and 2008. The 
institutional reforms in banking regulation, such as adjustable-rate subprime 
mortgages, with no legal limit on the interest charged, created incentives for 
lenders to get more credit available to borrowers, even for the borrowers with 
poor credit history records. Third, the absence of institutional 
complementarities, which institutions must compensate for each other’s 
shortcomings rather than reinforce each other’s incentives. 
Following the sound principles of corporate governance leads to the creation of 
the necessary precautions against mismanagement, while promoting 
transparency in economic and the fight against fraud and corruption. The 
directors' responsibility is to ensure that effective corporate governance is 
applied in all relevant matters by establishing a compliance policy that governs 
the company's compliance with all applicable laws, including the establishment 
of effective compliance risk management policies and procedures and the 
obligation to prepare periodic reports regarding the compliance.9 
Companies, whether they are public or private10, that enjoy enduring success 
have core values and core purpose that remain fixed while their business 
 
8 Campbell, John. (2011). Campbell, John L. 2011. “The U.S. Financial Crisis: Lessons for 
Theories of Institutional Complementarity.” Socio-Economic Review 9:211-234. 217-228. 
9 See OECD. (2004). OECD Principle of Corporate Governance. OECD. The UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2018, the main principles of the code. 
10 Most companies in KSA are private. Unfortunately, there are no official detailed statistics. 
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strategies and practices endlessly adapt to a changing world.11 Therefore, to 
enjoy the prosperity, and to continue the progress, the companies need proper 
tools for managements, with well- designed management powers, duties and 
responsibilities, and that requires first to have a better understanding of the 
concept of the corporate governance and its related practices. According to 
Owen12 that corporate governance is the rules and systems by which the power 
is practiced and controlled in corporations. Corporate governance focuses on 
internal and external corporate structures as well, in order to monitor the actions 
of the management.13 Companies’ accountability can be established through 
the corporate governance mechanism, and it also regulates the distribution of 
the responsibilities between the different participants including: directors, 
managers and shareholders claim.14 The mechanisms of the corporate 
governance comprise: decisions and policies with the corporation and its 
agents, being designed for monitoring the actions.15 
In view of increasing interest in the concept of corporate governance, many 
international institutions have taken care of it, especially OECD, which aims to 
assist countries to develop legal frameworks for the application of corporate 
governance through the OECD principles of corporate governance.16 
As the globalisation of business introduced the concept of borderless business 
activities, these new phenomena need business management to be open and 
adopt management skills with the international dimension in mind, and give 
good consideration to the circumstances of the globalisation of business. One 
of the most prominent perspectives on current global business activities is 
Saudi Arabia's Vision 203017 that aims to increase the contribution of the private 
sector to the gross domestic product (GDP) and to attract foreign investment to 
 
11 Collins, C., & Porras, J., I. (1996). Building Your Company’s Vision. Harvard Business 
Review. September- October 1996, 74(5), 65. 
12 Owen, John., The Failure of HIH Insurance, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, (2003), 
ISBN 0975067826 (volume 3). 
13 Sifuna, A., P. (2012). “Disclosure or Abstain”: The prohibition of Insider Trading on Trial”. 
Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 27 (20). 
14 OECD. (2004). OECD Principle of Corporate Governance. OECD. 
15 Tricker, A. (2009). Essentials for Board Directors: An A-Z Guide, Bloomberg Press, New 
York. 
16 OECD. (2004). OECD Principle of Corporate Governance. OECD. 




Saudi Arabia, which means wider economic openness to the world. Several 
large Saudi projects18 will also serve as a centre for international 
communication in the economic, cultural, legal and other fields that have 
undoubtedly brought and will bring in many foreign companies. Therefore, 
Saudi Arabian Companies Law 2015 (SACL 2015) has been issued to provide 
a legal environment for incubators and incentives for the initiative and 
investment, in order to enhance the value of companies and develop their 
activities and contribute to Saudi economy. The SACL 2015 provides the 
appropriate legal framework for fair and sound corporate governance practices, 
institutionalising corporate business concepts, supporting the growth and 
sustainability of economic entities, improving the performance of enterprises 
and integrity of business transactions through the application of fair standards 
for transparency and disclosure, the role of shareholder meetings and boards 
of directors in corporate strategies and responsibilities for corporate activities. 
The SACL 2015 also recognises the concept of a holding company and a single 
company and recognises the interests of stakeholders. It is necessary for 
foreign companies and Saudi Arabia also to understand Saudi law and Islamic 
law; it is perhaps the best way to understand the law is to compare it with the 
laws of other countries such as the law of the UK, which is considered as a 
global economic centre. 
In light of the foregoing, underlining the directors’ powers and authorities and 
demonstrating practical problems which may result from some laws, as well as 
finding and presenting solutions, all play an important role in achieving stability 
for companies, with effects extending to the overall economic activity. 
1.2 The significance of this study  
The significance of this study lies in the importance of the sustainability of 
commercial companies in modern times, whether through job creation or 
community service by providing products or services in a stable manner; 62% 
of CEOs considered that corporate sustainability is essential to being 
 
18 For example NEOM, The Saudi Aramco listing in the capital (stock) markets, Red Sea project, 
The Saudi–Egypt Causeway that links Asia with Africa with a causeway and bridge, Silicon 
Valley in Saudi Arabia and others. 
Introduction 
14 
competitive,19 thus supporting the country's gross domestic product (GDP). 
Also, many global companies have already taken steps in sustainability to 
create long-term value and enhance the company's longevity by taking into 
account the company's operation in an ecological, social and economic 
environment. These global companies have pledged to commit to sustainability, 
through transparency and addressing material issues.20 The majority of 
companies are currently managed by non-owners due to the need for 
specialisation and experience that may not be owned by the majority of owners. 
The directors of companies must exercise the freedom to perform their duties 
as they deem fit for the success of the company, but this management of the 
company subjects to a number of controls and balances, both those contained 
in the legislation or the constitution of the company. The importance of these 
controls and balances is to prevent directors from abuse their position and hold 
them liable in the event of failure to comply with their duties. The successive 
global financial crises have shown the urgent need for corporate governance 
for corporate sustainability, by following the sound principles of corporate 
governance and promoting transparency and combating fraud and corruption. 
In 2016, when the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced 
Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, which aims to increase the private sector's 
contribution to GDP and attract foreign investment to the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, which means wider economic openness to the world. Many large Saudi 
projects will serve as a centre for international communications in the economic, 
industrial, educational and other fields that have undoubtedly brought in many 
foreign companies. In March 2017, foreign capital in the Saudi market reached 
651.6 billion Saudi riyals ($174 billion).21 The UK companies operating in Saudi 
Arabia up to the first quarter of 2018 have been estimated at 46 UK 
 
19 See Knut Haanaes, Why all businesses should embrace Sustainability, International Institute 
for Management Development, (2016) available at 
<https://www.imd.org/contentassets/44380898a141424abb873f8774127bc4/tc082-16-
print.pdf> accessed on 26 May 2020. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See 7707 foreign companies with investments of 652 billion riyals in the Saudi market. 




companies,22 and 10 UK companies have been awarded a work permit direct 
investment in Saudi Arabia.23 During the visit of the Crown Prince of Saudi 
Arabia, Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United Kingdom in 2018   London 
witnessed signed agreements between Saudi institutions and companies and 
British companies to increase trade exchange to rise to 65 billion pounds in the 
coming period.24 
One of the most attractive factors for foreign investment is the provision of an 
appropriate legal environment for investment that provides legal frameworks in 
a stable and fair manner, which will positively affect GDP. This is what 
happened recently in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through the enactment of 
SACL 2015 and other corporate governance laws that seek to adapt to global 
trade and attract more foreign investment into Saudi market. However, the 
company directors may in some cases, encounter conflicts under laws and 
practical reality, undermining their powers; in which case, many problems 
surface in actual reality. The conflict of laws or lack of explicit legal provisions 
may be one of these causes. Therefore, there are certain problems in – holding 
company directors liable – for acts which some may see as part of directors' 
powers, while others may find them beyond their powers. 
This study will investigate the powers, duties and liabilities of the directors of 
companies in both Saudi and UK law; so as to make sure that the management 
practices of commercial companies meet the international standards, and if not, 
then the study will suggest the proper mechanism for doing so. 
1.3 The aims and objectives of this study 
As mentioned above, company directors may in some cases, encounter 
conflicts under laws and practical reality, particularly in relation to their powers. 
 
22 See Country Companies on Ministry of Commerce and Investment available 
at:<https://mci.gov.sa/en/attache/britain/Pages/Country-Companies.aspx> accessed on 16 
August 2018. 
23 See Saudi investment authority awards licenses to 10 UK firms. 09 March 2018 available 
at:<http://www.arabnews.com/node/1262596/business-economy> accessed on 16 August 
2018. 
24 See U.K., Saudi Arabia Target 65 Billion Pounds of Mutual Investment. 7/3/2018 available 
at:<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-07/u-k-saudi-arabia-target-65-billion-
pounds-of-mutual-investment> accessed on 16 August 2018. 
Introduction 
16 
Based on the above, the aims of this study is to investigate the powers and 
liabilities of the directors of commercial companies in both of Saudi and UK 
laws; so as to make sure that the management practices of commercial 
companies under Saudi laws meet the international standards, and if not, then 
the study will suggest the proper mechanism for doing so. It can be said that 
the objective of this study are: 
To highlight and analyse company directors' powers, duties and liabilities 
through a critical evaluation of the legal regulation of these matters in Saudi 
Arabia and UK legislation, and clarifying the differences between these legal 
systems. 
1.4 Research questions 
The study seeks to investigate the powers, duties and liabilities of the company 
directors in Saudi Arabia and compare them with the laws in the UK to ensure 
that the management practices of commercial companies under Saudi laws 
meet the international standards. This study will attempt to answer the main 
question, To what extent does the regulation of directors' powers, duties 
and liabilities work effectively? 
The study will focus on a critical evaluation of relevant legislation on the subject 
matter of the study. 
1.5 Methodology 
To answer the research question, this study will apply doctrinal, comparative 
and critical analytical methods of the relevant laws and literature. Doctrinal 
analysis is considered one of the most important legal research methodologies. 
This method usually deals with clarifying the history of laws, how the law was 
before and the law is now and how the law evolved, because strong doctrinal 
analysis to determine what is the law, is often a necessary introduction to 
Introduction 
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research in other legal matters. Doctrinal analysis concentrates on traditional 
legal sources, such as cases and legislation.25 
Comparative study means examining the differences and similarities between 
the laws of a variety of countries in different systems in the world, such as 
common law, civil law, Islamic law and other legal systems. The importance of 
comparative law has increased tremendously in the present age because of the 
economic globalisation. Its importance is that it helps to promote mutual 
understanding and dispel both prejudice and misinterpretation in this world. It 
also provides a platform for legal intellectual exchange and helps to broaden 
the horizons of legislators worldwide. Comparative law may also provide an 
overview of legal transplantation from another legal system, which will be dealt 
with in detail in this study.26 This study will compare the relevant legislation in 
Saudi Arabia and the like on the UK side and other international organisations’ 
law, and highlight the similarities and differences in what needs to be clarified, 
taking into account the circumstances, cultures and religions of each legislation. 
It is worth mentioning that the aim of the comparative study is not to search for 
the best legal system, but the purpose is to know more deeply the various legal 
systems and thus develop what we have. Montesquieu27 believed that the laws 
must be adapted to each nation as it suits them. 
The study will rely on collecting information on primary and secondary sources. 
The primary sources will include legislation and cases law in the UK and Saudi 
Arabia. Islamic law can be addressed in relation to legislation in Saudi Arabia, 
where the legal system in Saudi Arabia derives its provisions from provisions 
of Islamic law.28 Therefore, with regard to Islamic law, the study will be 
 
25 Dixon, M. (2014). A doctrinal approach to property law scholarship. Who cares and Why?. 
Property Law Review, 3 160-165. available at 
<https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/246249> accessed on 26 May 2020. 
26 See legal transplantation on 1.6. 
27 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The spirit of laws, translated by Thomas 
Nugent, revised by J. V. Prichard, (1914) Based on a public domain edition by G. Bell & Sons, 
Ltd., London, 57. available at: <https://socialpolicy.ucc.ie/Montesquieu_constitution.pdf> 
accessed 30 July 2018. 
28 The Basic Law of Governance of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia 1992, art 7. 
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concerned with the provisions of the Qur'an29 and Sunnah30 and their 
interpretations and the sayings of the most prominent scholars of Islamic 
jurisprudence as it is relevant. In the event that there is more than one opinion 
of the scholars, the approach adopted in the thesis is to rely on the views of the 
senior scholars. In the case where the views are conflicting, the view that is 
based on the explicit evidence is adopted. Then, after that, we adopt the view 
that most scholars are agreed upon. The secondary sources will include the 
critical analysis of journal articles, books and other academic publications. 
This study will depend on the UK side on the sources in English. As for the 
Saudi side and the Islamic law, the sources of the English language will be 
relied on, if any, and, if not, Arabic sources will be relied on. 
1.6 Legal transplantation 
Due to economic globalization, the importance of comparative law has 
increased significantly. Comparative law helps to promote understanding 
between countries and dispel both prejudice and misinterpretation. It is believed 
that it is impossible to understand a national law without use of comparative 
law.31 Therefore, law scholars may benefit from other sciences in the 
application of comparative law or the reproduction of laws, for example, political 
science, economics, history, and religions may provide ideas on how to develop 
and apply comparative or cloned legal rules from another country and on the 
possibility of applying a law to different cultures.32 This is because the law is 
more than just a set of written rules; the law is a social practice within a legal 
society that constitutes the actual meaning of the rules, institutions and the way 
in which society operates. The aim of comparative law is to do a systematic 
study of foreign laws in order to derive models that would help formulate and 
 
29 In the Islamic faith, the Quran is the verbally revealed by the God (Allah) to the prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him) through the angel Gabriel (Jibril), which is the last of the holy 
books. 
30 In the Islamic faith, Sunnah is the second primary sources of Islamic faith and law, which is 
based on all transmitted record of the teachings, deeds and sayings, silent permissions (or 
disapprovals) of prophet Muhammad. 
31 Mousourakis, George. Legal transplants and legal development: A jurisprudential and 
comparative law approach. (2013) Acta Juridica Hungarica, 54.3. 220.  
32 Mousourakis, (n 31) 220. 
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implement legislative policies of the countries.33 It is believed that comparative 
law can provide those involved in law reform with a clearer perspective as to 
whether it is reasonable to fit into other systems and to what extent.34 It also 
provides a platform for legal intellectual exchange and helps to broaden the 
horizons of legislators worldwide. Comparative law may also provide an 
overview of legal transplantation from another legal system. 
Learning from other countries can be valuable, for example, when a country 
suffers from an economic or other problem, the benefit of a successful 
experience in another country may be considered. It is therefore frequently 
suggested that countries benefit from legal transplants. It is often assumed that 
legal transplantation can help legislators to choose the best ideas from 
anywhere in the world, especially when there is an urgent need for political and 
economic reform through legal transplantation to reshape broad areas of laws, 
which is necessary for economic and political reform.35 Legal transplantation is 
common because most systems, if not all, have been able to integrate ideas 
from around the world, which is important for implementing successful legal 
models from other countries in order to stimulate development.36 Watson 
believed that most changes in most legal systems are the result of legal 
borrowing, from the 17th century BC at the time of Hammurabi to modern 
transitions of European law to Eastern Europe.37 Unprogressive countries rely 
heavily on external advice in lawmaking because of the lack of independent 
governance or a weakness sign.38 Legal transplantation also save time and 
resources for international coordination in the legal field, particularly with regard 
to countries dealing with each other, such as the European Union and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries, to adopt the standard rules as part of domestic 
 
33 Ibid, 223-224, 227. 
34 Ibid, 230-231. 
35 Engelbrekt A, 'Legal and Economic Discourses on Legal Transplants: Lost in Translation.' 
(2015) Scandinavian Studies in Law, ISSN 0085-5944, Vol. 60, p. 111-140, 114-116; 
Mousourakis, (n 31) 227; Siems, Mathias. Malicious legal transplants. Legal Studies, 2018, 
38.1. 103-104. 
36 Siems, (n 35) 113-114. 
37 Watson, A. (1974). Legal transplants: An approach to comparative law ([Virginia legal 
studies]). Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 95-96. 
38 Schauer, Frederick, et al. The politics and incentives of legal transplantation. (2000) Center 
for International Development at Harvard University.  3-4. Available at: < 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/cid/wpfacu/44a.html> accessed on 15 August 2018. 
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laws or within specific areas of law such as commercial law, transportation law, 
intellectual property law, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) 
and the Comite Maritime International (CMI).39 Harmony in laws enables 
countries accession to international organisations such as the World Trade 
Organisation and the European Union, which happened with the Baltic states 
and Eastern European countries to design their legal models on the lines of 
German models.40 However, there are those who doubt the success of legal 
transplantation. 
The concept of legal transplantation is used to denote the phenomenon of 
borrowing legal rules and institutions from a legal system and transferring them 
to another system.41 It is claimed that the concept of legal transplantation first 
appeared in 1970 during the famous Watson controversy about its legitimacy 
and validity, but the fact that the concept of legal transplantation to describe the 
transfer of rules between countries was used earlier by Walton in 1927.42 There 
are many concepts that are used to describe legal transplantation for example 
transfer, exports, influence, borrowing, importation and reception. Each term 
represents an attempt to visualise the legal transplantation.43 There are also 
attempts to regulate this difference in nomenclature, for example, Ajani44 
divides the terminology contained in the legal transplantation into general terms 
and narrower concepts. General terms such as borrowing or influence refer to 
legal change processes. While narrower concepts such as legal transplants, or 
reception refer to transplantation. 
It can be said that the debate over the legality and validity of legal 
transplantation revolves around three views. The first view is that the law can 
be transplanted without knowledge or concern in the context of the legal rules 
of the donor country, by taking a historical perspective of the enormous 
 
39 Engelbrekt (n 35) 114-116 ; Schauer (n 38) 13-14; Mousourakis, (n 31) 219-223. 
40 Schauer (n 38) 13-14.  
41 Engelbrekt (n 35) 112; Watson, A. (1993). Legal transplants: An approach to comparative 
law (2nd ed.). Athens, Ga. ; London: University of Georgia Press. 21. 
42 Kviatek, B. (2015). Explaining Legal Transplants: Transplantation of EU Law into Central 
Eastern Europe [Groningen]: University of Groningen. 50. 
43 De Roo, A., Örücü, E., Jagtenberg, R., Transfrontier Mobility of Law, Kluwer Law 
International; 1 edition (1995) ISBN-9789041101709, 5. 
44 Ajani G, (1995) 'By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe.'  
43(1) Am J Comp L 93. 93. 
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influence of Roman law on existing civil laws in Europe and elsewhere. Watson 
believed that the law is self-contained and develops independently of the social 
context and it develops through legal borrowing which is the main way for the 
legal development.45 Therefore, Watson believed the theory that the law as a 
result of the needs of a particular society is incorrect. This is because 
historically, laws have not met the needs and aspirations of societies, although 
societies have maintained the laws for long periods of time. Societies also seem 
tolerant of unsuitable laws, and when the law change, it does so independently 
of the social context.46 Kahn-Freund47 agreed with Watson’s view that 
economic, social and religious factors are no longer an obstacle to legal 
transplantation due to globalisation. While political factors are becoming 
increasingly important for legal transplantation, Watson48 also called for the use 
of comparative studies to find similarities between different legal systems and 
to establish relationships between these legal systems. This corresponds to 
Walton's view49 of the possibility of full legal transplantation in unprogressive 
countries that want to be near the level of progressive countries. 
Contrary to the first view, Legrand believed in the impossibility of legal 
transplantation, as Legrand challenged the possibility of applying the legal 
transplantation.50 Legrand also criticised comparative studies for the wrong 
focus on the similarities between laws rather than differences, with no benefit 
from focusing on similarities in practice and impracticality in understanding the 
laws.51 The possibility of finding similarities between laws is minimal because 
the interpretation of legal rules is influenced by the cultural context at that time 
and place, which makes them different in practice, even if the legal rules appear 
to be written in the same form, thus it is impossible to establish relations 
 
45 Watson (n 37) 88. 
46 Watson, A. (2001). Society And Legal Change (2nd ed.) foreword by Paul Finkelman, Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia. 98-99. 
47 Kahn-Freund OO, (1974) 'On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law.' 37(1) Mod L Rev 1. 
8-11. 
48 Watson (n 37) 5-9. 
49 Walton, F. (1927) The Historical School Of Jurisprudence And Transplantations Of Law, 
Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law Vol. 9, No. 4. 189-192. 
50 Legrand P, (1997) 'The Impossibility of Legal Transplants.' 4(2) Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 
111. 113-114. 
51 Legrand P, (2003) “The Same and the Different” in Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday 




between the various laws.52 This is consistent with what Montesquieu believed 
as having little chance that the legal rules of a country will be suitable for 
another country.53 It also emphasises that the law must be seen as an 
expression of people's convictions in the same way that languages and 
customs gradually grow as a historical process.54 Legrand's view, the 
impossibility of legal transplantation, is based on the impossibility of separating 
legal transplantation from the social and cultural context; and the legal rules 
also change once they are transplanted from a legal system to another.55 
There is a third opinion, which lies between the two previous camps. It believes 
that there is a possibility of legal transplantation, but the social and cultural 
context must be considered during the process of legal transplantation. Örücü56 
believes that transferred legal rules must introduce into the recipient system so 
as to suit the social culture and the needs of the recipient country. Kahn-Freund 
agreed that the consideration of the social and cultural context is critical to the 
development and transplantation of the law. Kahn-Freund believed that not all 
legal rules can be transferred; there are degrees of transferability, so the degree 
to which any legal rule can be transplanted depends on the extent of its 
integration into the cultural context. Therefore, he believed the legal 
transplantation can be rejected and cannot be placed in the recipient country 
without suitable diagnosis and care.57 On this aspect, Örücü58 emphasises that 
the fine-tuning the laws transferred by the appropriate authorities of the 
recipient country is the key to success the legal transplantation. Therefore, 
according to this view, legal transplantation often fails due to the lack of proper 
application or not fine tuning the laws transferred or the inadequacy of laws and 
resulting non-integration into the cultural context of the recipient country. 
Since this comparative study deals with the duties and liabilities of the 
company's director in the UK and Saudi Arabian law. It may provide a platform 
 
52 Legrand (n 50) 277-278. 
53 Montesquieu (n 27) 57. 
54 Kviatek (n 42) 50-51. 
55 Legrand (n 51) 277-278. 
56 Örücü E, (2002) “Law as Transposition” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2002, 
Vol.51(2), pp.205-22, 207. 
57 Kahn-Freund (n 47) 6-17. 
58 Örücü (n 56) 7. 
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for legal intellectual exchange and help to broaden the horizons of legislators 
in Saudi Arabian, the UK or elsewhere, which may help the idea of legal 




Chapter Two: Legal principles with respect to company directors and 
board of directors 
2.1 Legal principles with respect to company directors 
2.1.1 Who is a director?  
The company director is considered as the main human actor of the company, 
which is the natural legal person able to do the legal acts of the company 
towards others, whereas, without the directors, companies cannot achieve the 
desired purposes. Believing in the importance of a director, the UK legislator 
addresses the definition of a director in the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006). 
The CA 2006 provides that the director is any legal person who holds the 
position of director by any name called.1 The CA 2006 also stipulates that there 
must be a minimum number of natural persons as directors of the company2, 
whereas before the CA 2006 it was not required to appoint a natural person as 
a director. However, after the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 
2015 goes into force, non-natural legal entities will not be able to act as 
company directors, s 87 states that the directors of all companies must be only 
natural persons.3This formulation of the definition of the director does not seem 
to be precisely defined for the director, and this may be due to the fact that the 
UK legislator wants this definition to include all those who practice the actual 
functions of the director and participate in decision-making, whether this legal 
person is appointed and registered as a director in accordance with the required 
procedures "de jure" or not "de facto". This flexibility in definition fits with the 
commercial nature of companies. This flexibility also includes a wider range of 
responsibility, including all those who exercise the role of director and who have 
not formally registered or shown themselves as directors for any reason. 
Accordingly, this definition includes shadow directors, de jure directors and de 
facto directors. Despite this flexibility and comprehensiveness in the definition 
of the director, the legislator provides the definition of shadow directors, stating 
 
1 CA 2006 s 250.  
2 CA 2006 s 155.  
3 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 s 87. 
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that the shadow director is a legal person that the company directors are 
accustomed to acting in accordance with his/her directives and instructions.4  
This custom of following the directions and instructions of the shadow director 
must be instinctive and company directors must be without the use of their 
independent judgment in making decisions.5 Although the shadow director 
definition includes all legal persons, whether they are a natural person or not, 
there are exceptions to this definition. The first is the person will not be 
considered a shadow director of a company if s/he advises as a professional 
capacity, without exceeding the scope of professional advice in their respective 
fields, and the company directors act in accordance with this advice and 
instructions. The second exception is that the parent company will not be 
considered a shadow director of its subsidiary companies if any subsidiary 
company acts in accordance with the instructions and instructions of the parent 
company for the purposes of directors’ duties, transactions requiring members’ 
approval or contracts with sole member who is also a director. In Smithton v 
Naggar,6 the Court of Appeal held that the holding company director was not a 
de facto or shadow director of its subsidiary. 
The de facto director is close in concept to the shadow director. Some legal 
persons serve as official directors "de jure", although they are not appointed. 
Courts apply the legal duties of the directors to these persons, even if they are 
not formally appointed, and they are treated as de jure directors. The English 
Court of Appeal, therefore, held that the distinction between a shadow director 
and a de facto director actually is not always clear.7 However, Millett J in Re 
Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd8 made a distinction between de facto directors and 
shadow directors. Millett J believed that de facto director acts as a person 
claiming to act as a director despite s/he has not been appointed or validly 
appointed, and the company hold out her/him as a director. Otherwise, a 
shadow director does not pretend or claim to be a director, but rather rules out 
themselves and hide behind others who claim to be directors, whether they are 
 
4 CA 2006 s 251.  
5See Lord (Liquidator of Rosshill Properties Ltd) v Sinai Securities Ltd [2004] EWHC 1764 (Ch); 
Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd [1994] B.C.C. 161. 
6 [2014] B.C.C. 482. 
7 See Millett J in Re Kaytech International Plc. [1999] B.C.C. 390. 
8Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd [1994] B.C.C. 161. 
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de facto directors or de jure directors, and that the company does not hold out 
the shadow director as a director; and these directors follow the directions and 
instructions of the shadow director instinctively without using their independent 
judgment in making decisions.   Morritt L.J in Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry v Deverell,9 believed that the board's exercise of independent 
judgment does not preclude a person's liability for being a shadow director.  
However, Timothy Lloyd QC in Re Richborough Furniture Ltd10 had a different 
view of what Millett J said in that a person is liable as a de facto director. 
Timothy Lloyd QC believed that the court must have clear evidence that s/he is 
the sole person directing the affairs of the company, and if there are other 
directors, it is necessary to prove that the person "de facto" acted on an equal 
footing with others in directing the affairs of the company.  Concerning equality 
principles, Lewison J argued, in order to impose fiduciary obligations, there 
must be a direct relation of trust and confidence between the shadow director 
and the company.11 In Popely v Popely,12 Hacon QC (sitting in the High Court) 
mentions the principles relevant to de facto director. They are:  
"[s/he must] be part of the corporate governing structure of the company.... 
[and] assumed a role in the company which imposed on him the fiduciary 
duties of a director.... [which] assessed objectively by reference to all the 
relevant evidence. Merely being involved in the management of the 
company or exercising a degree of influence over its decision making is 
not in itself enough. An act will qualify as an act done in the capacity of a 
de facto director if the corporate governance of the company requires that 
an act of that nature can be done only by someone having the capacity of 
a de jure director. If the individual enjoyed some other capacity in which 
he could properly have done the act, it will not have been done as a de 
facto director. It is possible for an individual to be simultaneously a de 
facto director and a shadow director of a company. The capacity in which 
he acts in relation to the company will depend on the nature of the act. 
 
9  Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Deverell [2001] Ch. 340. 
10 [1996] B.C.C. 155. 
11 Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Gary Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) at 1286. 
12 [2019] EWHC 1507 (Ch) at 88. 
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[But] an act cannot be simultaneously carried out both in the capacity of a 
shadow director and a de facto director". 
In examining the scope and nature of the general duties of company directors, 
some practical problems arise. In s 170(5) of the Act the extent to which general 
duties apply to shadow directors is explained by stating that the general duties 
apply to the extent applicable to corresponding common law rules or equitable 
principles. This formulation may have been contested by the Grand Committee 
in the House of Lords, since the comprehensive application of the duties may 
not be appropriate.13 The Committee proposed to amend the phrase to "to the 
extent it is reasonable, just and equitable for any such general duty to apply".14 
The aim is to grant courts discretion in deciding whether or not to apply the 
duties to shadow directors in a proportionate manner.15 Although the 
government refused to change the wording of the law, the government 
acknowledged that it was important not to place shadow directors in a worse 
position than directors, where directors might be relieved from liability in some 
circumstances, other than shadow directors.16 Accordingly, it does not prevent 
courts from considering the application of duties on a case by case basis or 
from relying on existing case law.17 After the Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Act 2015 came into force, s 170(5) of the Act has been amended 
to read as “(5) The general duties apply to a shadow director of a company 
where and to the extent that they are capable of so applying.”18 
The problem for shadow directors is that they cannot meet two duties, duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest and duty not to accept benefits from third parties. The 
reason for this lies in their not claiming or acting as directors of the company.19 
In Instant Access Properties v Rosser,20 Rosser was alleged to have violated 
the duty not to accept benefits from third parties and the duty to avoid conflicts 
 
13 Baroness Neville-Rolfe, Hansard, Grand Committee, Column GC338(19 January 2015).  
14 Ibid, Column GC337-338. 
15 Ibid, Column GC338. 
16 Ibid. 
17 The Explanatory Notes for Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, s 89. 
18 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 s 89.  
19Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd [1994] B.C.C. 161; Hansard, Grand Committee, Column GC339 (19 
January 2015). 
20Instant Access Properties v Rosser, [2018] EWHC 756 (Ch). 
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of interest. Rosser denied breaching duty not to accept benefits from third 
parties, and with regard to the duty to avoid conflicts of interest said he 
disclosed the dispute to the board and the shareholders. These differences in 
duties between directors and shadow directors were to be taken into 
consideration by the legislature when drafting the law. On the other hand, there 
are those who look at the positive aspect of the harshness of the law on shadow 
directors as the consequences will be good for promoting loyalty and care from 
those who are involved in guiding companies.21 
In the SACL 2015, there is no explicit definition of a director, despite the 
importance of its definition, as if the Saudi legislator believes that the word 
“director” is clear, without the need to clarify it by definition. Instead of defining 
what a director is, the Saudi legislator clarifies what a director shall undertake 
and what shall not undertake of actions.22 As if Saudi legislator believes that 
defining the director by their work and actions better than establishing a 
definition. Unlike the UK legislator, the Saudi legislator does not address the 
shadow director issue. The legislator repeatedly stipulated that the company 
shall be managed by one or more appointed directors and the company shall 
be bound by any acts performed by the appointed directors, which may mean 
it is implied that in KSA there is non-recognition of shadow directors and de 
facto directors in the face of commitments purported to be undertaken by the 
company towards a third party.23 The simple truth here is that the position is 
unclear in Saudi Arabian law. 
By examining Saudi Arabian Commercial Court cases, a single case implicitly 
recognised de facto directors. In the suit before the Commercial Court,24 the 
company claimed for compensation for the company's losses against its 
director. The director defended this claim by asserting that he was a fictitious 
director, as he was appointed only to complete the administrative procedures 
required to register the company, and days after the completion of the 
administrative procedures to register the company, a brother of one of the 
 
21 S Witney, Duties owed by shadow directors: closing in on the puppet masters?, [2016] J.B.L. 
321. 
22 SACL 2015 arts 31 and 32. 
23 SACL 2015 arts 23, 68 and 164. 
24 The Saudi Arabian Commercial Court judgments, 1289/Q (2016). 
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shareholders was appointed as a director by the shareholders’ decision, but his 
name was not officially registered as the company director in the company's 
register with the Ministry of Commerce. Also, the new director had an office in 
the company in the name of the general director’s office, he was meeting 
employees and clients in it, also he has the power to issuing orders and signing 
documents belong to the company. As for the defendant (fictitious director), he 
was divested of his powers and his work became more like the work of the 
secretary. Accordingly, the court ruled that the claim rejected and that the 
compensation claim should arise against the actual director who was appointed 
by the shareholders’ decision. 
2.1.2 Appointment of directors  
A company, as a legal person, is not able to do legal acts that fall within the 
scope of its purpose except by the agency of a natural person who is a director. 
The CA 2006 and SACL 2015 define the provisions on corporate governance 
in terms of the number of directors, the methods of appointment and specific 
terms in directors. 
The appointment of company directors is subject to several requirements, such 
as a specific required age of the directors and minimum numbers of directors. 
The UK laws identify the legal age for occupying the position of company 
director as stated in the CA 2006 that, a director must be attained sixteen years 
old for the appointment to be valid;25 and the Secretary of State has the power 
to enact a provision for exceptions from the minimum age requirement.26 
Whereas the SACL 2015 does not state the minimum legal age for occupying 
the position of director, although there is a decision to determine the age of 
majority by the age of eighteen years by the Shura Council - the kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia.27 The CA 2006 also identifies the director of a company as a 
person who occupies the position of director, by whatever name called as long 
as the required minimum number of the natural person directors is met28, while 
before the CA 2006, a company was eligible to be appointed as a director of 
 
25 CA 2006 s 157. 
26 CA 2006 s 158.  
27 The Shura Council decree (114) in 1955. 
28 CA 2006 ss250 and 155. 
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another company without any required minimum number of the natural person 
directors.  However, after the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 
2015 goes into force, non-natural legal entities will not be able to act as 
company directors, as s 87 states that the directors of all companies must be 
only natural persons, with some powers for the Secretary of State to exclude 
cases in which non-natural legal entities may be appointed as a director of a 
company. 
The reason for prohibiting the use corporate directors as a director is to 
encourage transparency, which reflects the common concerns among the G-
20 and OECD regarding disclosure of company ownership and control.29 It is 
recognised that companies can only act through their directors, which is the 
case for corporate directors, where they have to follow the instructions of their 
boards which may be the boards of these companies are companies 
'commercial entities'.30This restriction is coming for the undesirable chain of 
command because in this chain the directors of the company can be hidden 
and exploited this in matters other than illegal.31It is also in case a corporate 
director is a shadow director or de facto director, there will be an obstacle to 
prove it.32 Therefore, those who control a corporate director are relatively 
isolated from the consequences of decisions taken with regard to the company 
they manage.33 
However, abuse by some does not mean harming other companies that 
legitimately benefit from existing flexibility, so it is required at least one natural 
person as a director in the CA 2006, if necessary to hold the company 
accountable or take direct responsibility.34While, the SACL 2015 allows any 
legal person to be a director of a company, even if such the legal person is not 
 
29G20/OECD, ‘Principles of Corporate Governance’ (2015) I/A. 
30 Report of the Company Law Committee (June 1962), Cm.1749 , The Report of the Patton 
Committee on Company Law Amendment in Northern Ireland (para 17). 
31Jason Ellis, The Continued Appointment of Corporate Directors: An Examination of the Effect 
of S.87of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, (2016), 37 Company Law. 
203, 204. 
32Re Hydrodan (Corby) Ltd [1994] B.C.C. 161. 
33Secretary of State v Hall [2006] EWHC 1995 (Ch); [2009] B.C.C. 190; Report of the Company 
Law Committee (June 1962), Cm.1749, The Report of the Patton Committee on Company Law 
Amendment in Northern Ireland (para 17). 
34 White Paper "Company Law Reform" (March 2005), Cm.6456, para.3.3. 
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a natural person such as a holding company, managing its subsidiaries or 
taking part in the management of other companies in which, it holds shares.35 
Companies might be administered by more than one director because of its 
need or in accordance with its memorandum of association. Although the CA 
2006 expressly states that the number of directors must not be less than one 
director in a private company and two directors in a public company36, it must 
comply with the minimum number of directors that is prescribed in the 
company's articles and if a company has fewer than prescribed, the directors 
cannot act unless there is a provision in its articles addresses this situation.37 
While in the SACL 2015 and SACGR 2019, a specific number of directors is not 
addressed, except to require the number of members of the board of directors 
is specified so that not less than three and not more than eleven members and 
the law mandates the administration of a joint stock company to its board of 
directors.38 
In this context, it is worth address the diversity of the composition of boards, as 
pressure is mounting on the boards to have a policy of diversity in the boards 
and gender balance in senior management and its relation to the strategy of the 
company and how to implement it.39 The SACL 201540 and related laws do not 
provide for any promotion of the diversity of the composition of boards. Rather, 
SACL 2015 only requires that a board member shall have the required 
experience and competence. However, Saudi Arabia's Vision 203041 aims to 
increase women’s participation in the workforce from 22% to 30% in 2030. The 
indicators of the first half of 2020 showed through the report issued by the Saudi 
Arabian General Authority for Statistics that empowering Saudi women and 
increasing the share of their participation in the labour market has increased 
 
35 SACL 2015 art 183(a). 
36 CA 2006 s 154.  
37 See Re Alma Spinning Co, Bottomleum Co (1880) 16 ChD 681; Re Scottish Petroleum Co, 
(1883) 23 ChD 413. 
38 SACL 2015 art 86(1). 
39 The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018, Principle J prevision 23 p.9. 
40 SACL 2015 art 70. 




from 25.9% Q1/2020 to 31.4% in Q2/2020.42 However, the debate about the 
advantages and disadvantages of diversity cannot be underestimated. Of 
diversity advantages, enhancing the independence and creativity and 
stimulates the board on the diversity of different perspectives; the presence of 
personalities from different backgrounds and ethnic experiences means finding 
different solutions to problems in a company and making decisions at a high 
level of quality.43 The diversity is also a professional incentive which is an 
incentive for employees to do their best for career advancement regardless of 
race or gender and the like.44 The benefit of diversity is about public relations 
and social responsibility in terms of understanding the needs of society and 
enhancing the company's reputation in the view of the public, the media and 
the government is clear.45 
By contrast, diversity has potential disadvantages. One of these shortcomings 
is conflict, lack of cooperation and inadequate communication. The problem 
may be the possibility of a lack of communication between senior executives 
and minority outside directors.46 Diversity may also result in a preference for 
directors with insufficient experience or qualifications only for increasing the 
diversity in the board.47 
The CA 2006 does not explicitly specify who is responsible for appointing 
company's directors although it stipulates that it must be included in the 
registration application that, a statement of the company’s proposed officers 
which contain the person who is to be the first director of the company.48 The 
appointment of directors is usually in accordance with the provisions of the 
articles of the company. In case of the absence of the provisions of the directors' 
 
42 See Labor market statistics Q2 2020 by the Saudi Arabian General Authority for Statistics at 
<https://www.stats.gov.sa/sites/default/files/LM_2Q2020%20%28Press%20release_EN%20%
29.pdf> [accessed on 4 December 2020]. 
43 Ferreira, D. (2011). Board Diversity. In Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, 
Research, and Practice (pp. 225-242). John Wiley and Sons, p. 227; Rao, K. & Tilt, C. J Bus 
Ethics (2016) 138: 327. p.337 available at <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2613-5> 
Accessed on 16 November 2018;Erhardt, N., Werbel, J., & Shrader, C. (2003). Board of 
Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance. Corporate Governance: An International 
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45 Ferreira (n 43) p. 228; Rao & Tilt (n 43) p.338-339. 
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48 CA 2006 s9(4)(c) and s12(1)(a). 
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appointment, the appointment shall be made by the members of the company 
who have an inherent power to appoint directors by an ordinary resolution or by 
a decision of the directors.49 In all cases of the appointment a person as a 
director of a company, it is required a desire of the person in order to be valid 
appointment.50 The SACL 2015 differentiates between the types of companies 
in the appointment of directors and specifies the shareholders as the 
responsible for appointing directors in companies in general, whether such an 
appointment is stipulated in the articles of association or in a separate contract. 
In the joint stock company, a board of directors, that is appointed by the 
constituent general meeting for the first board of directors and then by the 
regular general assembly, is responsible for the administration of the 
company51 and appoint the Chief Executive Officer of the Company.52 It also 
must call the regular general meeting to convene when the number of directors’ 
falls below the minimum prescribed to achieve the quorum by electing the 
required minimum number.53 
It can be said that the appointment of directors can occur in two ways, the first 
directors and the subsequent directors’ appointments. The model articles for 
public companies 2008 state that the first directors’ appointment, which usually 
the appointment of first directors be in accordance with the provisions of the 
company articles; and in the case of the provisions absence of the directors' 
appointment, the appointment shall be made by the company members who 
have an inherent power to appoint directors by an ordinary resolution or by a 
 
49 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) reg 20. 
50 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) reg 17 (the phrase "who 
is willing" is a condition in order to be the appointment valid.); In Re CEM Connections Ltd, 
[2000] BCC 917the official receiver sought the disqualification of a director. The director 
contended that the application should be dismissed on the basis that she had not been 
appointed as a director. The official receiver submitted that the director had signed form 288 
recording her consent. However, the application in respect of the director and seeking the 
disqualification was dismissed, on the grounds that the director had not been validly appointed 
as a director of the company. Whilst the signing of form 288 was prima facie evidence that a 
person had consented to act as a director, there was strong evidence in the instant case that 
the director had not been aware of the true nature of any of the forms she had signed. 
51 SACL 2015 arts 25, 63, 86, 75 and 164(1). 
52 SACGR 2019 art 25(3). 
53 SACL 2015 art 70(2). 
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decision of the directors. This director must retire from office at the first annual 
general meeting unless they are reappointed by the members54.  
The subsequent directors’ appointment can be made after the appointment of 
the company's first directors, as the company, by the members or directors, 
might need to appoint other directors either a supplement the quorum stipulated 
in the CA 2006 or in the company's articles, or fill a vacancy due to a director's 
resignation from office. The 2008 model articles grant the members the powers 
to appoint a person as a director by an ordinary resolution.55 It is worth noting 
that the appointment motion of two or more directors, at a general meeting of a 
public company, must not be made by a single resolution unless this resolution 
has first been agreed to by the meeting without any vote being given against 
it.56 The model articles of 2008 also empower directors to appoint a person as 
a director in the company57. This power may be exercised to complete the 
minimum quorum of the company, provided for in the CA 2006 and in the 
company's articles, so that the directors can act to administration the company 
after the quorum is achieved. The model articles for public companies 2008 
state that a director who is appointed by the directors must retire from office at 
the first annual general meeting unless they are reappointed by the members58. 
2.1.3 Removal of directors 
As the appointment of the director has methods, the removal of the director has 
also methods and provisions defined by the CA 2006 and the SACL 2015 and 
other relevant laws. In UK laws, the removal of directors has ways whether by 
a resolution of the members, resignation or under the constitution and articles 
of the company. 
The company's members have significant legal authorities. The CA 2006 grants 
the company's members the power to remove a director from office at any time 
by issuing an ordinary resolution for this purpose, regardless of the existence 
 
54 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) reg 20 and 21(1). 
55 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) reg 20(a). 
56 CA 2006 s 160(1). 
57 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) reg 20(b). 
58 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) reg 21(1). 
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of any terms in the contractual agreement between the director and the 
company.59 However, this resolution must be at a meeting of the company, in 
accordance with the required procedures.60 The director may also protest 
against the removal resolution and hear it at the meeting.61 Removal of the 
directors from their office at any time regardless of the existence of any terms 
in the contractual agreement between the directors and the company does not 
mean that they are deprived of their rights, the provisions of their contracts with 
the company are applied including compensations for dismissal during the 
period of validity of their contracts.62 
In this regard, it should be noted that the power of the members to remove 
directors from their position by ordinary decision does not mean the derogating 
of any power that may exist apart from the CA 2006.63 In Bushell v Faith,64 there 
were 3 members and each member owned 100 shares. In the articles of 
association, each share shall be equal to one vote. But, in the case of a vote 
on the dismissal of a director, the director shall have 3 votes for each share. 
Two of the members decided to remove the third member from the position of 
a director and they thought that they had 200 votes against 100. But the reality 
was they had 200 votes against 300 votes. The members objected to the fact 
that the weighted votes infringed s184 of the Companies Act 1948 and 
appealed to abolish it. Since there is nothing in the Companies Act and common 
law to prevent some shares from being given special voting rights, the court 
affirmed that the provision in the articles of association was not contrary to s184 
and was therefore not void. Thus, the director cannot be removed save by a 
special resolution or an extraordinary resolution or in any agreement between 
the company and the director. The two members' appeal was dismissed. The 
judgment in Bushell v Faith65  has been criticised as it is contrary to the spirit of 
s184 of the Companies Act 1948. Also, the judgment promotes the idea of “a 
mockery of the law” and it nullifies the existence of the legal provisions to 
 
59 CA 2006 s 168. 
60 CA 2006 ss 169, 228, 303 and 338. 
61 CA 2006 s 169. 
62 CA 2006 s 168. 
63 CA 2006 s 168(5)(b). 
64 [1970] A.C. 1099. 
65 [1970] A.C. 1099. 
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remove directors.66 In addition, the validity of weighted voting clauses in the UK 
indicates legal provisions can be manipulated, thereby losing their practical 
worth. 67 
Directors may also wish to terminate their appointment by resignation for any 
reason.68 This resignation must be in accordance with the required procedures 
in the articles of association of the company and the terms of the contractual 
agreement between the director and the company. Otherwise, the company 
shall have the right to refuse the resignation. The resignation may not 
necessarily mean the termination of the relationship between the director and 
the company; directors may then be liable for their resignation in accordance 
with wrongful trading provisions.69 Directors who have resigned are also still 
subject to the duty set out in s 175 duty to avoid conflicts of interest, with respect 
to the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity of which they 
became aware during the time they occupied the director position; and the duty 
under s176 duty not to accept benefits from third parties, in respect of matters 
completed or omitted by them prior to their ceased from serving as director.70 
The company's constitution may also provide for some cases where a director 
must be removed from the office. The Model Articles 200871 specify some cases 
that lead to the termination of the directors' appointment automatically. Of these 
cases the existence of a bankruptcy order against the directors or making any 
composition with their creditors in general, also if a director is physically or 
mentally unable to act as a director and may remain so for more than three 
months on the written report by a medical practitioner, or suffers from a mental 
disorder, a court makes an order prohibiting, in whole or in part, that person 
 
66 Cassim, R. (2019). The Device of Weighted Votes in Blocking the Removal of Directors from 
Office under the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008. 63(2), 281-302. 
67 Griffin, S., Hirst, Michael, & Walton, Peter. (2006). Company law: Fundamental principles 
(4th ed.). Harlow: Pearson Longman, 288. 
68The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) private companies reg 
18(f), public companies reg 22(f). 
69 Insolvency Act 1986 s 214. 
70 CA 2006 s 170(2). 
71 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) reg 18 of privet companies 
and reg 22 of public companies. 
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from exercising any powers or rights in person. Companies also have the full 
right to add other reasons in their articles to terminate directors' appointment. 
In SACL 2015 the removal of directors from their position has ways and 
circumstances. This removal depends largely on the form of the company and 
the circumstances of the director. In General Partnerships, the removal of a 
director depends on two main things which are first, is the director a partner in 
the company or not? Secondly, has the director been appointed in the General 
Partnerships’ articles of association or in a separate contract? In the case that 
the director is a partner in the company there are two cases. (1) If the director 
has been appointed in the articles of association, then in this case s/he has 
immunity against the termination except by a decision issued by the competent 
judicial authority at the request of the majority of partners.72 The removal of a 
director other than this manner (the judicial authority) shall entail the dissolution 
of the general partnership unless the general partnership’s articles of 
association provides otherwise.73 (2) While if the director is a partner and s/he 
has been appointed in a separate contract, then in this case s/he may be 
terminated by an ordinary resolution from the partners.74 Finally, with respect 
to General Partnerships, if the director is not a partner, s/he may have office 
terminated by a resolution from the partners, whether the director has been 
appointed in the articles of association or in a separate contract.75 
Similarly, in the resignation of a director, the managing partner appointed in the 
articles of association must not resign unless for a cogent reason, otherwise 
s/he shall be liable for the compensation and her/his resignation shall result in 
the dissolution of the General Partnership unless the articles of association 
provides otherwise.76 A non-partner director appointed in the articles of 
association or a director appointed by a separate contract, whether a partner or 
non-partner, may resign provided that the resignation occurs on the right time 
and the director notifies the partners before the resignation takes effect at a 
 
72 SACL 2015 arts 33 and 34; the term 'partners' is used in the official translation of SACL 2015 
rather than the terms 'members or shareholders'. 
73 SACL 2015 art 33(1). 
74 SACL 2015 art 33(2). 
75 SACL 2015 art 33(2). 
76 SACL 2015 art 34(1). 
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reasonable period, otherwise the director shall be responsible for a 
compensation.77 
In a limited liability company, the shareholders have full freedom to remove a 
director, whether the director is appointed in the company's articles of 
association or in a separate contract, without prejudice to their right to 
compensation due to removal.78 The SACGR 2019 stipulates that the ordinary 
general assembly may dismiss all or any of the board members of directors at 
all time. The ordinary general assembly also, upon the recommendation of the 
board of directors, may terminate the membership of absent members of the 
board of directors from attending three consecutive meetings without a 
legitimate excuse.79 
2.1.4 Directors’ disqualification 
Many companies follow the approach of separation between ownership and 
control that is the basis of the agency's theory, which takes into account the 
difference that may arise between directors and shareholders in the 
management of the company. This separation is due to the creation of limited 
liability companies. This created significant difficulties in respect of how 
companies with limited liability status could be effectively controlled. 
Recognition of this limiting liability has prevented the courts from looking to the 
members for reparation more than the extent of their shareholding when the 
company is caused damage to individuals or the environment. Therefore, there 
are many restrictions on an investor's ability to deal with bad practices within 
companies. One of the aims of this separation of ownership and control is for 
companies to look beyond shareholders to broader stakeholders, as companies 
avoid actions that could put employees or the public at risk, delay payment of 
creditors, or embrace risky ventures just to increase revenue.80 However, this 
theory is not enough to curb the drivers of human behaviour that may affect 
directors' decisions. In order to ensure that directors comply with their duties 
 
77 SACL 2015 art 34(2)(3). 
78 SACL 2015 art 165(1). 
79 SACGR 2019 art 19(a). 
80 Alsharqawi, A., (2019) Separation of Ownership and Control in Corporate Governance, 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, Vol.84, 65-72, DOI: 10.7176/JLPG. 
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towards the company, to maintain the integrity of businesses environment and 
to protect stakeholders from those who misuse limited liability, the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 was enacted to disqualify a person for a 
specified period from being a company director. 
It was the former position that disqualification of directors could only be by the 
courts, but in the Insolvency Act 2000 an administrative equivalent was added 
to the order of judicial disqualification, the so-called disqualification 
undertaking, and was voluntary without the need for judicial proceedings.81 This 
administrative equivalent has the same effect as the court order, once it is 
accepted by the Secretary of State and can only be amended by order of the 
court. The benefit of this administrative equivalent is not to incur trial costs on 
the directors disqualified.82 
It should be noted that the directors’ disqualification proceedings are 
considered as a civil process, but the violation of the order of disqualification is 
the commission of a criminal offence and can be fined and sent to prison for up 
to two years, and extend the period of disqualification and impose personal 
liability for any debts incurred by the company during that period.83 It has been 
agreed that the entry of a director into illegal transactions is a sufficient reason 
for disqualification as a director on the basis of unfitness.84 In view of the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the disqualification of directors 
can be classified as disqualification due to misconduct and unfitness. 
Misconduct includes conviction a person of an indictable offence in respect of 
the company or a continuing default with respect to the provisions of the 
companies’ legislation requiring any return, account or documents that must be 
provided to the registrar of companies.85 The discovery of the commission of 
fraudulent trading during the liquidation of the company and participation in 
wrongful trading or the fact that a person exercises as a director and has an 
 
81 Insolvency Act 2000, s 6. 
82 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and Failed Companies: A Guide to Director 
Disqualification, November 2017, p.4. 
83 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, ss 13, 14 and 15. 
84 See Re Looe Fish Ltd. [1993] BCLC 1160. 
85 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, ss 2 and 3. 
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undischarged bankruptcy of all this within the misconduct.86 In all previous 
cases, misconduct is considered regardless of whether the company was within 
or outside the UK. 
As for disqualification due to unfitness, based on a satisfactory application that 
the conduct of a person as a director of a company is unfit to be concerned in 
the management of a company; or appeared to the Secretary of State for the 
public interest based on a report inspectors disqualify a person from being a 
director.87The legislator grants the court the discretion to determine whether the 
director is unfitness, taking into account, among other things, a violation of 
fiduciary or other duties of directors; or mismanagement of the company in non-
compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act to maintain the accounting 
records and records of directors, secretaries and members, or failure to achieve 
the annual return and other matters contained in the Companies Act.88 
In view of the reasons for the disqualification of directors mentioned above, it is 
clear that they are closely linked to the application of the general duties of 
directors as required without prejudice to them. This is because the breach of 
the duties mentioned in the CA 2006, is considered to be either misconduct 
such as breaching the duty not to accept benefits from third parties; or unfitness 
such as breaching the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence.89 
It is worth addressing the matter of the impact of conduct in the event that it 
occurs outside the United Kingdom on directors’ disqualification. The UK laws 
are clear in the application of the disqualification of directors in the event of 
what would be considered misconduct, regardless of whether the company was 
within or outside the UK. This may be for protecting the UK labour market by 
allowing the Secretary of State to seek to prevent them from managing 
companies.90 On the contrary, if a person is convicted of misconduct within the 
United Kingdom, is there an external influence in a country where there are no 
similar regulations to be disqualified. As is well known, because of the principle 
 
86 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, ss 4, 10 and 11. 
87 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, ss 6 and 8. 
88 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 9, and Schedule 1. 
89 CA 2006, ss 171-177. 
90 CA 2006, s 1184; Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, s 104 (5A). 
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of sovereignty there can be no obligation not to exercise a person in a country 
where these regulations are not applied. However, the Supreme Court in Bilta 
(UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Nazir,91 unanimously held that section 213 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 on fraudulent trading has an extraterritorial effect because 
the effect of winding up of a company could not be regional but extended all 
over the world. 
In Saudi Arabia, there is no explicit law for the disqualification of directors, but 
there are some regulations not to nominate for the position of the board of 
directors any person who has been convicted of an offence against honesty.92 
There are also rules to form the boards of directors of the joint stock companies, 
in that they consist of persons who meet the conditions of expertise and 
adequacy of the honesty, in addition to not being a state employee, not being 
convicted of a crime, not being insolvent or bankrupt, not acting in a manner 
otherwise in financial markets, commercial business rules, not being a member 
of more than five listed companies, having scientific and practical experience, 
committed to the provisions of the laws, regulations and instructions, have 
sufficient time to work and having independent judgment and non-conflict of 
interest.93 The Saudi Arabian legislator should enact a law that is similar to the 
UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 to protect companies and the 
Saudi Arabian market, provided that its provisions do not contradict the 
provisions of Islamic law94 and human rights principles. For further details see 
para 7.3.2 (Tenth point at p. 229). 
2.2 Legal principles with respect to the board of directors 
2.2.1 Board structure 
The board of directors is considered as the most important part of a company 
in terms of coordinating interactions within the company's boundaries, 
organising relations, enforcing internal regulations, developing strategies for 
 
91 [2015] UKSC 23.  
92 SACGR 2019 art 65(2). 
93 Decree of the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Investment, No 24233, 24/04/2016. 
94 Sharia (Islamic law) does not prohibit this, provided that the procedures are fair and for the 
purpose of achieving the public interest(benefit), not just for the punishment or harm to the 
person (director). It is left to the judge's discretion. 
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the company, delegating responsibilities and monitoring implementation. The 
board is also responsible for overseeing the company's procedures and 
appointing directors. The board of director or the supervisory board in two-tier 
board acts on behalf of the shareholders in the monitoring capacity. All in order 
to solve the problem of collective action in accordance with corporate 
governance regulations. 
The Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company (SE) 
recognises that the board can be constituted from one of two forms; one-tier or 
two-tier board.95 The one-tier board consists of independent executive and non-
executive directors working collectively.96 The board of directors (one-tier 
board), which manages the company, is appointed at the shareholder meeting, 
and then the board selects some of its members to work in the monitoring 
process. Shareholders also have ultimate power over the composition of the 
management control committee and the selection of its members.97 The one-
tier board is considered as the traditional model of the board of directors and is 
most common in most global economies,98 as is often the case in UK, US, and 
Saudi companies.99 It has two main functions. The first, it is considered as the 
executive body of the company, and it is obliged to ensure that the company's 
business conforms to the Companies Act and the related laws; as well as the 
implementation of working methods on behalf of shareholders. The second, the 
one-tier board working as a major institutional tool by which shareholders are 
supposed to be able to hold directors responsible for their actions as a business 
director.100 Therefore, this board is often described as combining the 
responsibilities between monitoring and consultation.101 These include a 
 
95 The Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company (SE) 2157/2001 Art.38. 
96  Glau, T. (2009). Lessons from Germany: Improving on the U.S. Model for Corporate 
Governance. International Law and Management review, 5, at 237. 
97 Ghezzi, F., and Malberti, C. (2008). The Two-Tier Model and the One-Tier Model of Corporate 
Governance in the Italian Reform of Corporate Law. European Company and Financial Law 
Review, 5(1), at 16-17. 
98 Glau,T (n 96) 237. 
99 SACL 2015 art 68(1); SACGR 2019 art 17 and 22. 
100 Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson and Michael Wright, Corporate governance: accountability, 
enterprise and international comparisons, John Wiley & Sons, 2005, p.104; Paul Davies and 
Klaus Hopt "Boards in Europe–Accountability and convergence. The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Vol. 61, No. 2 (2013), pp. 301-375. 
101 Francois Belot, Edith Ginglinger, Myron B. Slovin and Marie E. Sushka,“Freedom of Choice 
between Unitary and Two-Tier Boards: An Empirical Analysis” October 1, 2013, Journal of 
Financial Economics (JFE), 112(3), 364. 
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number of responsibilities identified by Boland in six general responsibilities. 
These responsibilities are in appointing and supervising directors, providing 
guidance for the company, establishing policies based on governance, 
controlling the company and the relationship with executives, commitment to 
the credit obligation and supervision.102  
As for the two-tier board, the advisory and supervisory responsibilities are 
divided between two boards, supervision and management boards.103 The 
supervisory board shall be appointed directly at the shareholders' meeting.104 
The total number of board members ranges from 3 to 21 members.105 Then this 
supervisory board appoints the directors of management board and it also has 
the right to remove the members of the management board at any time.106 
Nevertheless, the supervisory board cannot participate directly in the 
management of the company, except in some cases where the management 
board is required an approval by the supervisory board for a decision.107 
Therefore, this model can be considered based on the principle of separation 
of ownership and control,108 which gives shareholders limited powers 
represented in the appointment and removal of members of the supervisory 
board.109 The management board consists of executive directors, who 
determine the company's purposes, implement the necessary measures, 
supervising the company's operations in managing the business jointly, 
managing the manpower, coordinating the tasks, maintaining the books of 
accounts and so on.110 The supervisory board consists of non-executive 
directors and employees; and the board has a supervisory role to review 
management decisions and annual reports, overseeing the appointment, 
removal and monitoring of directors on the management board. This board can 
 
102 Boland, M., & Hofstrand, D. (2009). The role of the board of directors. Iowa State University, 
File C5-71, 2013. 
103 Francois Belot, Edith Ginglinger, Myron B. Slovin and Marie E. Sushka, (n 101) 364 
104 Ghezzi, F., and Malberti, C (n 97) 13.  
105  Section 95 AktG, section 7 MitbestG, sections 4 para. 1, 9 Montan-MitbestG; Section 96 
para. 2 sent. 1, para. 3 AktG, section 7 para. 
106 Ghezzi, F., and Malberti, C (n 97) 16-17. 
107 Glau,T (n 96) 237. 
108 Ghezzi, F., and Malberti, C (n 97) 9. 
109 Ibid, 20-21. 
110 Jungmann, Carsten, The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier 
Board Systems - Evidence from the UK and Germany, European Company and Financial Law 
Review, Vol. 3, No. 4, 426 - 474, 437 (2006). 
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be also considered as a representative of shareholders, stakeholders and other 
parties,111 which achieves a balance between all interests in the company.112 
The two-tier board may be a temporary solution in Saudi Arabia to the problem 
of directors or board of directors not complying with their duties and Corporate 
Governance best practice. This is because the two-tier board is a useful 
mechanism in delegating the business to qualified directors. It also could be a 
temporary solution that maintaining the interest of creditors in certain 
circumstances; where this board achieves greater transparency because of the 
balance of power between management and monitoring and enhanced 
response to stakeholders. This thesis argues that reforming the substantive law 
is much better through reforming the directors' duties by imposing a duty to take 
into account the interests of creditors in certain circumstances and clarifying the 
liabilities that may be deterring to those who may think to breach the duties. 
The one-tier board is characterised by being simpler than the two-tier board 
and it also provides a faster and more efficient decision-making process113 and 
a higher flow of information, which contains a larger number of meetings and 
committees, which in turn brings a wide range of information. This board also 
has permanent contact with the company's executives which can promote 
relationships and better understanding of business. Furthermore, non-
executive directors participate in the decision-making process and are not 
limited to subsequent monitoring of decisions.114 In the one-tier board the 
management and supervision are carried out by one administrative body, and 
therefore its board has broad discretionary powers to delegate authority. It may 
also grant directors who are non-members of the board significant power.115  
However, in the 1990s, the one-tier board was criticised for the collapse of a 
number of companies due to mismanagement, which was a result of the weak 
role played by non-executive directors, which later proved that many non-
 
111 section 7 para. 2 MitbestG, section 6 para. 3 Montan-MitbestG; section 100 para. 2 sent. 2 
AktG; sections 394, 395 AktG. 
112 Sections 100 para. 1 sent. 1, 119 para. 1 No. 1 AktG. 
113 Francois Belot, Edith Ginglinger, Myron B. Slovin and Marie E. Sushka, (n 101) 364. 
114 Jungmann, Carsten (n16) 16, 60-64. 
115 Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt (n 100) 25. 
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executive hiring decisions were made by executives.116 This means that a 
personal relationship may play a role in effective appointment and control, 
which casts doubt on the independence of the board and thus the failure to 
monitor the executives and act on an equal footing with them.117 By contrast, 
boards with a large number of independent members have enjoyed greater 
freedom and better performance.118 Therefore, the UK Corporate Governance 
Code 2018 is consistent with the Cadbury report that the board of directors must 
consist of a number of executive and non-executive directors and at least 50% 
of the board are independent non-executive directors, so as to prevent control 
of the decision-making process. The Corporate Governance Code 2018 also 
grants non-executive directors a broader prime role to appoint and remove 
executive directors.119 However, the one-tier board is criticised because having 
independent members is not enough for being neutral because of the personal 
relationship between the members of the board.120 The one-tier is also criticised 
for having to take the decision and monitor it at the same time.121 
The two-tier board is alleged that it is a useful mechanism in delegating the 
business to qualified directors.122 It also achieves greater transparency 
because of the balance of power between management and monitoring and 
enhanced response to stakeholders, thus attracting a higher level of foreign 
investors.123 It also has the advantage of avoiding conflict of interest within the 
board with regard to judicial proceedings, as the supervisory board represents 
 
116  Mahmoud Ezzamel and Robert Watson, Wearing two hats: the conflicting control and 
management roles of non-executive directors, Corporate governance, 1997, 54-79; Kevin 
Keasey, Steve Thompson and Michael Wright, eds (n 100) p.10.   
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Michael Wright, eds (n 100) p.10.  
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121  Block, David and Gerstner, Anne-Marie, "One-Tier vs. Two-Tier Board Structure: A 
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the company's claims against the management board, which provides the 
possibility of instituting proceedings against the management.124 However, this 
allegation cannot be proven in practice, because the supervisory board has 
strong motives to avoid instituting proceedings against the management board 
because it proves by instituting proceedings that it has violated its duties.125 As 
in ARAG/Garmenbeck,126 the supervisory board decided not to instituting 
proceedings, and it could not rely on the rule of protecting business judgment. 
Therefore, a higher level of judicial inspection was applied to the supervisory 
board. 
However, the two-tier board is criticised for excessive formalities with regard to 
reporting the supervisory board and the division between the managers and 
monitors. The separation between the supervisory board and the management 
may lead to a lack of information necessary to improve the performance of the 
company. It also increases the company's financial and time costs for the 
meetings between the supervisory and management boards.127 Despite the 
importance and the advantages of independence in the supervisory board from 
the management board, it can be argued that it is not involved in the executive 
procedures and lacks the commercial knowledge from inside the company, 
which lead to a lack of information necessary for the practice of effective 
supervision; it is difficult to understand and assess the effectiveness objectively 
in the management procedures if the considerations are not taken into 
consideration and economic alternatives from the inside.128 Although some 
supervisory boards have taken the option of appointing former members of the 
management board to ensure familiarity with the necessary information, they 
 
124 S.90 of the German Stock Corporation Act 2010.   
125 Hans C. Hirt, “The enforcement of directors' duties in Britain and Germany : a comparative 
study with particular reference to large companies”Peter Lang AG, Euroean Academic 
Publisher, 2004, p.262; 125 ARAG/Garmenbeck, German Supreme Court (BGH), (1997), II ZR 
175/95, In: NJW. 1997, 1926. 
126 ARAG/Garmenbeck, German Supreme Court (BGH), (1997), II ZR 175/95, In: NJW. 1997, 
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127  Aste, L (n 123) 36; Hopt, K., and Leyens, P. (2004). Board Models in Europe – Recent 
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128 Roberts, John; McNulty, Terry; Stiles, Philip, Beyond Agency Conceptions of the Work of 
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have fallen into the dilemma of personal relationships with the board, which 
may significantly affect independence and effective monitoring.129  
It remains to be said that with the adoption of laws for duties on directors to 
protect the interest of stakeholders and with greater monitoring and recognition 
of the growing importance of the one-tier boards through the delegation of many 
powers, for example the audit committee, which consists of independent 
directors, it can be said that the one-tier boards become more similar to two-
tier boards.130 
2.2.2 Directors’ meeting and decision-making 
The directors of the company are appointed to work collectively so that 
everyone participates in decision-making, but they may delegate any of their 
powers to anyone to perform it.131 However, in premium listed companies there 
must be a formal determination either in a schedule or in the annual financial 
report that may be delegated to others and the matters within the competence 
of the board.132 In the Saudi law, delegation of powers of the board is stipulated 
in general, the board may delegate its powers to one of its members or third 
parties and the chairman of the board by a written decision to delegate some 
of her/his powers to other members of the board or to others in carrying out the 
works or specific work.133  
To achieve collective action so that everyone can participate in decision-
making, directors have the all the rights to participate in management, attend 
and vote at the board meeting and express their views freely and take into 
account their decisions at the board meetings.134 In general, the decisions must 
be taken at the meeting in companies that have more than one director. All 
decisions must be taken either by a majority at the meeting or by unanimity so 
that all eligible directors agree "signed" on the decision, even if it is not at the 
 
129 Block, David (n 121) 33. 
130 Ibid, 39, 50-51. 
131 The model articles of association in SI 2008/3229, art 5 of public and privet companies. 
132 The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018, para A.1.1.  
133 SACL 2015 arts 75 and 82. 
134 See Romer LJ in Re H R Harmer Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 62; Jessel MR in Pulbrook v Richmond 
Consolidated Mining Co [1878] 9 ChD 610. 
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meeting. The unanimous decisions shall be formalised in a written decision 
signed by all directors or indicated to the unanimity in the decision. 135 Directors 
in public companies may make fit rules for decision making, in a manner that 
does not conflict with the company's articles.136 The SACL 2015 stipulates that 
decisions are taken by the majority, while unanimous decisions are not 
addressed. However, in urgent matters, the board may adopt resolutions and 
present them to its members individually, unless a member requests in writing 
that the board be convened to deliberate on such resolutions, in which case 
they shall be presented before the board at the first following meeting.137 
In order for the meetings' decisions to be valid, the rules and regulations relating 
to the board meeting must be applied. The meeting must be notified so that any 
director may call to the directors meeting, either by giving notice or by the 
company secretary in any way.138 In addition, the quorum for directors' 
meetings is one of the main reasons for being the meeting decisions valid. The 
model articles of association in SI 2008/3229 stipulates that the quorum is the 
presence of two qualified directors unless the directors decide otherwise.139 In 
the absence of sufficient directors to form a quorum, the directors in office may 
appoint a sufficient number of directors to reach the quorum or may call a 
general meeting for it.140 Accordingly, any decision taken at a meeting that has 
not been quorate is considered null and void.141 In the Saudi law, the quorum 
for valid board decisions is the presence of half of the board members provided 
that is not less than 3 directors. In the absence of sufficient directors, directors 
must call the regular general assembly to convene within sixty days to make up 
the necessary number of directors.142 
 
135 The model articles of association in SI 2008/3229, arts 7 and 8 of public and privet 
companies. 
136 The model articles of association in SI 2008/3229, arts 19 of public companies.  
137 SACL 2015 arts 83 and 84. 
138 The model articles of association in SI 2008/3229, art 8 of public and art 9 of privet 
companies. 
139 The model articles of association in SI 2008/3229, art 10 of public and art 11 of privet 
companies. 
140 The model articles of association in SI 2008/3229, art 11 of public and privet companies. 
141 See Re Greymouth Point Elizabeth Railway and Coal Co Ltd, [1904] 1 Ch 32. 
142 SACL 2015 arts 70 and 83; SACGR 2019 art 32. 
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The meeting of the board is headed by a chairman appointed by the directors 
and they have the right to remove him/her at any time.143 The chairman of a 
premium listed company must be an independent non-executive director.144 It 
cannot be one person who combines the position of Chief Executive Officer and 
chairman of the board, as is also the case in Saudi law, but the Saudi law state 
that the CEO is prohibited to be appointed as chairman, during the first year 
following the end of his/her service.145 
Studies assume that directors are equally involved in directing, controlling and 
monitoring the company activities. In fact, directors are not equally involved in 
making decisions that affect the company’s policy, and there is a wide variation 
in the extent to which the decision-making power is for each director.146 
Perhaps this is due to pre-decision-making influencing factors such as the 
CEO’s power, time constraints, and reputational concerns that make directors 
hesitant to communicate their position and opinion openly.147 Also, some 
directors have more control over decisions than others as members of the 
board committees and the board chairman, which is affecting the participation 
on an equal footing in the company decisions with other directors.148
 
143 The model articles of association in SI 2008/3229, art 12 of public and privet companies. 
144 The UK Corporate Governance Code 2018, A.2.1, A.3.1. 
145 SACGR 2019 arts 24 and 28. 
146 Kim, Seoyoung, Directors' Decision-Making Involvement on Corporate Boards (March 10, 
2015). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1528596 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1528596 35-36. 
147 Malenko, Nadya. (2014). Communication and Decision-Making in Corporate Boards. Review 
of Financial Studies. 27. 1486-1532. 10.2139/ssrn.1712431. 13-15. 
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Chapter Three: The powers and duties of company directors in UK 
law 
3.1 Introduction  
One of the most fundamental aspects of CA 2006 is codifying the general duties 
of the company's directors for the first time. Before the enactment of this law, 
the duties of directors were not codified in a written law but rather left their 
interpretation and application to the provisions of common law and equitable 
principles.1 The reason for this delayed codification may be to obtain a clear 
and comprehensive picture of the duties of the directors. The codification 
evolution was long in gestation as the idea was rejected in the 1920s because 
it was impossible to apply. Until the 1990s the idea of codification was 
considered again to be only partially possible and then it was suggested that 
the codification be so comprehensively that it addresses the most frequently 
used and most influential duties depending on common law and equitable 
principles.2 Perhaps the reason for considering codification again was that 
company's directors, especially in small companies, who did not have a 
permanent legal consultant, were struggling to understand and apply the 
provisions of common law and equitable principles to their duties towards the 
company, because these principles and provisions are wide and complex. The 
stakeholders also faced difficulties in their estimation the scope of directors' 
responsibilities.3 Therefore, the purposes of codifying the duties of directors 
was to enhance the clarity of the law and make it easier for the responsibilities 
of directors towards others to be identified without the need for a legal 
consultant to interpret these duties. It also aims to prevent fraud and 
mismanagement that cause corporate collapse.4 Interestingly, there is no 
independent mention of the fiduciary duty in the general statutory duties, but 
 
1 Marjan Marandi Parkinson, Directors' duty to exercise independent judgment: the path to 
s.173 of CA 2006 and beyond, Comp. Law. 2017, 38(9), 272; Arden (n 6) chapter 1, 1-2. 
2 Company Law Amendment Committee (1925–26) (Cmd 2657), 20; Company Directors: 
Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties, Law Commission 
Consultation Paper No 153, Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 105, part 14.8. 
3 Parkinson (n 1) 1; Arden (n 6) chapter 1, 1-2. 
4 Ibid. 
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the duties, exception of section 174, are enforceable in the same way as the 
fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors.5 
However, there is a criticism of the codification of the general duties, which is 
not self-contained. These duties need recourse to the provisions of common 
law and equitable principles to be fully understood. This opposes the claim that 
the purpose of codifying the general duties is to facilitate understanding and 
awareness of the directors' duties. Because recourse to common law and 
equitable principles requires the assistance of a legal consultant to interpret 
these duties one might wonder whether codification was worthwhile. 
This chapter deals with the laws of the United Kingdom in relation to the duties 
of the company director, in order to compare them with the laws of Saudi Arabia 
in another chapter, and highlighting the legal problems in enforcement these 
duties on the ground through the mechanism of exercising the discretion of 
directors. 
3.2 The directors’ powers 
Although most discussions in this study will be about the directors’ duties, it is 
worthwhile to dwell briefly on the directors' powers. It is also worth 
distinguishing between power and duty. Power is the ability that the law confers 
to do something.6 The duty is the obligation to do something or not to do 
something7 and a duty may restrict exercising powers.8 Under the Model 
Articles 2008, directors are granted broad managerial powers that for the most 
part, the law does not see the need to itemise them.9 Yet as for duties, they 
need to be itemised, because they give rise to obligations and may raise 
liabilities, so the liabilities are the result of a breach of duty.10 
 
5 CA 2006, ss 171-177. 
6 Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, Yale 
University Press (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1920), as posted (2019) on,  
<https://thomasalspaugh.org/pub/fnd/hohfeld.html#Hohfeld1913-sflc> accessed on 6 June 
2020. 
7 Ibid. 
8 See (3.3.1 duty to act within powers). 
9 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) reg 3. 
10 CA 2006 s 178. 
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As already mentioned, the directors’ powers are wide and most of them do not 
need to be itemised, but that in order not to confuse powers with duties, it is 
worth mentioning some examples of the directors' powers. Power to declare a 
dividend. S416 of the CA 2006 provides that the directors’ report, in non-small 
companies, must state the amount (if any) that the directors recommend should 
be paid by way of dividend. This power must be exercised only on the 
distributions are made only out of profits available for the purpose. These profits 
are a company's profits available for distribution are the company's 
accumulated, realised profits, so far as not previously utilised by distribution or 
capitalisation, less its accumulated, realised losses, so far as not previously 
written off in a reduction or reorganisation of capital.11 The power to litigate 
deserve mention. The power to litigate can be considered as one of the general 
managerial powers assigned to the directors by the Model Articles 2008. This 
power also is supported by the court judgment in John Shaw and Sons (Salford) 
Ltd v Shaw,12 three directors held a board meeting and decided to sue other 
directors for their debt to the company. A shareholders’ meeting decided that 
the claim against the other directors should be discontinued and the Court of 
Appeal must strike out the claim on the ground that the directors’ decision, to 
sue the other, had been invalidated by the members. The court held that the 
members had no power to overrule the directors. One of the powers is the 
power to appoint additional directors, see (para 2.1.2 Appointment of directors) 
for further details. Power to make provisions for employees regarding the 
cessation or transfer of the company' business, see (para 3.3.2 Duty to promote 
the success of the company) for further details. Mayson, & others13 provide a 
number of the directors' powers, for example, power to forfeit shares.14 Power 
to refuse to register a transfer of shares. For private companies, the directors 
have the power to refuse to register a transfer. While for public companies, the 
directors can refuse only in relation to partly paid shares.15 Power to circulate 
 
11 CA 2006, s 830. 
12 [1935] 2 KB 113. 
13 French, D., Mayson, Stephen W., & Ryan, Christopher. (2019). Mayson, French & Ryan on 
company law. (Thirty-sixth edition, 2019-2020 edition / Derek French. ed.). Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press. 483. 
14 CA 2006, s 659(2)(c); the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) regs 
58-61. 
15 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) private companies reg 
26(5), public companies, reg 63(5). 
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information to shareholders.16 Power to borrow and give security.17 These are 
all examples of powers, many of which derive their force from the Model 
Articles.  Some powers are explicitly derived from statute: such as the power 
conferred by s. 247 of the Companies Act 2006 to make provision for former 
employees, thereby reversing Parke v Daily News Ltd18. 
3.3 The directors’ duties 
3.3.1 Duty to act within powers 
As we noted above, directors of companies have broad responsibilities for the 
management of the business of the company. These powers are not absolute 
but are subject to restrictions limiting them by either a company’s constitution, 
the purposes so conferred or provisions of the CA 2006. Therefore, the CA 
2006, explicitly stipulates that the directors of companies must act within their 
powers, in accordance with the company's constitution and for the purposes so 
conferred.19 Directors are fiduciaries, therefore. A fiduciary is expected to be 
very loyal to the person who owes their duties (the company) so that there is 
no conflict of duties between the fiduciary and the company, and the fiduciary 
must not benefit from its position as a fiduciary or exercise their powers for 
personal benefit. 
Although s 17 stipulates that the company's constitution is the company’s 
articles and any resolutions and agreements, the CA 2006 does not leave the 
meaning of the resolutions and agreements as a general meaning which 
encompasses all possibilities to prevent the possibility of conflict in 
understanding the meaning. Instead, it defines what resolutions and 
agreements affect a company's constitution. S 29 defines effective resolutions 
and agreements as ones that are agreed by all the members of a company or 
all the members of a class of shareholders or resolutions or agreements that 
 
16 CA 2006, s 311. 
17 See Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation, [1986] Ch 246. 
18 [1962] Ch 927. 
19 CA 2006, ss 17(a) and 171. 
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effectively bind all members of a class of shareholders even though they are 
not agreed to by all those members.20 
Members and shareholders often have different views to directors on what is in 
the best interests of the company. This difference in views usually because of 
the responsibility that rests with directors and the defining the concept of the 
company's success, for example, the company's success may be for 
shareholders is to make profits only, while in the perspective of directors it 
means to achieve the company's objectives and take the responsibility towards 
both the shareholders as a whole and the stakeholders. The direction of 
members and shareholders may collide with whether directors act in the 
company's best interests. Therefore, the power to manage the business of the 
company, as a duty of directors, is based on the principle of division of power 
between directors and members. In Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd21, 
the judge recognised the principle of division of power between directors and 
members. Millers Company decided to allot shares for its urgent need for 
capital. Two of the company's members announced their dissatisfaction and 
would reject any offer of the shares. Howard Company made a bid to Millers to 
allot 4.5 million ordinary shares at a higher price than Ampol. Millers' directors 
took a majority decision to allot and issue shares immediately. The allotment 
and issuance of shares by Millers' directors were contrary to the wishes of the 
company members. Regardless of the directors' objective and the ultimate 
judgment, the principle of division of power between directors and members 
was considered in this case. Lord Wilberforce said, directors might make 
decisions against the majority of shareholders' wishes, and the shareholders 
cannot control the directors in the exercise of these powers during their stay in 
office. According to this principle, the company's constitution is the source of 
authority to directors of the management of the company and often the 
appointment of other directors and taking decisions on matters not assigned for 
management. This principle does not confer on members and shareholders the 
power to interfere in the matters which have been assigned to directors’ control 
 
20 CA 2006, ss 17 and 29.  
21 [1974] A.C. 821.  
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or to direct directors to the mechanism of exercising the powers assigned to 
them. 
Once the management power is granted to directors to manage the company, 
the shareholders and members cannot interfere with decisions made by 
directors, even if these decisions are against the wishes of most shareholders, 
except in limited cases. One of these is with the existence of a special 
resolution, art 4 of the Model Articles 2008, which authorises shareholders to 
direct directors by special resolution to take a specified action or to refrain from 
taking a specified action. However, this is related to a subsequent resolution 
and does not invalidate anything which has been done by directors before the 
passing of the resolution.22 Furthermore, if directors of the company believe 
that a particular course of action is not in the best interests of the company, 
they may refuse to pursue this course of action even if the entire membership 
wishes it to be pursued. This can only be countered if the members ratify to 
pursue it which means relieving the directors from liabilities for breach of 
duties.23 Other than that, members may not interfere in the management of the 
company or direct directors, and members only have the right to remove any 
directors from their office by an ordinary resolution at a meeting.24 
The duty to act within directors’ powers requires directors of a company to act 
in accordance with a company’s constitution as aforementioned and for the 
purposes so conferred. The provisions of the Companies Act and the 
company's constitution are the real source of authority to directors of the 
freedom to exercise the general powers in order to manage the company as a 
going concern in accordance with the purposes for which they are conferred to 
promote the success of the company.25 The exercise of power for purposes 
other than the purposes of the company, described as improper or collateral, is 
an exercise that can be revoked. This species of exercise is punishable not 
because of a mistake but for abuse of powers as it is an illegal act of legal 
 
22 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) reg 4. 
23 CA 2006, s 239. 
24 CA 2006, s 168.  
25 CA 2006, ss 171 and 172; the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229) 
reg 3. 
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authority to exceed the powers granted. In Fairford Water Ski Club v Cohoon,26 
a director was liable for breach of duty to act within powers. One of the main 
allegations was the payment of an annual management charge. The company 
asserted that its directors had no power to pay the annual management charge 
that it had never agreed to. The result was that the transaction was voidable 
and the director was accountable to the company for any profit he had made. 
In Eclairs Group Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas Plc27, directors did what they thought was 
beneficial to promote the success of the company, but their action was 
considered as outside the ambit of their powers. Directors took a majority 
decision to impose restrictions on shareholders' rights (limiting voting rights of 
shareholders). Although this power was derived from the Company's Articles of 
Association, the power used was an improper purpose, which was intended to 
affect the forthcoming shareholders' meeting. Consequently, the decision was 
rescinded because of the improper purpose. This is because the authority they 
had used had been granted for a specific purpose that did not include restricting 
voting rights to shareholders. Consequently, the decision was rescinded for 
violating their duties to act within their powers for improper purpose. However, 
the proper purpose rule is not concerned with exceeding the powers granted 
but with acting within the power conferred by exercising for an improper reason. 
Each company has restricted purposes for the use of directors’ power so the 
use of the power outside its purposes is similar to the use of the power for an 
improper purpose. Langford28  comments on this judgment that the judgment in 
this way leads to a test that takes into account the self-motivation of directors 
but is ultimately an objective test. This test assesses the directors' conduct 
against what the court determines as proper purposes by which a specific 
power can be exercised, and thus places a limit on the directors’ acts. 
Worthington29 also comments on this case by saying, this case provides expose 
for improper purposes, but it does not give rise to certainty. In the end, none of 
the main questions on improper purposes was identified. These questions are. 
 
26 [2020] EWHC 290 (Comm). 
27 [2015] UKSC 71. 
28 Rosemary Langford, The Proper Purpose Rule as a Constraint on Directors’ Autonomy – 
Eclairs Group Limited v JKX Oil & Gas Plc, Modern Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 1, pp. 110-120, 
(2017), 118. 
29 Worthington, S. (2016). Directors' Duties and Improper Purposes. The Cambridge Law 
Journal, 75(2), 213-216. 
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“(1) how to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable balances of 
proper and improper purposes. (2) What consequences should follow a finding 
of improper purposes? This was not considered by the Supreme Court. The 
decisions made for improper purposes are voidable (3) Assuming the directors 
decided one way only because of an improper purpose, but they would have 
decided precisely the same way had that improper purpose not been present, 
should their decision then be allowed to stand?” 
However, the concept of the proper purpose may be undefined in the 
company's constitution or the interpretation of this concept may be disputed. 
Also, setting limits in advance of the scope of the exercise of power by directors 
is impossible. This is because the limits of the scope of directors’ powers, which 
directors are precluded from exceeding, cannot be enumerated in advance 
since the different situations cannot be anticipated.  
Therefore, determining the meaning of the proper purpose is controversial. The 
proper purpose is related to, inter alia, the activity of the company, the 
shareholders’ objective, the intent of directors, and the motive behind the 
decision and consideration of the best interests of the company and others. The 
appointment of directors is based primarily on confidence and trust in their good 
faith and in their work involving discretionary decision-making. Section 172 of 
CA 2006 determines the meaning of the purpose in general and directs 
discretionary decision-making by stating that directors must act in good faith in 
a way that enhances the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole. Other than the direct benefit of its members, the purpose of the 
company may also include the likely consequences of short and long term 
decisions to achieving the objectives set by the company, including financial 
and strategic objectives of the company. Taking into account the interests of all 
stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, customers and society as a whole 
by positive consideration of the impact of the company's operations on the 
community and the environment, fostering the company’s business 
relationships with others and maintaining the company's reputation are 
considered as purposes of the company.30 The protection of the interests of 
 
30 CA 2006, ss 171 and 172.  
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creditors likewise is a purpose of the company, in the event the company has 
entered into insolvent liquidation or the director was aware of or ought to have 
concluded that there is no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid 
engaging in the insolvent liquidation before the company's winding up 
commencement.31 In the case of multiple purposes, the court can determine 
the primary purpose of the substantial one in view of the weightiest purpose 
that directors feel is stronger and consideration for the reasons for decision-
making by directors and which purpose has been relevant to it. The proper 
purpose is influenced by the influence of decisions on dishonest considerations 
or personal interests. If a decision is influenced by different considerations, 
some of which are proper and others improper, it is considered the direct 
significant influence.32 
It is considered that the power of the allotment of shares as one of the powers 
of the directors of the company but is not an absolute power. Under s 549 of 
CA 2006, directors of a company are prevented from exercising any authority 
to allot shares or to grant rights to subscribe to shares of the company. 
However, the exception is over such matters as the allotment of shares in 
pursuance of the share scheme of employees and the granting of the right to 
subscribe for the allotted shares or to convert any security into the shares so 
allotted. Directors may exercise the power to allot shares of a private company 
when it has only one class of shares except when prohibited from doing so by 
the company’s articles.33  
Directors may exercise the power to allot shares in the event of authorisation 
from the company to allot shares if they are authorised to do so by the 
company’s articles or by resolution of the company.34 Authorisation that might 
be granted for a particular exercise could be conditional or unconditional. 
However, such authorisation must state the maximum amount of shares to be 
 
31 CA 2006, s 172; Insolvency Act 1986, ss 213 and 214. 
32A Seretakis, 'Hostile Takeovers and Defensive Mechanisms in the United Kingdom and the 
United States: A Case against the United States Regime' (2013) 8(2) Ohio St Entrepren Bus 
LJ 245, 260-262; Andrew Keay Directors' Duties (3rd edition, LexisNexis, Bristol 2016), 97-120; 
Inferred from the judgment in Eclairs Group Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas Plc [2015] UKSC 71. 
33 CA 2006, ss 549 and 550. 
34 S 551(9) of CA 2006 states that the resolutions affecting a company’s constitution mentioned 
in s 17, s 29 apply to the resolution under this section. 
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allotted under it and the date on which it will expire not later than 5 years from 
the date of authorisation provided in the company’s articles at the date of its 
incorporation. The date and duration of the resolution shall not preclude the 
ability to renew, amend or revoke the resolution again by a resolution of the 
company for a further period not exceeding 5 years with the same conditions of 
issuing the resolution as the stipulation on the maximum amount of shares that 
may be allotted and the date on which the renewed authorisation will expire.35 
Directors may exercise the power to allot shares even after the expiry of the 
authorisation if the allotment of shares has been allotted in pursuance of an 
offer or an agreement of the company made before the expiry of the 
authorisation or the authorisation allows the company to make an offer or an 
agreement after the expiry of the authorisation. The allotment of shares may be 
made in accordance with the requirements imposed under s 793 of CA 2006, 
where a company may notify any person whom it is believed is interested in the 
company’s shares, currently or during the three years preceding the date on 
the issued notice, or to confirm a fact or provide information. The information 
required in the notification must be provided within a reasonable time as 
specified in the notification. In addition, the law under s 561 of CA 2006 requires 
that an offer must be made to every person who holds ordinary shares in the 
company and that it be allotted to him/her on the same favourable terms at 
least; or the expiration of the period in which the offer may be accepted, or the 
company has received a notice of acceptance or refusal with respect to the offer 
made.36 
In all cases, directors are obliged to exercise the power of allotment of shares 
in accordance with the conferred purpose to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole. Directors are not authorised 
to exercise their power to allot shares for their own interests or to maintain their 
positions. The allotment of shares with the intention of retaining the majority of 
shareholders who dilute the power is considered not to be part of the directors’ 
fiduciary function. The preference of one shareholder or group of shareholders 
over the rest by exercising a fiduciary power to allot shares for any purpose is 
 
35 CA 2006, s 551. 
36 CA 2006, s 561 and 793. 
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improper. The allotment of shares is often used to raise the company's capital 
to enhance the company's success and not to prevent the takeover of the 
company by a person acting legally.37 The rule of proper purpose is a principle 
in which justice governs the exercise of the powers of the fiduciary in respects 
which are not necessarily determined by the instrument of the company's 
articles, but by understanding the context of business.38 In Howard Smith Ltd v 
Ampol Petroleum Ltd39, Millers Company decided to allot shares for its urgent 
need for capital. Two of the company's members (Ampol and Bulkships 
Companies) own 55% of the shares. Ampol Company had offered to buy all the 
shares that Millers Company intended to allot. Millers' directors rejected 
Ampol's bid for being too low. Ampol and Bulkships then announced their 
dissatisfaction and would reject any offer of the shares. Howard Company 
made a bid to Millers to allot 4.5 million ordinary shares at a higher price than 
Ampol. Millers' directors took a majority decision to allot and issue shares 
immediately. By this allotment and issuance of shares, Ampol and Bulkships 
were reduced their percentage of the company from 55% to 36.6%. Howard 
was in a position to make an effective takeover offer. Ampol challenged the 
validity of the issuance of shares to Howard and sought an order in the Supreme 
Court for the rectification of the share register by removing Howard as a 
member of Millers in respect of the allotted shares. Millers' directors alleged 
that the reason for the issuance of shares was to obtain capital, while Ampol 
claimed that the objective of directors was to reduce the voting power owned 
by Ampol and Bulkships. The judge, after considering the circumstances of the 
case, held that the allotment of shares was invalid because the directors had 
exercised their powers for an improper purpose to allot shares. Therefore, the 
judge ordered the share register to be rectified. 
3.3.2 Duty to promote the success of the company 
The duty when exercising managerial powers to promote the success of the 
company contained in s 172 is one of the most important duties of directors in 
 
37 CA 2006, ss 171 and 172; The Explanatory Notes to the CA 2006, part 323; Keay (n 32) 96-
101.  
38 See Eclairs Group Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas Plc [2015] UKSC 71. 
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the CA 2006. It caused a sizable debate when this duty was discussed in 
Parliament because there were doubts over how this section was to be 
interpreted or applied, even if this duty appears to be clear in relation to the 
obligation to act in good faith in the interest of the company. This duty is the 
core of the fiduciary duty owed by directors but there are other aspects in s 172. 
The duty to act in good faith to promote the success of the company is 
somewhat different, as there are some new concepts such as ‘the success of 
the company’. This new concept includes an explicit statement on the interests 
of non-shareholders.40 
The Company Law Review Steering Group has made the duty to promote the 
success of the company part of a strategy to deliver what it called the 
enlightened shareholder value principle (ESV). Directors should be more 
comprehensive when performing their duties and making decisions by taking 
into account all the company's relationships. This compelled listed companies 
to prepare and publish an operational and financial review (OFR) and disclose 
a range of qualitative and forward-looking information which is not commonly 
observed in regular financial statements, for instance, the company's policy 
regarding non-shareholders such as employees, social and environmental 
issues related to the company's business and other issues. This disclosure 
enabled the government to know corporate stakeholders better.41 The (OFR) 
was valid until the Strategic Report and Directors’ Report have been published 
in the last quarter of 2013, which repealed the (OFR). The Strategic Report and 
Directors’ Report obliges all listed and unlisted companies, except for small 
companies, to prepare the strategy report as a part of the annual report for each 
financial year of the company to inform company's members and help them to 
assess the performance of directors to promote the success of the company. 
 
40 Andrew Keay, The Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance 
(Routledge 2014) 82-86; Andrew Keay, ‘Good Faith and Directors' Duty to Promote the 
Success of their Company’ (2011) 32(5) Company Lawyer 138; Elaine Lynch, ‘Section 172: A 
Ground-breaking Reform of Directors' Duties, or the 'Emperor's New Clothes'?’ (2012) (33)7 
Company Lawyer 196; R Goddard, ‘Directors' Duties’ (2008) 12(3) Edinburgh L Rev 468, 471-
472. 
41 Lynch (n 40) 197-198. 
The powers and duties of company directors in UK law 
62 
The information contained in the annual report and the strategic report is of the 
interest to shareholders and stakeholders.42 
Based on the above, directors need to consider the objective of the company 
and know the priority in the performance of their function according to the 
enlightened shareholder value principle in the interpretation of the duties of 
directors to act in the interest of the company during managing the company. 
This means directors must act in the interest of shareholders and take into 
account other broader interests – the so-called interests of stakeholders. In this 
context, Lord Goldsmith explained that the government’s intention is that the 
objective of the company should be determined by looking at the company's 
constitution, the shareholders' resolutions and everything else related in order 
to reach the judgment.43 
The shareholder primacy theory holds that the company exists only for the profit 
of its shareholders. This approach was prevalent in the UK prior to the CA 
200644 and is based on the fact that the shareholders are the owners of the 
company and the directors are the shareholders' agents. Thus, this theory 
enhances economic efficiency as it stimulates shareholder profits. 
Shareholders of an unlisted company are at risk because they are unable to 
dispose of their shares easily and quickly when they are dissatisfied with how 
the company is managed. In contrast, the employees, creditors and others, who 
deal with the company, are able to protect themselves in accordance with the 
terms of contracts concluded with the company. The shareholder primacy 
theory affected companies' transactions with non-shareholders as they were 
reluctant to make financial investments in the companies. This effect has led to 
adopting a pluralist approach.45 
 
42 The CA 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013. 
43 DTI, ‘CA 2006: Duties of Company directors, Ministerial Statements’ (June 2007) Lord 
Goldsmith, Lords Grand Committee (6 February 2006) column 256, available at: 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file40139.pdf accessed 4 March 2018. 
44 In the former Companies Act 1985, there were no provisions requiring directors to consider 
the interests of any person other than the shareholders, which affected the companies' 
transaction with the non-shareholders where they were reluctant to make financial investments 
in the companies. 
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The pluralist approach considers the company as a social entity that takes 
responsibility for all stakeholders such as employees, creditors, suppliers and 
society as a whole, and does not function only in the interests of shareholders. 
The difficulty with the pluralist approach is that the risk of accountability to 
directors. Moreover, directors must consider the interests of all stakeholders on 
an equal footing, which will slow the decision-making process. The decisions 
will also be weak due to the nature of the conflicting interests of stakeholders. 
Therefore, a compromise was found between these approaches in the form 
ESV theory. This works on a broader and longer-term approach by adhering to 
the need to build long-term relationships and trust with employees, suppliers, 
customers and others to ensure long-term success.46 
The ESV theory seeks to raise awareness among companies so that a 
company can be managed in a well-balanced manner in consideration of the 
interests of shareholders while strengthening relations with stakeholders. This 
means that directors are committed to achieving the success of the company 
for the benefit of shareholders by taking into account all relevant considerations 
for the purpose of the success of the company. This requires taking a balanced 
and appropriate view for the company in the short and long term and stresses 
the need to maintain effective and continuous relationships with stakeholders. 
The impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment 
should be considered while retaining the benefits of shareholders as an ultimate 
objective of the company. Accordingly, the ESV theory is about how directors 
manage the company. This gives directors a broader discretion to override 
shareholders' interests provided they act in such a way that they believe it will 
enhance the company's success for the benefit of the members as a whole.47 
It is noted that the ESV theory is reflected in s 172 of CA 2006, which includes 
one of the duties that is owed by directors and it can be considered as the 
loyalty duty. The duty to promote the success of the company is the 
fundamental duty of directors and any other duties given in the CA 2006 are 
applications of this duty such as the duty to avoid conflicts. S 172 is based on 
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the established rule that directors must act in good faith in the interest of the 
company in order to promote its success and achievement of its objectives. As 
Lord Denning stated in Scottish Co-op Wholesale Society v Meyer48 in the 
context of competing with the company's textile business, ‘the duty of the three 
directors to the textile company was to do their best to promote its business 
and to act with complete good faith towards it’. 
There is a question about whether s172 is it based on common law or is it an 
entirely new duty. It can be said that the exact equivalent of s172 was absent 
in common law. But this duty is related to the duty of loyalty to act in good faith 
for the interests of the company.49 In Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd,50 Lord Greene 
said that "They must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they consider - 
not what a court may consider - is in the interests of the company". In the same 
manner, s172(1) imposes on directors the duty to act in the way he considers, 
in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members as a whole. Also, subsection (3) provides that this 
duty is subject to any enactment or rule of law requiring directors to consider 
the creditors' interests in certain circumstances. Prior to the enactment of this 
duty, common law imposed on directors a duty towards the creditors in financial 
distress times.51 Therefore, I can be said that this duty is a codification of the 
common law.  
Lord Denning’s views are consistent with s 172(1) of CA 2006, which states 
that the acts of directors are to be in good faith. It is not easy to define good 
faith exactly because of the different contexts in which it arises. Sealy believes 
that the term good faith is ambiguous and has two meanings, a subjective 
meaning and an objective meaning. The subjective application is honest human 
 
48 [1959] AC 324; Keay (n 40) 91-93. 
49 Andrew R Keay, ‘The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is it Fit for Purpose?’ 
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behaviour with best intentions. The second describes the status of the activity 
as good faith in the sense of ‘genuine’, and has objective application.52 
However, the meaning of good faith is seldom specified despite its widespread 
use. This is either because it is assumed that everyone knows what it means 
or because its widespread use has created an unclear and inconsistent 
understanding of what it means. Good faith is often linked to ethical standards, 
where it is called an ethical legal principle. This requires the interests of others 
to be taken into consideration. Generally, when the term ‘good faith’ is used in 
law it includes honesty and propriety. In other places, the expression good faith 
includes equity, fulfilment of obligations, fair disclosure, loyalty and the 
requirement not to violate the rules of corporate law.53 On this, Nowicki argues 
that there is no generally accepted and well-defined definition of good faith in 
the context of directors' responsibilities. She is supported by Summers who 
supports the impossibility of applying a specific definition. Nowicki sees that the 
problem lies in the fact that ‘importing a definition of good faith into the context 
of director conduct from other areas of law is not ideal, because most definitions 
of good faith are context-specific’. 54 She ultimately defines good faith55 as 
something that is ‘in the best interests of the shareholders’. This indicates that 
Nowicki's definition is in line with the shareholder primacy theory unless she 
means that the ultimate purpose is in the interests of shareholders but taking 
into account all relevant considerations for stakeholders.  
Courts have been able to apply the concept of good faith to broad 
circumstances by granting judges a measure of discretion. The result of this 
has been that courts have adopted a method of interpretation of 'good faith' by 
contrast, such as the absence of malice and lack of intent to harm. They also 
often explain what ‘bad faith’ is in the case at hand rather than getting involved 
 
52 LL Sealy, ‘Bona Fides and Proper Purposes in Corporate Decisions’ (1989) 15(3 and 4) 
Monash U L Rev 265, 269. 
53 FK Juenger, ‘Listening to Law Professors Talk About Good Faith: Some Afterthoughts’ (1994-
1995) 69(5) Tul L Rev 1253, 1253-1254. 
54 Elizabeth Nowicki, ‘Not in Good Faith’ (2007) 60(2) SMU L Rev 441, 454; RS Summers, 
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in the interpretation of good faith. For example, in Re Walt Disney Co Derivative 
Litigation56, the judge ruled that: 
I am of the opinion that the concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a 
conscious disregard for one's responsibilities, is an appropriate (although 
not the only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in 
good faith. Deliberate indifference and inaction in the face of a duty to act 
is, in my mind, conduct that is clearly disloyal to the corporation. It is the 
epitome of faithless conduct.  
In Davies v Ford,57 the court interpreted "good faith"  by contrast, which was the 
absence of good faith by acting in a manner other than the interests of the 
company, as the directors had diverted the company's business to their own 
company. Bad faith is not just about a bad decision and neglect but involves a 
conscious act of wrong because of fraud or a dishonest purpose. Therefore, 
proving bad faith is a daunting task.58 In Starling v The Climbing Gym Ltd,59 the 
court held that the director participating in a similar business to that of the 
company but elsewhere some 200 miles away from the company's business is 
still a breach of duty to the company by failing to act in good faith or in the best 
interests of the company, which has created a conflict of interest between the 
director and the company. 
The duty to promote the success of the company, as already mentioned, is 
somewhat different. The term ‘company success’; there has been some 
controversy about the interpretation of its ambiguous meaning. In spite of the 
absence of a definition of the term ‘success of the company’ in s 172, it is 
determined that the success of the company must be for the benefit of its 
members as a whole. It can be said that ‘success’ means achieving the 
objectives set by the company, including financial and strategic objectives in 
the short and long term and so on. There is also another view that the 
interpretation of directors of the company for success is a meaningful 
explanation and cannot be challenged, provided that the acts of the directors 
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are in good faith. Although some concern has been expressed that directors 
might make business decisions on such matters as broad strategies and that 
we cannot review these decisions in courts, this can be countered by the 
argument that directors must always act in good faith and without negligence in 
making decisions or they will be liable for breach of duty to exercise reasonable 
care, skill and care in accordance with s 174 of CA 2006.60 
Lord Goldsmith considered the success of commercial companies according to 
whether it created a long-term increase in its value. The company's constitution 
and resolutions may determine the appropriate success of the company by 
setting out what the members collectively want the company to achieve. These 
objectives can either be clarified at the time of the establishment of the 
company and in the company memorandum or subsequently approved by 
shareholder resolutions. He also stated that most investors in companies often 
consider money as the objective with a long-term increase in value. For some 
companies, such as charities and community interest companies, success 
means achieving the objectives for which the company was established.61 
Many directors believe that giving immediate returns to shareholders is a 
priority regardless of the long term value of such a course of action. This is the 
reason why the Company Law Review Steering Group considered it necessary 
to encourage long-term work through the drafting of a new law in 2006 in which 
directors' duties were to work for the ultimate objective of achieving benefit to 
shareholders by building a successful business that takes into account all 
stakeholders and the impact of reputation on the business. 62 It is therefore 
imperative for directors to examine the company's objectives and to know what 
could be considered success for the members as a whole. They can do this by 
looking at the company's constitution, the shareholders' decisions and 
everything else that is related. The determination of the success of the company 
must be consistent with its constitution because this consistency is the core of 
the first duty in s 171 that directors of a company must act in accordance with 
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the company’s constitution. The ability of companies to succeed depends on 
their relationships with their business partners, customers and other 
stakeholders. However, first and foremost the focus must be on the fact that 
ultimate success is always measured in terms of the benefits to members.63 In 
Fairford Water Ski Club v Cohoon,64 the directors were liable for breach of duty 
to promote the success of the company. The claim related to the transfer of a 
plot, situated by a lake, from the company to a director (Craig). The company 
considered this as a 'substantial property transaction' for Companies Act 
purposes and thus was invalid because it did not have members' approval, 
which breaches the duties stipulated in ss171 and 172 of the CA 2006. The 
judge upheld the company's claim and considered that the transfer was a 
breach of duty to promote the success of the company, as it was made at a 
significant undervalue. The directors were accountable to the company for 
equitable compensation for the loss. 
There has been some discussion on the reason for the legislator's use of the 
word ‘members’ rather than ‘shareholders’. The explanation is that the 
legislation applies to limited liability companies and companies that are limited 
to stocks. According to Keay,65 courts have assumed that the term ‘members 
as a whole’ includes current and future shareholders and the company’s goal 
to make a profit. This logic can be applied if the long-term approach is adopted 
to include future and current shareholders. In the case of adopting a short-term 
approach, it is difficult for courts to evaluate directors' decisions because some 
of the decisions may be more beneficial to the current shareholder than the 
future shareholder. However, s 260(C) and s 994(2) of CA 2006 refute this view, 
stating that the term member includes every person who is a member or not a 
member but owns shares in the company. In other words, a member is a 
shareholder whose name appears on the register of members, as sometimes 
shares are transferred but by error the registration never occurs. 
S 172 of CA 2006 lists the factors that directors must consider when executing 
their duty to promote the success of the company. It is noteworthy that this does 
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not impose a new duty on directors other than to the company. The general 
directors' duties are owed by company directors to the company as stated in s 
170 of CA 2006. Keay66 argues that this list of factors does not offer anything 
new. It can be said that there was nothing to prevent directors, before the CA 
2006, from considering the likely consequences of any decision in the long term 
and the interests of others as well as shareholders as long as directors acted 
in good faith for the interests of the company as a whole. However, directors 
are now, after the enactment of this duty, obligated to consider these factors. 
The idea of shares, in general, is in essence partly about ‘rights to future 
income’. This means that usually there can be no benefit to shareholders 
without the continued flow of profits in the future. Unless the investment 
objective is a capital asset that may increase in value, which is usually linked 
to the company's strategic decisions. In turn, to maintain the company's ability 
to sustain its business and profits over time, the company's strategic decisions 
and the possible long-term consequences of these strategic decisions must be 
considered. These consequences must be considered in economic terms in 
accordance with accounting measures. This means considering the flow of 
financial resources in a timely manner to meet the entitlement of stakeholders, 
which ultimately depends on the company's revenue and business viability. 
Indeed, shareholders' interests are unlikely to be enhanced if the company's 
employees or customers feel resentful.67 
The omission of the short-term implication in s 172 of CA 2006 has been 
considered to indicate the importance of the long-term and its preference over 
the short-term. However, most directors consider the short-term and believe 
that giving shareholders immediate returns is a priority. The legislator also felt 
it was necessary to encourage long-term business to continue the company's 
business. This is allowed by common law provisions in view of long-term issues 
in decision-making.68 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) has confirmed that considering the interests of 
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stakeholders is a high ethical standard that is certainly in the company's long-
term interest, making it more credible and trustworthy.69 
Incorporating the interests of the company's employees is among the factors 
that directors must consider in making their decisions to promote the success 
of the company. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance state that 
mechanisms to enhance the performance of employee participation should be 
allowed in the context of corporate governance such as the representation of 
staff on boards and in governance processes and the mechanisms of sharing 
of profits, pension commitments and others related to performance 
enhancement. In this regard, the two-tier board can be considered as a 
representative of the company's employees, which achieves a balance 
between all stakeholder interests in the company. This board achieves greater 
transparency because of the balance of power between management and 
monitoring and enhanced response to stakeholders (employees).70 This 
incorporating implies its importance as the employee is the human capital of 
the company and is of value to the company and not just a tool that manages 
the company's financial assets. Directors have power to, therefore, make 
provisions for employees regarding the cessation or transfer of the company' 
business under s 247 even if this is a breach of the public duty to promote the 
success of the company.71 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 requires 
directors to have regard to the employee interest, a requirement that can be 
traced back to 1980. 
The powers of the company's directors include making provision for the benefit 
of anyone employed by the company or its subsidiaries. Payments to 
employees are permitted provided that there is sufficient reason for them 
related to promoting the success of the company, such as contributing to the 
development of the company's business which benefits members later because 
of the efforts made by the employees to make profits. This is because it may 
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be a good reason to retain qualified staff or enhance the morale as this will lead 
to benefits for members over the long-term.72 Directors may take into account 
certain issues that affect employees, such as by taking into consideration their 
views on any matter related to the company's operations or health and safety 
issues in the company and so forth. Directors, therefore, have complete 
discretion in assessing the interests of staff.73 
The company should invest and establish a good working environment by 
giving employees common sense through good strategic communication and 
inspiring leadership. This will lead to employees treating the company not only 
as a source of income but as the right organization through which to develop 
their professional potential. All of these strategies aim to achieve the company's 
objectives and to indicate to employees that they are an essential part of 
achieving the desired objectives by building a long-term mutually beneficial 
relationship.74 The other side of this, as Cerioni75 states, is that employees may 
be dissatisfied when they see their interests being neglected. Their 
dissatisfaction will generate poor relations and negatively affect the 
organization because of the interconnection of their work and the final product 
provided by the company. 
The court rejected the disgruntled shareholders' claim about directors in 
Hampson v Price's Patent Candle Co.76 The shareholders here claimed that the 
directors exceeded their granted powers. Directors made a gratuity to the 
employees who had displayed good character throughout the year, for their 
efforts to help the company make profits more than has been declared during 
previous sixteen years. It was argued that the amounts paid, which were in the 
form of one week's extra pay to each employee in the company who have 
displayed good character throughout the year, were outside the ambit of the 
directors' powers. The reason for the court's rejection of the claim was that the 
meaning of management for the company's affairs is managing the company in 
the best possible way. Directors know how to administer the company's 
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business for the best, and they should be allowed to decide whether the action 
is beneficial to the company or not. Furthermore, the amount paid was not great 
and the conduct was appropriate for the company's affairs as payment to 
employees was likely to motivate them to work more seriously in the future for 
the benefit of the company. 
However, the above-mentioned ‘in the interests of the company's employees’ 
does not mean giving employees full immunity, nor does it omit consideration 
of the ultimate objective of the company, which is usually the benefit of the 
members as a whole. In a ministerial statement, Margaret Hodge MP,77 in 
contrast to the government view, stated that the ESV approach is beneficial 
both to the owners of businesses and society. The company's interests and its 
employees' interests will not always be identical, for example, it will sometimes 
be necessary for the company to lay off employees. 
This also applies to suppliers and customers in terms of strengthening the 
company's relationships with them for long-term gains. Relationships have 
been described as ‘intangible assets’ and ‘relational assets’ are a fundamental 
element of the company's organisational wealth. This means the company's 
ability to create long-term value is by relying, inter alia, on customers and 
suppliers. Economic studies have confirmed that customer loyalty to the brand 
reduces marketing costs and stabilises the volume of production and sales, 
thus increasing the operating profit.78 OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance79 are consistent with the provisions of s 172 of CA 2006, which 
urge stakeholders to be dealt with fairly whilst considering all their interests. 
It is necessary to take into account the impact of the company's operations on 
society and the environment in order to promote good relations with society. A 
business that has public support or at least does not appear hostile to the public 
can be involved in community planning and problem-solving. This may give it 
the opportunity to present its own side when an opportunity arises through a 
 
77 DTI, ‘CA 2006: Duties of Company Directors, Ministerial Statements (by Margaret Hodge)’ 
(DTI, June 2007). Margaret Hodge, Commons Report, 17 October 2006, column 789, available 
at: <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file40139.pdf> (accessed 7 Feb 2018). 
78 Cerioni (n 62) 13-14.  
79 G20/OECD (n 69). 
The powers and duties of company directors in UK law 
73 
donation to resolve an issue or to refrain from some actions that affect society. 
In actual fact, the existence of a business which has negative impacts on 
society and the environment, or that creates public hostility, is subject to 
constant threat even if it is profitable for a period of time. This is because a 
negative reputation tends to spread widely and rapidly, which provides a 
perfectly competitive environment for any competitors. Arguably, the 
determination of the negative impact of the company's operations on reality is 
not determined in a legal text but it is left to directors' discretion and business 
context. Perhaps the reason for inclusion in s 172 is to encourage companies 
to take care of the environment through compliance with ecosystem and health 
measures and encourage companies to disclose policies on business ethics 
and the environment. It can further be the company’s' expenses for the benefit 
of society and the environment does not conflict with the success of the 
company and it is not considered as an exceeded power granted by directors 
in the courts' view.80 
The final factor states that directors must have regard for the need to act fairly 
towards the company's members. This means not showing a preference for one 
shareholder or group of shareholders over the rest, especially if some of the 
shareholders are weaker than others who have not been involved in the 
appointment of directors.81 ICSA Guidance on Directors' General Duties 
stipulates that directors need to ensure that private shareholders are not 
disadvantaged by the structure of corporate transactions or share issues, or by 
a lack of information, and that it is important to find a useful system to achieve 
equality between shareholders.82 
It is noted that the mentioned factors endeavour to achieve objectives, the most 
prominent of which is to build the company's reputation for high standards of 
business conduct and maintain it, which made the legislator provide it as one 
of the factors to be considered. It is necessary that the company consider the 
factors in s 172 and other factors that help maintain the company's reputation 
to promote the success of the company for the benefit of the members as a 
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whole since the factors stipulated are not exhaustive but highlight areas of 
importance that reflect responsible business behaviour.83 Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) can be considered as a way to build a company's 
reputation and maintain it. The importance of reputation stems from the 
importance of trust in business operations because of the reliance on credit for 
daily operations. Therefore, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance found 
that many companies have found it useful to develop codes of conduct for their 
operations based on professional standards.84 
It can be said that these factors may cause some conflict in how directors take 
into account these factors among themselves and also they with the benefit of 
members as a whole. However, the answer to that is simply that in the event of 
a conflict between the factors themselves, directors, based on their own 
discretion, choose among the factors the action that would promote the success 
of the company for the benefit of members as a whole, even if that action has 
a negative impact on one or more of these factors. Taking these factors into 
consideration does not mean that traditional considerations, such as the 
profitability, financial implications on shareholders, etc, should be neglected as 
these are a priority and of crucial importance to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of the members as a whole. In having regard to these 
factors, the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence will apply.85 In 
Martin Shepherd v Michael Roy Williamson, Phoenix Contracts (Leicester) 
Limited,86 the  judgment was that the director had been balancing the adverse 
consequences of his conduct with regard to its relationship with its important 
customer and the possibility of harming the company's employees if the 
contract had not been obtained. The director was also concerned about the 
company's reputation as a whole because of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
investigation in collusive practices in the construction industry. It was among 
those practices giving and taking of covers by submitting a higher bid than 
competitors for a contract with the knowledge that it would not succeed. The 
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aim was to enable the parties to make special arrangements about who would 
undertake construction projects and how they would share the price. Therefore, 
the director of the company decided to inform the hotel (an important customer 
of the company) to frustrating any covering in which the company may have 
participated as the company was involved in covering, but its intention for the 
participation in covering was only for not being removed from a client's tender 
list by the contractor. The covering was bid-rigged by some construction 
contractors. The director who informed the hotel explained that he was very 
concerned about the OFT investigation. The director denied bad faith or any 
motive other than the desire to defeat the covering in which the company may 
be involved, while the shareholder considered that the director acted to harm 
the company. 
It is important when dealing with the duty to promote the success of the 
company to indicate that directors may need to consider various factors in 
certain circumstances. S 172(3) of CA 2006 provides that directors must 
consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company in certain 
circumstances. The term ‘certain circumstances’ is not defined, but subjecting 
this section to any enactment or rule of law requiring directors to consider or 
act in the interests of creditors of the company has removed the ambiguity by 
applying the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986,87 which interprets the 
meaning into the insolvency of the company or the company being at risk of 
insolvency. In this case, directors are required to take a balanced view to 
promote the success of the company and the risks which creditors may be 
exposed to because they have not received their receivables when the 
insolvency occurs. 
Under ss 214 and 246ZB of the Insolvency Act 1986, the court may, at the 
request of the liquidator or the administrator88, declare that the director is liable 
if there is a failure to take into account the interests of creditors in the event the 
company has entered into insolvent liquidation or the director was aware of or 
ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the 
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company would avoid engaging in the insolvent liquidation before the 
company's winding up commencement. The conclusions and steps which 
directors ought to reach and take are those that would be known or ascertained 
or are done by reasonably diligent directors who have the common experience 
that is fairly expected from directors or from anyone doing the same functions 
as that of directors in respect of the company. In Toone v Ross,89 a payment of 
unlawful distributions to employees and shareholders was made by the 
directors at a time when the company had been insolvent. The applicants, the 
joint liquidators, applied for an order that the directors of the company were 
liable to repay certain payments made by the company. The applicants argued 
that the payments were unlawful distributions to the shareholders and made at 
a time when the company was insolvent and the respondents should have 
taken into account the interests of the company's creditors, not just the 
shareholders. The court agreed. Therefore, the respondents were liable to 
account for the loss. 
In this regard, it should be noted that there are measures in the Corporate 
Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, which puts in place measures to amend 
insolvency and company law to meet the challenges caused by the impact of 
coronavirus (COVID-19). One of these measures, there will be a temporary 
suspension only for eligible companies, originally from 1 March 2020 until 30 
September 2020, of s 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986. Therefore, the court 
assumes that directors are not liable for any worsening of the company financial 
position or its creditors because of breaching the UK's wrongful trading 
provisions that occur during the mentioned period. 90 This amnesty does not 
cover other forms of directorial liability.  On 26 November 2020, the Corporate 
Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (Coronavirus) (Suspension of Liability for 
Wrongful Trading and Extension of the Relevant Period) Regulations 2020 
came into force. The Regulations have extended the wrongful trading liability 
suspension to begin with 26th November 2020 until 30th April 2021. 
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The Insolvency Act 1986 determines the exact time for entry into force of the 
interests of creditors. It provides that the company's directors must comply with 
the interests of creditors at the commencement of the actual insolvency, so-
called insolvent liquidation, when the company has insufficient assets to repay 
its debts, other liabilities and the expenses of the winding up.91 However, the 
duty to take into account the interests of creditors may arise in circumstances 
where the company has not actually been insolvent. But to what extent should 
the company be close to the insolvency?  The defendants in BTI 2014 LLC v 
Sequana SA92 argued that it must be very close to insolvency so that there is a 
real risk of insolvency rather than remote. It is, therefore, possible to say that 
there are four possible answers to the question of when the time for entry into 
force of the duty to take into account the interests of creditors takes effect. First, 
it may be when the company is actually insolvent, either on the basis of cash 
flow or balance sheet. Second, it may arise when the company is on the verge 
of insolvency or approaching insolvency. Third, it may arise when the company 
is insolvent or it is likely to be insolvent; in other words, it means that a company 
is of dubious solvency. Fourth, it may arise when there is a real risk of 
insolvency, unlike a remote risk of insolvency. In other words, such as the 
company in a parlous financial situation or financial difficulties. This may be an 
appropriate description of a company's situation in certain cases, but it is so 
vague that it cannot be considered as a useful test of the important step of 
commitment the duty of the interests of creditors. 
Despite these possible answers, there is no decision in any English authority 
that clearly relies on the assumption that the duty of the interests of creditors 
arises from anything less than the actual insolvency. There is also a problem 
with the formulation of the second category (on the verge of insolvency) 
because it proposes a temporal test, it is proposed that the actual insolvency 
will be within a very short time. This may describe many situations in which the 
duty is considered, but it does not cover the situation that the company may be 
able to repay its debts when they are due for some time or a future period of 
time. Nevertheless, the likely insolvency may occur which prejudice creditors. 
 
91 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214. 
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Therefore, it is difficult to determine the exact moment at when a company 
becomes insolvent, the insolvency may suddenly occur. Directors may not 
know and are not expected to know that the company is actually insolvent until 
some time after it occurred.93 Therefore, the definition of Insolvency Act 1986, 
to the inability to pay debts, excludes the reasonable suffering financial 
difficulties faced by companies. If it appears during the winding up of the 
company that any business of the company has breached s 214 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 and s 172(3) of CA 2006, or any business has been carried 
on with intent to defraud the creditors of the company, the liquidator must claim 
against the directors and prove that the directors knew (at the time) the financial 
distress of the company and did not take every possible step to minimise the 
potential losses to the company's creditors. The obligation of the liquidator to 
prove breach by the director is evidence that the acquittal of directors is 
consistent with the rules of common law, in which the proof lies upon the one 
who affirms, not the one who denies.94 Commenting on BTI 2014 LLC v 
Sequana SA,95 Graham96 says that, it is unfortunate that the company directors 
that pay a dividend in order to place this amount out of the reach of its creditors 
so as to bring s.423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 into play, is treated on the basis 
that they act according to their duties to the company if the company is not 
insolvent. Also, that the standard for the duty to take into account the interests 
of creditors under s.172 of the CA 2006 is very low and it constitutes a gap in 
the law which, if not resolved by the courts, must be addressed by Parliament. 
The applied test of the duty to act in the interest of the company or creditors in 
the case of insolvency is an objective test. In cases where there is evidence of 
actual consideration of the best interests of the company, the considered test 
is subjective rather than objective, which is if a director honestly believes that 
his/her act or omission is in the interest of the company, it is a state of his/her 
mind. In Wessely and Peter Hughes-Holland v Richard White,97 The liquidators 
applied for an equitable compensation from the managing director for a breach 
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of duties 171 and 172 in entering into the two deeds of release, since the 
director did not act mainly for the benefit of the creditors. The company ceased 
trading because of its financial situation on 10 May 2010 and it was put into a 
voluntary liquidation of creditors in 2011. On behalf of the company, the director 
executed a deed of release on 14 May and 20 May 2010 whereby the employer 
and the company were released from the future performance under the 
contracts. The employer was relieved of any liability of any payment obligations. 
The director received advice from insolvency practitioners that the novation was 
a means of avoiding termination of the existing contracts. The director also 
provided evidence that he had considered the novation would enhance the 
interests of employers, employees and creditors, and that this is the best way 
in these difficult circumstances. As the director gave evidence that he 
considered that all interests of employers, employees and creditors pointed in 
the same direction, his entry into the deeds of release was not in breach of 
duties under ss. 171 and 172. Because the conduct of the respondent (the 
director) must be judged at the time the act was committed and in that 
situation’s context and circumstances, and also because he genuinely 
considered he was acting in accordance with the advice of trusted 
professionals, and the insolvency consultants knew the plan of novation, 
therefore, his act was not considered to be in breach of the duties. 
 
3.3.3 Duty to exercise independent judgment 
The exercise of judgment independently by directors is a fundamental part of 
their fiduciary duties and powers. As being in a fiduciary position, directors are 
responsible both for all their performed actions and also the actions that should 
have been performed.98 Directors are required to exercise their powers freely 
and independently of anyone else's control, but their exercise the judgement 
independently must comply with the duty in s172 of the CA 2006 to act in good 
faith and to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole.99 Therefore, the allegation of receiving instructions from others or 
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allegation subjecting their powers to the will of others will not be a good defence 
for directors to evade any breach of a fiduciary duty.100 This is entirely 
consistent with the legal principle known as "Delegatus non potest delegare". 
In Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co,101  Bevan, who was the chairman of the 
company and a senior partner in Ellis & Co, influenced other directors in Re 
City Equitable Fire Insurance Co by directing them verbally, which was a cause 
of the company’s losses. It started when Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co 
granted Ellis & Co a loan of £30,000. Later the increases of the loan reached 
to £200,000. Although the estimate of the security value after the company's 
liquidation was under £31,000. The increase in the loan, despite the fact that 
the security was not adequate, would not have been for Ellis & Co. without 
Bevan's influence, with no evidence that directors were conscious or should 
have been conscious that there was not adequate cover for the loan, which 
caused the company to lose £1,200,000 in the end. 
However, the directors' obligation to act independently does not mean that 
directors make their decision away from consulting any other person. The 
independent judgment requirement does not prevent directors from consulting 
or working with others, in some cases, non-consultation may be a breach of the 
duty to act with reasonable care. It is inconceivable for directors to do 
everything by themselves. This is because of the overlap and speed of business 
processes, balancing between the interests of the company and the interests 
of the stakeholders in the event of conflicts and what could be interpreted as 
fraudulent trading or wrongful; or even to exploit the opportunities and not to be 
missed under the pretext of hesitation or lack of knowledge of the associated 
risks. For these reasons, consultants are an appropriate solution to provide 
guidance and advice to directors to help solve challenges and exploit 
opportunities to the fullest. However, in Government response: Insolvency and 
Corporate Governance,102 some  respondents noted that the problem with the 
use of professional advice is that directors go for the advice they want, so 
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counsellors are likely to fail to exercise independence and their advice is to be 
as desired by the client. Yet the ultimate directors' judgment must be their own 
and they will bear the consequences of their actions.103 The independent 
judgment is not infringed if directors act in accordance with any restrictions on 
the future exercise of their discretion under an agreement entered into by the 
company or in a way authorised by the company's constitution.104 Shareholders 
are authorised, by special resolution, to direct directors to take a specified 
action or to refrain from taking a specified action. This authorisation is related 
to a subsequent resolution and does not invalidate anything, which has been 
done by directors before the passing of the resolution.105 Furthermore, if 
directors of the company believe that a particular course of action is not in the 
best interests of the company, they may refuse to pursue this course of action 
even if the members wish it to be pursued. This can only be countered if the 
members ratify to pursue it which means relieving the directors from liabilities 
for breach of duties.106 
Section 173 of CA 2006 does not impose a mechanism on directors to exercise 
independent judgment. It is left to directors to act freely. This may be because 
of the complexity and the difference of decision-making processes from a 
company to another.107 The law imposes directors' exercise to be under the CA 
2006 and the company's constitution, which enables directors to have 
discretion over the decision making without the need to return to the wishes or 
the approval of shareholders, based on the principle of division of power 
between directors and members aforementioned in 3.2 Duty to act within 
powers. The directors must use care in making decisions and they should be 
aware of instances in which the benefit of the business judgment rule is 
unavailable. In re Tyson Food, Inc. (Tyson I),108 the directors failed to exercise 
independent business judgment by approving self-interested transactions. This 
meant that the business judgment rule did not apply to protect the directors. 
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Therefore, the directors must take reasonable measures to avoid self-
interested transactions and to act in the best interests of the company in good 
faith. 
There is debate over the position of nominee directors and the external 
influence on them. The CA 2006 does not define the concept of the nominee 
directors, the reason may be that "nominee director" is not a clear term 
because, in the view of the law, all registered directors owe the same duties, 
with regardless what they are called.109 However, the term "nominee director" 
in companies cannot be overlooked, which means directors are nominated by 
shareholders or stakeholders of a company to represent their particular 
interests. The right to appoint a nominee director could be provided under the 
company's constitution, the appointor's influence or because of other reasons. 
There is nothing wrong in appointing the nominee directors as long as they 
remain free to exercise their best judgment in the interests of the company they 
serves. Nominee directors' position can be difficult when the company's 
interests are not consistent with the interests of the appointor. In this position, 
there are two approaches that govern actions of the nominated director. The 
approach in English law is that the nominee director does not act in the 
appointor's interest except when the interests of the appointor and the company 
are compatible, otherwise it is a breach of the duty to exercise independent 
judgment.110 This approach has been criticised as causing uncertainty in the 
law and lacked guidance with respect to the interests of non-shareholders. It 
also does not touch the reality of commercial companies which means it is not 
applicable, because the commercial reality imposes on the nominee directors 
to maintain loyalty to their nominators.111 It is also contended that s 173 of CA 
2006 authorises the restriction of the directors' future exercise of the 
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discretionary power in accordance with an agreement which is believed to be 
in the interest of the company or the company's constitution allows it.112 It is 
important to note that in terms of binding the company to the terms of a contract 
the case law made it clear as does s173 (2)(a) of CA 2006 that as long the 
directors/nominee directors bona fide thought the contract was in the interest 
of the company when they entered into it then it is valid even if it restricts the 
exercise of their discretion.113 S 175 of CA 2006 expressly states that the duty 
to avoid conflicts of interest is not applied in the event that the directors so 
authorise. Thus, it is permissible to act in the interest of the nominators if it is 
authorised by directors in a private company unless this invalidates the 
company's constitution. While in a public company, its constitution must provide 
for this authorisation. 114 The other approach belongs to an Australian court that 
is completely contrary to the English approach by recognising that the directors’ 
consideration is in the interests of their nominators and that the directors must 
have a reasonable belief that their action is in the interest of both the company 
and the nominators together. 115 The company's constitution may determine the 
company's interests, which may include the nominee directors who act in the 
appointors' interests.116 This approach has been criticised by the fact that the 
directors' consideration to the interests of the nominators and the preference of 
nominators' interests over the interests of the company is contrary to the 
avoidance of actual or potential conflict. It also violates the duty not to disclose 
company information or misuse the information without the company's 
consent.117 S 170(1) of CA 2006 explicitly states that directors owe their duties 
to the company, not to something else. Finally, the work of the nominee 
directors is considered to be related to two irreconcilable duties.118 
The persons assigned to subsidiaries are considered to be the most prominent 
categories of the nominee directors by holding companies. In Charterbridge 
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Corporation Ltd v. Lloyds Bank Ltd,119 Pennycuick J held that each company 
was a separate legal entity, the directors of the company were not entitled to 
sacrifice its interests for the other companies' interests within a corporate group. 
The court in this case considered all the circumstances, including that the 
company's memorandum expressly allowed the company to consider the 
interests of another company. The court held that taking into account the 
interests of the other company was one of the purposes expressed and would 
be contrary if some restrictions were put in place to do so. While some case 
law state that nominee directors must act in the interest of the company itself 
and not in the interest of the company group.120 This is due to the fact that the 
company's creditors may only look at the company in repaying their debts 
without the parent company as in the rest of the stakeholders.121 In general, 
wholly owned subsidiaries are consistent with the parent company. The parent 
company often appoints the directors of the subsidiary and removes them and 
it is considered the main source of finance. Its directors are often the directors 
of the parent company, with whom they communicate the parent company's 
policy and direction.122 In such a company it often seems that the interests of 
the subsidiary are consistent with the interests of the parent company. 
However, in cases where there may be a difference of interests, such as that 
the subsidiary has significant creditors and the like with regard to taking into 
account the interests of the stakeholders. Therefore, the nominee directors are 
obliged to take into account the interests of the company itself, away from the 
parent company.123 
In this regard, a question arises about the liability of the parent company for the 
debts of its subsidiary. In the circumstances in which the parent company 
exercises administrative functions in the subsidiary and becomes a party to 
wrongful trading, it is fully responsible for the debts.124 This confusion may be 
due to the fact that the reason for the establishment of subsidiary companies is 
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often the avoidance by the parent company from potential liability and transfer 
the liability to another legal person (subsidiary companies). 
Because the parent company often controls the subsidiary by appointing and 
removing the subsidiary's directors and so on; and the directors of the 
subsidiary are often the directors of the parent company, with whom they 
communicate the parent company's policy and direction,125 the English Court 
of Appeal held that the distinction between a shadow director and a de-facto 
director actually is not always clear.126 This is because the influence of the 
person may be hidden at times but be clear at other times.127 The holding 
company scenario is the most prominent example that underlines this problem 
in terms of determining their status. Holding company usually does not deviate 
from two things, either to be only a shareholder in the other company without 
interfering in its administration or having the decision to administer the 
subsidiary. In the second case, it is claimed that the holding company is 
considered as a shadow director of the subsidiary.128 However, the CA 2006 
explicitly states that a body corporate is not considered as a shadow director of 
any of its subsidiary companies, by reason of the subsidiary's directors 
habitually acting in accordance with the directions and instructions of the parent 
company, for the purposes of general duties of directors.129 
A related issue in this area is raised in the literature on an interlocking 
directorate. This means that the same person is a director of two or more 
companies at the same time.130 Some researchers have realised that 
interlocking directorates have a positive effect on both society and the 
interlocking companies themselves. It benefits the society through an efficient 
and stable supply of consumer products. It also benefits the companies by 
reducing uncertainty in the market by being able to know which business 
companies can cooperate with and know the most vulnerable competitors. It 
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also benefits parties to predict the future market status.131 However, there are 
some concerns that interlocking directorate can increase the influence of these 
companies by acting as a group to reduce competition, thereby harming the 
consumer. It is also considered as a cause of the spread of bad information in 
the market, leading to negative effects.132 This concern began in the late 
nineteenth century in the United States of America on the impact of interlocking 
directorate on competition, which led to this concern  to the enact s 8 of the 
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 which prohibits interlocking directorate between 
competing companies.133 The situation in the United Kingdom, like the United 
States, is that the interlocking directorate is no longer consistent with directors’ 
duties.134 
This duty requires directors to exercise their powers independently, without 
subjecting their powers to others’ will, whether by delegation or otherwise.135 
This is entirely consistent with the legal principle known as "Delegatus non 
potest delegare". This principle means that when a person has a power or a 
power to make a decision, they must exercise the power personally and must 
not delegate it to others unless the original source of authority authorises 
expressly them to delegate it to another person. As expressly provided in the 
CA 2006, directors derive their power from the company's constitution.136 
Therefore, the duty to exercise independent judgment does not confer directors 
the power to delegate, nor does preclude directors from exercising the 
delegation power granted by the company's constitution.137 But directors must 
decide independently whether to follow the action suggested by that a 
delegated person.138 
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In Re Leeds Banking Company v Howard's,139 Howard was a shareholder who 
had been offered some of the reserved shares, he had accepted conditionally. 
The board of directors did not explicitly assent to conditional acceptance. The 
board of directors decided that the remaining undistributed shares should be 
allotted. The manager afterwards wrote to Howard that the accepted shares 
had been allotted to him. There was ambiguity in whether (Howard's shares) 
were considered of "the remaining undistributed shares" or not. The judgment, 
in this case, stated that no decision had been made with respect to those shares 
and there was no acceptance by the board of directors of Mr. Howard's terms. 
It also appears that through the deed of settlement under which the company 
was established, the power to allot these shares was delegated only to the 
board of directors, and the board had no power to delegate the allotment of 
shares to the manager and two private directors, and that the rule “delegatus 
non potest delegare” applies. Therefore, in respect of Howard's shares, Mr. 
Howard's name must be removed from the shares list. 
3.3.4 Duty to exercise reasonable care, skills, and diligence 
In order to ascertain the performance of managerial powers by company 
directors and their care of duties, several things must be considered, including 
the consideration of the nature and manner of the company's business, in 
accordance with the circumstances surrounding it with what is not inconsistent 
with the company's constitution and the provisions of the director's contract 
appointment.140 Judicial decisions must also be considered to determine the 
standard of competence required of the company's directors in the field of skill, 
care and diligence. 
It can be recognised that the standard of (care, skills, and diligence) in the 
English common law was developed in two phases, the first is pre-1986 and 
the second it began from 1986. Each phase is characterised by a standard to 
determine (care, skills, and diligence). The pre-1986 standard of care and skills 
was a subjective standard where directors are not required in the performance 
of their duties skill more than what is reasonably expected from someone who 
 
139 (1865-66) L.R. 1 Ch. App. 561. 
140 See Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company, Limited [1925] Ch. 407. 
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has the same of knowledge and experience.141 Therefore, directors are 
discharged from their legal company's duties if they act honestly for the 
company benefit and they did their best as much as they could142. Neville J, in 
Re Brazilian Rubber Plantation and Estates,143 held that directors might 
manage a rubber company in total ignorance with regard to rubber, without 
taking responsibility for the mistakes that may result from this ignorance. While 
if the directors familiar with rubber products, the company must be given the 
advantage of knowing when doing business. Directors must take reasonable 
care that an ordinary man is expected to take under the same circumstances. 
Since the Insolvency Act 1986 was enacted, it can be considered as the 
beginning of the adoption phase of the objective and subjective care standard 
together based on what is reasonably expected from someone professional in 
their position and considering the knowledge, skill and experience that they 
actually have. The judgment in Norman & Anor v Theodore Goddard & Ors,144 
and Re D'Jan of London Ltd,145 confirmed what is stated in s 214(4) of the 
Insolvency Act 1986. This judicial precedent adds an additional standard of care 
for what is stated in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company, Limited.146 The 
standard of care expected from directors in Norman & Anor v Theodore 
Goddard & Ors,147 and Re D'Jan of London Ltd,148 is, having the common 
experience that is fairly expected from a director or from anyone doing the same 
functions as that of directors in respect of the company and considering the 
knowledge, skill and experience that they actually have. In turn, s 174 of 
Companies Act does not differ from what is stated in the Insolvency Act 1986, 
Norman & Anor v Theodore Goddard & Ors,149 and Re D'Jan of London Ltd,150 
in determining the standard of care expected from directors. In Re D'Jan of 
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142 Cassidy J, 'Directors' Duty of Care in Australia - A Reform Model.' (2008) 16(1) Asia Pac L 
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145 [1993] B.C.C. 646. 
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London Ltd,151 Mr D'Jan signed a change to the insurance policy that, the 
insurance broker had filled out, without reading it. The insurance form contained 
a mistake; the answer "No" was to a question that was supposed to be "Yes" 
with regard whether he or any director or partner went into liquidation; he was. 
This mistake was enough for the insurance company to shirk responsibility. As 
result of this, the insurance company refused responsibility for a fire at the 
company's premises, which destroyed £174,000 of stock. Signing forms without 
reading them can be done by a busy director. Directors often do not read every 
document that they need to sign, but this does not mean they were not 
negligent. The form was very simple and asked questions that the director was 
the best person to answer. Mr D'Jan did not appear reasonable care and 
diligence when he signed the form as stated in s 214(4) of the Insolvency Act 
1986. Therefore, Mr D'Jan was liable to compensate the company, based on 
the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 and subject to the provisions of s 
727152 of the Companies Act 1985. In Manolete Partners v Ellis,153 the wrongful 
trading claim against a director failed due to his exercising reasonable care. 
Whereas, the director responded that there was no point in the company history 
when it could reasonably be argued that the director ought to have concluded 
there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into 
insolvent liquidation. The director also relied on Hurst & Co’s Addendum 
“Independent Accountants Report” stated that the company would not be 
trading from an insolvent position. The judge upheld the director's defence and 
considered the director exercised reasonable care. 
The situation in the exercise of diligence is the same in the standard of care 
and skills. The exercise of diligence was in two phases as well in the English 
common law, the first is pre-1986 and the second it began from 1986. In Re 
City Equitable Fire Insurance Company, Limited,154 Romer J adopted with 
regard to the directors’ diligence that directors' duties are of an intermittent 
nature and must be carried out at the board of directors’ meetings. Directors 
are not obliged to attend all board meetings but in accordance with 
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circumstances that they are reasonably able to attend. In Re Cardiff Savings 
Bank,155 the Marquis of Bute who was described in the bank documents issued 
as president, at the age of six months after the death of his father in 1848. In 
1869 Marquis of Bute attended the first meeting of the trustees and managers 
of the bank after 21 years of his appointment as a president of the bank. It was 
not considered the omission of attending meetings of the bank as neglect or 
omit duties. 
The required approach has evolved with regard to the standard of diligence 
expected of directors by the issuance of the Insolvency Act 1986 and 
addressing the wrongful trading156 provisions in terms of what directors are 
responsible to the creditors of the company. Introducing the provisions of the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986157 as well, allowed the courts to 
make an order to disqualify unfit directors of companies in the management of 
a company. This means an increase in rigour, and repeal of old standards. In 
Baker v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,158 the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry took action to disqualify directors against ten directors for 
not ensuring that the company had sufficient systems to control and monitor the 
activities of small employees, especially individual traders whose unauthorised 
transactions led to the collapse of Barings Bank. The case went against three 
for trial. One of the three directors, "Mr Baker", was dismissed as the manager 
of the main commercial banking branch. The judge concluded that the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry had proved that "Mr Baker" was 
incompetent under s 6 of Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
In practice, it is not expected that directors do everything by themselves. In the 
event that directors decide to rely on the work of others by delegating some 
tasks and responsibilities to others in accordance with the known legal principle 
aforementioned "Delegatus non potest delegare". However, directors, based 
on the judgment in Baker v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,159 must 
take adequate measures to ensure that the person who is delegated is proper 
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to carry out the tasks and responsibilities. Nor are the directors absolved from 
the duty of supervising the functions of the person delegated. 
3.3.5 Duty to avoid conflicts of interest and to declare the interest in a 
proposed transaction or arrangement 
The duty to avoid conflicts of interest is one of the directors’ fiduciary duties, 
which is associated with the trust entrusted to them to exercise managerial 
powers properly. S 175 of the CA 2006 stipulates that directors must avoid a 
circumstance, which have or can have a direct or indirect personal interest in 
conflict explicitly with the company's interests or is likely to conflict with the 
interests of the company, including a conflict of interest and duty and a conflict 
of duties. The provisions of this section also provide examples of the 
circumstances to which the duty applies. This involves exploiting the position of 
directors in a company by misuse of property, information and opportunities for 
the personal interest of the directors.160 The director's resignation does not 
resolve the conflict of interest, as the directors remain liable for the duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest. Therefore, directors must not take advantage of any 
property, information or opportunities that they realised when they were acting 
as a director.161 In Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers,162 Aberdeen 
Railway Co. needed a number of iron chairs, and Blaikie Brothers was 
contracted to supply them. Blaikie was the director and the chairman of 
Aberdeen Railway Co. and also a managing partner in Blaikie Brothers. After 
handing over two-thirds of the iron chairs, Aberdeen Railway Co. refused to 
accept any more chairs. Blaikie Brothers sought to implement the contract or 
obtain compensation for breach of contract. Aberdeen Railway Co. succeeded 
in making the Blaikie’s self-dealing contract voidable. In Davies v Ford,163 the 
directors breached their duties by diverting its business to their own company. 
The directors defended themselves by arguing that that the company had been 
close to insolvency and it had been unable to take up the business opportunities 
exploited by themselves for their own benefit. So, the company's situation could 
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not reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest. The 
argument was rejected. First, the express term in s175(2) of CA 2006, stating 
that the "This applies in particular to the exploitation...opportunity (and it is 
immaterial whether the company could take advantage of...opportunity)". 
Second, directors of an insolvent company have a duty to act in the interests of 
creditors. It follows that the only situations that can reasonably be regarded as 
likely to give rise to a conflict of interest are where the directors act in a manner 
conflicting with the interests of the creditors, and not that of the shareholders. 
Therefore, the directors were accountable to the company for equitable 
compensation for the loss. 
Directors must refrain from working for a competitive company at the same time 
as holding office. Under the CA 2006, this conduct is no longer consistent with 
directors’ duties.164 In Shepherds Investments Ltd v Walters,165 Mr Walters and 
Mr Hindle, who are the former directors of the claimant investment companies, 
breached their fiduciary duties and breached their obligation of loyalty by the 
steps they took before their resignation from the company in encouraging the 
establishment of a competing company and violated the terms of employment 
contract. Directors were obligated to the contract of employment in the service 
of the employer in good faith and fidelity for the best in the company's interest. 
They also not to participate directly or indirectly in any business rival for a period 
of six months from the end of their employment. In CJC Media (Scotland) Ltd v 
Sinclair,166 the director established a rival company for the previous company 
after the resignation and appropriating a contract that was a mature business 
opportunity belonging to the previous company. The defender took active steps 
to solicit the contract, which he had the duty to avoid a conflict with the previous 
company (the pursuer) in relation to that contract and he had known that the 
company (the pursuer) was continuing to seek to obtain the opportunity. This 
was considered as the breach of his fiduciary duties following his resignation. 
The court refused to grant him the relief because he had not acted reasonably. 
 
164 CA 2006, s175; ICSA ‘Guidance on Directors' General Duties’ (June 2015) 2.5.2; Inferred 
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It has also been accounting him for profits, for the related contracts that the 
defender benefited from were due to breach of fiduciary duty. 
Despite the rigour of s 175 of the CA 2006 in avoiding conflicts of interest, there 
are exceptions to this duty. The self-dealing transactions are excluded from 
conflicts of interest arising from transactions or arrangements with the 
Company in accordance with the disclosure procedures required in ss 177 and 
182 of the CA 2006. A director must disclose the nature of such interest in full, 
clear and accurate to the other directors if s/he is directly or indirectly interested 
in a proposed transaction or arrangement with the company, and there is a 
reasonable conflict of interests.167 This disclosure must be before the company 
enters into the transaction or arrangement.168 This disclosure may be made by 
written or general notices to other directors or at a meeting of the directors.169 
The director is also obliged to make a new disclosure if the previous disclosure 
is inaccurate, incompleteness or s/he realises after the disclosure that the facts 
have changed.170 In Gwembe Valley Development Company Limited and Anor 
v Thomas Koshy and Ors,171 Mr. Koshy, who worked for GVDC, was liable to 
account for any profits because he did not deliberately disclose the direct 
benefit of lending GVDC from Lasco which Mr Koshy owns two-thirds of this 
company. It is also excluded from this duty if it is authorised by the directors of 
private companies, with nothing to prevent in the company's constitution. In 
public companies, there must be a provision in the company's constitution that 
empowers the directors to authorise the matter.172 In Angela Burns v The 
Financial Conduct Authority,173 because of the lack of prior disclosure of 
conflicts of interest through misuse of the fiduciary position to gain personal 
benefit, as she failed to disclose a conflict of interest in that she was 
simultaneously seeking a non-executive position and consulting work. She also 
omitted important details from her job history when applying to positions. Burns 
(an investment expert) was sentenced a penalty of £154,800 and made a 
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prohibition order pursuant to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
because of the lack of integrity in a controlled function and the lack of fitness 
and propriety. In Fairford Water Ski Club v Cohoon,174 the directors were liable 
for various breaches of duties under the CA 2006. One of the main allegations 
was the payment of annual management charge by the company to a director 
(Craig), which the company said it had never agreed to. The directors failed to 
declare the nature of their interest in the management agreement, and because 
they had not disclosed the amount of fee payable under the agreement, as they 
must declare the ‘nature and extent’ of any interest they had in a transaction or 
arrangement with the company. Therefore, a director was accountable to the 
company for any profit he had made. 
3.3.6 Duty not to accept benefits from third parties 
In the context of the conduct of integrity and propriety, s 176 states that directors 
must not accept a benefit from a party other than the company or its associated 
companies or their representative, because of their doing or their abstention 
from doing anything related to their work.175 This duty applies to current 
directors and resigned directors in respect of matters done or omitted before 
they ceased to be a director.176 For protecting directors from unexpected things 
and linking the law to reality, it is excluded from the application of this duty if it 
is unreasonable to consider the acceptance of benefit leads to a conflict of 
interests and duties.177 It is also excluded the benefits offered by the person to 
a director and the services of this director are provided to the company by that 
such person.178 Lord Goldsmith179 gave an example of that, the operating 
companies that provide management services to companies, whether the 
director is an employee of this operating company or its owner. 
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This duty at first glance might be thought to overlap with the duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest. However, after consideration and scrutiny, the duty not to 
accept benefits from third parties is more specific than the previous duty (Duty 
to avoid conflicts of interest). The former duty obligates to avoid conflict of 
interests and duties. While this duty prohibits the acceptance of any benefit from 
an external party that reasonably leads to conflicts of interest, acceptance of 
benefits by a party may be considered a criminal offence and a breach of a 
directors’ duty.180 Therefore, it is important to clarify, inter alia, the extent of the 
benefits and what the legal consideration to this benefit is a bribe or a secret 
commission and what is the difference between them. Some benefits are easy 
to distinguish, such as financial rewards or high financial value gifts. However, 
giving or receiving corporate hospitality is problematic about its legality extent. 
Giving or receiving corporate hospitality can be considered as a conflict of 
interest in the event that the hospitality is provided by a person or company and 
the director is involved with them in negotiations on a new contract.181 
The common law in Industries and General Mortgage Co Ltd v Lewis,182 
confirmed that these benefits are considered bribes bribery means the payment 
of a secret commission, as well as because it induces employees to act 
positively towards the payer and negatively towards principals. While in 
Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid and Others Respondents,183 a 
distinction was made between bribery and a secret commission. Lord 
Templeman believed there is a difference between bribery and secret 
commission and the secret commission could also be considered a bribe in 
some cases. He defines the secret commission as a benefit received by a 
fiduciary because of trust or knowledge acquired by the fiduciary position, while 
bribery is a benefit given to a fiduciary for the betrayal of trust. In Gwembe 
Valley Development Company Limited and Anor v Thomas Koshy and Ors,184 
Mr Koshy's acts were considered a part of a dishonest breach of trust of a 
director. Mr Koshy was a reason to make GVDC enter into the process of 
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obtaining a loan from Lasco which Mr Koshy owns two-thirds of this company. 
In Medsted Associates Ltd v Canaccord Genuity Wealth (International) Ltd,185 
the court held that a major element of the agents' fiduciary duty is that they must 
not receive or agree to receive a secret commission from a third party. This was 
having found that a broker had lost commission from an investment institution 
as a result of it breaching a non-circumvention clause in a trading agreement 
by dealing directly with clients. The court ought not to assist the fiduciary in 
profiting from its own breach of fiduciary duty. In order to apply the bribery law 
and secret committees, there must be a trust and confidence relationship 
between the recipient of the benefit and the director who places the recipient in 
a conflict position between her/his interest and duty. In Prince Eze v Conway,186 
the judge held that relationship between the recipient and the buyer was not 
one which engaged the law of bribery and secret commissions. Although the 
relationship between the two parties was a fiduciary relationship, the agent not 
owed fiduciary duties. In FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners 
LLC,187 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to lay to rest the opposing two 
lines of authority by holding that a fiduciary who receives a bribe or commission 
in his capacity as a fiduciary holds the proceeds on a constructive trust for his 
principal. In other words, the principal (the company) will have proprietary rights 
in the bribe/secret profit. 
By reference to the Fraud Act 2006 and Bribery Act 2010, there are differences 
between the secret commission and bribery. The components of bribery, payer, 
recipient and benefits which linked to the position of the fiduciary to do 
something in the interest of the payer.188 The components of the secret 
commission are the fiduciary, benefits which linked to the position of the 
fiduciary and acting for the interest of fiduciaries themselves.189 In a simplified 
manner, the secret commission can be such as an employee working in a juice 
shop which daily takes 50 cartons of fruit to squeeze them then sold them as 
juice. The employee purchases two additional cartons from his/her own account 
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and sells them to his/her account using the employer's premises and facilities, 
without disclosing this interest to the employer. In this case, "the abuse of 
position" is applied from Fraud Act 2006, and it is considered as "the offence of 
fraud by false representation".190 To differentiate it from bribery, in the previous 
example the employee is supposed to advise the employer about the fruit 
quality. This advice, regardless of suppliers, is supposed to be based on the 
product's advantages, prices and value for money. The employee then 
recommends that the fruit be purchased from a particular supplier not for an 
advantage except that the supplier has provided or promised to provide a 
benefit to the employee to induce the principal to purchase from this supplier.
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Chapter Four: The powers and duties of company directors in Saudi 
Arabian law and Islamic law 
4.1 Introduction 
The legislator gives broad powers to the company directors to achieve the 
company's purposes and promote its sustainability. The directors of companies 
must maintain independence to perform their powers and duties as they deem 
fit for the success of the company, but this management of the company is 
subject to a number of controls and balances, both those contained in the 
legislation or the constitution of the company. The importance of these balances 
in preventing directors from abuse of position, and the liability in the event of 
failure to comply with the duties will be discussed below. 
This chapter deals with the laws of Saudi Arabia and Islamic law in relation to 
the duties arising on the exercise of powers of the company director, in order 
to compare them with the laws of the United Kingdom, and highlighting the legal 
problems in enforcement of these duties on the ground through the mechanism 
of exercising the discretion of directors. 
It is noteworthy to mention the sources of the directors’ duties, before 
addressing these duties. During ruling on the disputes related to directors’ 
duties in Saudi Arabia, it is imperative to refer to the provisions stipulated in the 
SACL 2015 and other legislation related to the directors’ function. The law is 
the primary source for the directors’ duties. Accordingly, it is imperative that the 
judges, when a dispute is presented to them in this matter, seek to find an 
answer in the legal provisions.1 
In the event that the judges do not find any relevant legislative provisions or do 
not find an answer in the legislative provisions of the presented dispute, they 
will resort to another source, which is the provisions of Islamic law. Islamic law 
is considered as the general law in Saudi Arabia, which regulates all legal ties 
of any nature and subject to all persons. Therefore, if there were no legal 
 
1 Dr Muhammad Hassan Al-Jabr, Saudi Commercial Law, Riyadh, (2000), ISBN 99-331-440-5, 
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provisions answer and solve the presented dispute, then it is necessary to refer 
to the provisions of Islamic law to search for the required answer. However, it 
should be noted that it is not resorted to the provisions of Islamic law unless the 
legislative provisions are silent or unclear. However, there is a question when 
the provisions of Islamic law conflict with commercial legislation. Whereas, 
Islamic law is considered in this case as Civil Law, it has been agreed in the 
event of a conflict between the provisions of the Civil Law and the provisions of 
the Commercial Law, the commercial law provision should prevail over the civil 
law provision if provisions were in the same degree.2 
One of the sources for directors’ duties is the company's articles of association. 
The company's constitution is usually that which regulates the company's 
management and the powers of directors and imposes restrictions on the 
powers of directors. As in the contract of appointment of the director, it may 
stipulate the directors’ powers and impose some restrictions on them. The 
company purpose determined in the articles of association of the company is 
considered one of the sources of the directors’ duties. The company purpose 
is the real project that the shareholders have targeted to achieve, and directors 
must commit to act to achieve the purpose determined in the company’s articles 
of association, accordingly, the directors' powers are restricted to this purpose. 
General assembly decisions may grant permission to the directors to breach 
some duties, such as a conflict of the personal interests with the interests of the 
company or competition and the like, it may also restrict some of the powers of 
the director, as an attachment to the resolution to appoint the director.  
Finally, another of the sources for the directors’ duties is commercial custom, 
which means the set of unwritten rules that with regard to a specific matter in a 
particular way with a belief in binding it and the necessity to follow its provisions. 
In the event of a conflict between legislative provisions and commercial 
customs, the legislative provisions should prevail over the commercial 
customs.3 
 
2 Muhsin Shafiq, Commercial Law, Dar Al-Nahdhat Al-Arabia, Cairo, (1997) para 21. 
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In this regard, it is worth noting that the difference between the term Sharia and 
Islamic law, as it is well known that Sharia includes all Islamic provisions, and 
it includes beliefs and practices. Not all of these provisions may fall within the 
concept of Islamic law. Practices in Islamic law are divided into a person to the 
God worship or a person with another person activity. A person to the God 
worship is divided into two parts, obligation or sins. As for sins, they are two 
parts, which sin with sanctions (this fall or that sin without sanctions, which 
requires repentance and asking forgiveness from the God. As for a person with 
another person activities, it is divided into two parts: economic and social, and 
they are all fall within the concept of Islamic law. Therefore, it can be said that 
Islamic law is what the judiciary can deal according to the provisions of Sharia 
(see figure below). 
 
Islamic law does not prohibit in the management of companies any 
organisational legislation or administrative regulation intended to protect the 
interests of the company and in order to continue to achieve the desired 
purpose, provided that this legislation does not conflict with the provisions of 
Sharia. The basis for managing companies and what the director is permitted 
to do is due to the custom of traders. The director in Islamic law is an agent of 
the shareholders, as the company's management is based on agency theory. 
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Therefore, the company's director is required to have the honesty, integrity, 
experience and knowledge.4 
The approach followed in this chapter is to combine the Saudi Arabian law and 
Islamic law because Islamic law in relation to Saudi law is like the common law 
to the UK law. Many legal provisions in Saudi Arabian law are explained by the 
provisions of Islamic law. 
4.2 Duty to act within powers to achieve the purposes of the company 
Directors of companies have broad responsibilities for the management of the 
business of the company. These powers are not absolute but are subject to 
restrictions limiting them in either a company’s constitution, the purposes so 
conferred or provisions of the SACL 2015. Therefore, the SACL 2015, explicitly 
stipulates that the directors of companies must act within their powers, in 
accordance with the company's constitution and for the purposes so conferred.5 
Directors are fiduciaries, therefore, a fiduciary is expected to be very loyal to 
the company so that there is no conflict of duties between the fiduciary and the 
company, and the fiduciary must not benefit from their position as a fiduciary or 
exercise their powers for personal benefit. 
In the SACL 2015, the powers of the directors are absolute unless the 
company's articles of association restrict these powers, and if the company's 
articles of association do not determine that, the powers are within the scope 
of the duties stipulated in the SACL 2015 and which consistent with the 
purposes of the company. Articles 29 and 75 of the SACL 2015 stipulate that 
the directors undertake all regular management actions that fall within the 
purpose of the company, and represent the same before courts and arbitral 
tribunals and any third party unless the company's articles of association 
explicitly stipulate the restriction of their power. Saudi law grants broad powers 
to directors to exercise management of the company. Article 22 of Saudi 
Arabian Corporate Governance Regulations 2019 (SACGR 2019) also affirmed 
that the company's directors have the broadest powers in the management of 
 
4 Kamal Ibn Al-Humam, Fateh Al-Qadeer, Dar AlKutub AlElmiah, Beirut, (2003), part 5 p 9. 
5 SACL 2015, Arts 29, 30 and 75; SACGR 2019, Art 21. 
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the company to achieve its purposes. Therefore, the phrase "all management 
actions and the acts that fall within the purpose of the company"6 stipulated in 
the SACL 2015 interprets the extent of the directors' powers in the company's 
management. In this regard, Al-Rasheed7 says that the position of director (the 
acts assigned to be done) is not determined on the basis of an agency or 
delegation, but rather that it is determined on the basis derived from the nature 
of the company and its business. But the power of the director is not completely 
absolute, there are some restrictions, for example, adherence to the purpose 
of the company so the director cannot do business that it is inconsistent with 
what is stated in the company's articles of association, otherwise, the director 
is considered exceeding her/his powers and is being held liable. Also, the 
director is restricted by the principle of specialisation; it is not possible to 
override the powers of others that determined in the company's articles of 
association or what has been approved in the general assembly meetings or 
even what violates the SACL 2015, such as when the director exceeds the 
power of the board of directors unless it was delegated by the board of directors. 
The SACL 2015 restricts the power of the director in several businesses, which 
are, donations, guaranteeing the company to others, resorting to arbitration, 
reconciliation regarding the rights of the company, selling or mortgaging real 
property unless such sale falls within the scope of the company’s purposes, 
and selling or mortgaging the company’s place of business, except with the 
consent of the shareholders or an explicit provision in the company's articles of 
association.8 
Perhaps the intention of this is that the Saudi legislature seeks to protect the 
company and the shareholders and others due to the seriousness of the power 
granted to a director in this regard, so the legislator stipulated the necessity of 
authorising these acts with controls and conditions for their exercise by the 
company's articles of association or the general assembly meetings of 
shareholders; for example, the directors of the company can be granted the 
 
6 SACL 2015, Art 29. 
7 Abdulaziz Al-Rasheed, (2010), The liability of the chairman and members of the board of 
directors of the joint-stock company. Master Dissertation. Department of Commercial and 
Arbitration Law, College of Law, Al-Khalijia University, Bahrain. P51. 
8 SACL 2015, Art 30. 
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power to absolve the company's debtors of their obligations with specific 
controls in the company's articles of association, such as showing the maximum 
value of the debt that is waived, the period that must be exhausted before the 
release, the total debts that may be waived during the same financial year and 
so forth from the controls.9 The Saudi legislator allows the board of directors to 
sell or mortgage the company's assets, the company's business place, or 
release the company’s debtors of their liabilities, and contract loans for any 
periods of time.10 Whereas in the former Saudi Arabian Companies Law 1965, 
the board of directors may not contract loans with a term of more than three 
years or sell or mortgage the company's estates, sell or mortgage the 
company's business place, or release the company’s debtors of their liabilities 
unless expressly stipulated in the company's articles of association.11 
As for the duty to undertake the purposes of the company, every company is 
established to implement a specific purpose that stated in the company's 
articles of association that the shareholders aim to achieve through the 
company. There are some duties that are explicitly stipulated in the SACL 2015 
that relate to the company's business and its financial life, and which some 
consider different duties for directors. However, after scrutiny, it can be said 
that these duties are within the scope of the duty to undertake the purposes of 
the company. Among these duties, is the duty to register the company in the 
Commercial Register and to publish its Articles of Association and bylaws and 
any amendment on it.12 The duty to prepare the company's annual financial 
statements and a report on its operations and financial position.13 There is a 
duty to protect the statutory reserves of the company, as the SACL 2015, 
obliges to set aside 10% of each year of net profits to form a reserve called the 
statutory reserve of the company until the company’s total reserve reaches 30% 
of the company's paid-up capital.14 Finally, there is a duty to report the 
company's losses in the event that the losses total 50% of its capital, the 
company’s directors must record this incident in the commercial register and 
 
9 Al-Jabr (n 1) 335-336. 
10 SACL 2015, Art 75. 
11 The former Saudi Arabian Companies Law 1965, Art 73. 
12 SACL 2015, Arts 13 and 22. 
13 SACL 2015, Art 175. 
14 SACL 2015, Art 129. 
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invite the shareholders to a general assembly meetings to consider whether the 
company shall continue to exist or to be dissolved and if the company’s 
directors neglect to invite the shareholders or the shareholders fail to pass a 
resolution in order for the company continue to exist or to be dissolved, the 
company shall be deemed dissolved by the virtue of the law.15 
Islamic law is consistent with Saudi Arabian law that the director may act in the 
company's business in the interest that leads to its success. The directors have 
all power if they are granted by shareholders, and this principle is limited by 
what the people in the same field are accustomed to in terms of trade and 
company requirements.16 However, Islamic law restricts the directors in their 
acts to what the Sharia permits. If the directors have acted in respect of 
something that is forbidden by Sharia (such as dealing with usury or fraud in 
transactions and similar forbidden transactions) their acts are invalid, and they 
are liable for their acts.17 
4.3 Duty to exercise reasonable care 
In order to ascertain the performance of the company directors and their care 
of duties, several things must be considered, including the consideration of the 
nature and manner of the company's business, in accordance with the 
circumstances surrounding it with what is not inconsistent with the company's 
articles of association and the provisions of the director's contract of 
appointment. The provisions of Islamic law must also be considered to 
determine the level of care required by the director.18 
In general, the level of care in Islamic law has two standards in accordance with 
the meaning of performing care. First, the commitment to caring for the usual 
person. The second is the commitment to achieve the desired purpose. What 
is meant by performing the usual person care is that the person does the care 
of the usual person in the same circumstances and position to try to reach the 
 
15 SACL 2015, Art 181. 
16 Ibn Rushd Al-Qurtubi, Bidayat Al-Mujtahid Wa Nihayat Al-Muqtasid, Maktabat Al-Kulyat Al-
Azhryah, Cairo, (1986), part 2 p 280. 
17 Aladdin al-Kasani, Badayea Al-Sanaiya fi Tartib Al-Sharia, Second Edition, Dar AlKutub 
AlElmiah, Beirut, (1986), part 6 p 68-72. 
18 The Basic Law of Governance of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia 1992, art 7. 
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desired purpose and s/he does not have to achieve this purpose. The care here 
is subjective and objective standard and it is agreed upon by appointment 
contract, custom or determined by law, and the typical example of the duty to 
do the usual person care is the care of a doctor, as s/he does not commit to 
healing the patient, but rather s/he is obliged to do care that matches the 
scientific principles in the medical field.19 As for the commitment to achieve the 
desired purpose, it is the subject of the person doing a work that leads to 
achieving a specific result, such as the commitment of the contractor to 
establish a specific building, and the commitment of the tenant to return the 
leased property after the end of the lease. In this type of commitment, the result 
(the desired purpose) is intended, and the effort and care that the person exerts 
to achieve are only a means to achieve the commitment (the result/the desired 
purpose) and effort and care are not the subject of the commitment, therefore, 
if the result (the desired purpose) is not achieved, the liability is held.20  
Islamic jurisprudence has clearly distinguished between these two types of the 
commitment of care. In the commitment to do the usual person’s care, there is 
no liability that if a director does reasonable care, without neglect or exceed the 
usual norm. In the event that the achievement of the result is stipulated as a 
condition in directors’ acts, the condition is invalid and the directors are not 
liable if they fail to achieve the desired purpose if they did the reasonable care.21 
The Saudi legislature adopted the director commitment in a manner that is 
consistent with Islamic law and exerted the care of the usual person’s care 
(objective-subjective standard).22 However, the subjective standard at least has 
to be not less than the objective standard. If the director proves that s/he is 
doing this care on a personal level, s/he remains liable if the care is less than 
the substantive level, then s/he must provide reasonable care as those who are 
in the same position. The directors must be obligated to perform their duties 
and commitment to the limits of their power determined in the law or the articles 
 
19 Al-Alfy, Muhammed Jabr, Health Insurance and Use of Health Cards, Journal of the Islamic 
Fiqh Academy, Thirteenth Issue, (2001) 3/482. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Al-Baghdadi, Ghiath Al-Din, Majmae Al-Dhamanat, Dar AlKutub AlElmiah, Beirut, (1971) part 
2 p 47. 
22 SACGR 2019, Art 21. 
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of association of the company or under the appointment contract,23 and to 
refrain from any activity that harms the company and the purpose that the 
company is established to achieve.24 Fahmy25 confirms that directors must 
carry out the business and exercise the powers that they have granted, they 
must make every effort to improve the company's management and monitor the 
progress of its business and achieve the purposes for which the company is 
established, and their commitment in this regard is a commitment to exercise 
reasonable care not to achieve the result (desired purpose), and therefore if the 
directors carry out their duties carefully, there is no liability, even if the 
company’s conditions worsen. In the judgment declared by the Commercial 
Court,26 the respondents (two directors) were liable to pay compensation to the 
shareholders for the damages incurred by the company due to their negligence 
in the company's management. Where the respondents committed financial 
violations such as paying incentives and bonuses for the company employees 
including themselves despite not achieving profits in the activity of the 
company, but the source of these incentives and bonus was from the sale of 
assets in the company. It has been also proven that there were differences and 
inconsistencies in the company's accounts and budget and that there are 
deficiencies in the company's internal monitoring process. Accordingly, the 
court ruled the directors liable for negligence in the company's management. 
4.4 Duty to maintain confidentiality 
The SACL 2015 states that directors may not disclose the secret information 
related to the company that they acted for, and they also may not exploit what 
has come to their knowledge by reason of their position, to achieve an interest 
for themselves or their relatives or third parties.27 This assertion from the Saudi 
Arabian legislature to obligate directors to maintain secrets is in accordance 
 
23 Dr. Abdul-Razzaq Al-Sanhouri, Explaining the Civil Law, Dar Al-Nahdhat Al-Arabia, 
Alexandria (2004), Part 1, p. 428. 
24 Muhyi-Al-Din Al Nawawi, Almjmw’a Shrha AlMhdhb, Dar AlKutub AlElmiah, Beirut, (2016) 
part 15 p 123. 
25 Mahmoud Mohamed Fahmy, The liability of the members of a board of directors of a company 
whether in their personal capacity or as representatives of others, Majalet Misr Al-Mueasira, 
(1985) 401 p. 6. 
26 The Saudi Arabian Commercial Court, Q/3/847 (2016); 291 (2019). 
27 SACL 2015, Art 74. 
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with Islamic law and most other legislation. Islamic law urges honesty, including 
maintaining the business secrets, as it is one of the requirements for fulfilling 
the obligations that the director has signed with the company to take into 
account its interests as like as take into account the interests of herself/himself 
and her/his family.28 Islamic law also urges the importance of maintaining 
secrets and considered that disclosing secrets is a betrayal of trust.29 
However, the Saudi Arabian legislature does not specify the meaning of secrets 
as stated in the SACL 2015. Some tend to exclude facts and information known 
to people, so it is not considered as secret.30 However, there is another opinion, 
which is that the known facts and information of the people remain a secret 
because its confirmation from the director is confirmation of its correctness. This 
opinion is what the French court31 adopted that revealing the secrets is not 
permissible, even if it focuses on facts or information that has become known 
to people because revealing the information by a director or an employee leads 
to confirm its correctness. Koman and Abdul-Hamid32 argue that what is meant 
by company secrets is every specific fact or information or a specific number 
that is not subject to publication or declaration, and no one but the concerned 
person (director) knows about it, thus the facts and general information or 
previously published in any legal way are not considered as secrets. 
Jubran33 says that the nature of the obligation to maintain secrets is not 
absolute but rather relative, so the scope of the directors’ duty to not divulging 
company secrets outside the General Assembly meeting is determined and 
then the directors may discuss these secrets during this meeting. Therefore, 
the directors are prohibited from discussing the secrets with the shareholders 
outside the scope of the general assembly meetings. Also, it is not considered 
 
28 The Noble Qur'an, Surah Al-Ma'idah ayat 1, Surah Al-Isra ayat 34, Surah Al-Mu'minun ayat 
8. 
29 The Noble Qur'an, Surah Al-Anfal ayat 27. 
30 Abdul-Qadir, The duty of confidentiality in the framework of commercial companies, Vinnak, 
Majallat al-Qānūn wa-al-Mujtamʻ 2014 Issue 3, pp.48-79, 51 DOI: 10.12816/0010004. 
31 See [crime., 19 decembre 1986, I. p. 347] as cited in Feninekh, Abdul-Qadir., The duty of 
confidentiality in the framework of commercial companies, Vinnak, Majallat al-Qānūn wa-al-
Mujtamʻ 2014 Issue 3, pp.48-79, 51 DOI: 10.12816/0010004. 
32 Koman, Muhammad. Abdul-Hamid, Reza, corporate crime in Saudi Arbia law., Dar Al-
Nahdhat Al-Arabia., Cairo, (1996) P. 153. 
33 Sadiq Jubran, The board of directors of the Saudi joint-stock company., First edition, Al-
Halabi Publications, Beirut, 2006, pp. 287-290. 
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a secret that the information required by the laws to place it at the disposal of 
shareholders in order to inform them of the information about the company 
before a period of the general assembly meeting or that information permitted 
by the laws to be published. However, the duty not to divulge secrets is limited 
to what the directors have known information about the company because of 
their positions only, which is without their positions in the company, they would 
not have known this information.34  
Finally, article 74 of SACL 2015 stipulates the penalty for breach of this duty, 
as it provides two penalties that must be applied together, namely the dismissal 
of the director from the company's management and the compensation for the 
damages incurred by the company due to the disclosure of the secret 
information. 
Confidentiality in Islamic law is based on the concept of trust, and maintaining 
trust is an obligation.35 Almighty said in the Noble Quran36 "O you who have 
believed, do not betray Allah and the Messenger, nor betray your trusts while 
you know".37 Also, this is the principle of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be 
upon him), in all his acts in the works that need to maintain confidentiality.38 
This is the principle of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH).39 Therefore, 
divulging business secrets is a breach of trust, and its consequences are grave, 
it is cheating and fraud. Rather, it is a sign of hypocrisy and bad morals. The 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said that "The hypocrite signs are three if they 
talk, they lie, if they promise, they renege if they are trusted, they betray".40 
The basic principle is that all secrets in Islamic law must be maintained, whether 
small or large, but the liability of divulging the secrets is emphasised in two 
things. First, that when divulging secrets leads to damage.41 Secondly, the 
 
34 SACL 2015, Art 74. 
35 Al-Raghib al-Isfahani, Al-Mufradat fi Gharib al-Quran, Dar Al-Qalam, Beirut, (2009), 25. 
36 The Noble Qur'an, Surah Al-Anfal ayat 27. 
37 See Sahih International at http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=8&verse=27 
[accessed 13 April 2020]. 
38 Muhammad Al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, First edition, Dar Touq Al-Najat, Damascus, 
(2002), 2948. 
39 Ibid, 2318. 
40 Muhammad Ibn Al-Arabi, Aridah al-Ahwadhi bi-Sharh Sahih al-Tirmidhi, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 
(1995), part 5 p 308. 
41 The Noble Qur'an, Surah Al-baqarah ayat 282. 
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secret shall not be about something is prohibited in Sharia, such as a crime or 
a violation that must be disclosed.42 
4.5 Duty to avoid conflicts of interest and to declare any personal interest 
The duty to avoid conflicts of interest when exercising managerial powers is 
one of the directors’ fiduciary duties, which is associated with the trust entrusted 
to them. The SACL 2015 stipulates that the director may not have a direct or 
indirect interest in the transactions and contracts that are concluded for the 
company’s account except with prior permission from the ordinary general 
assembly, renewed annually.43 The SACL 2015 seeks to ensure that directors 
act in the company's best interest in the first place, and to prevent them from 
using their power and position to obtain financial benefits that conflict with the 
interests of the company. This indirectly includes the relatives of the directors 
and those connected to them. Therefore, it is emphasized in the same law that 
directors may not use company information to achieve an interest for them, a 
relative, or others.44 
The SACL 2015 also obliges directors to declare any interest they have, directly 
or indirectly, in the transactions and contracts that are concluded for the 
company. The directors must inform the board of directors of this interest, and 
this declaration shall be recorded in the minutes of the board of directors 
meeting. The concerned director may not participate in voting for the resolution 
to be adopted in this respect, whether it is in the board of directors or the 
shareholders' meetings.45 In the event the director fails to declare her/his 
interest, the company or any interested party may claim before the competent 
judicial authorities to avoidance the contract and oblige the director to return 
any profit or benefit that has been gained thereto from it.46 In the former Saudi 
Arabian Companies Law 1965, a transaction that is performed through a public 
tender process is excluded from that if the director provides the best offer, then 
 
42 The Noble Qur'an, Surah Al-mujadilah ayat 9. 
43 SACL 2015, Arts 31 and 71. 
44 SACL 2015, Art 74. 
45 SACL 2015, Art 71(1). 
46 SACL 2015, Art 71(2). 
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s/he does not need to obtain permission from the ordinary general assembly.47 
This exception was highly criticised, as the prohibition that the legislature 
wanted it, did not necessarily relate to purely financial budgets, rather, for 
ethical considerations. In addition, the presence of the director in her/his 
position gives them an advantage in providing the best offer, due to the 
availability of confidential information. Therefore, there is no equality and 
justice, and there is a restriction of freedom of competition, which may lead to 
future competitors being reluctant to enter into tenders for this company, which 
may harm the company's future interests.48 
Islamic law is consistent with Saudi Arabian law to legalise the acts of the 
directors that lead to the success of the company within the limits of the power 
granted by shareholders and prevent wrongful acts. Since Islamic law considers 
the management of the company as an agency of the shareholders of the 
director, so Islamic law is strict in purchasing agents for their principals a 
commodity that the agents or their relatives own.49 Therefore, Islamic law 
scholars differed regarding whether the agents can purchase for their principal 
a commodity that the agents or their relatives own. 
Some Islamic law scholars have emphasised that the agents cannot purchase 
from themselves for their principal, even if the principal has authorised them to 
do so, because the rights to buy and sell will belong to one person.50 As for 
buying from relatives, it is permissible to buy from them if it is bought at the 
same value or less if the principal has authorised the agent.51 While some 
Islamic law scholars argue that the agents cannot purchase from themselves 
for their principal, unless if the principal has authorised them to do so.52 
 
47 The former Saudi Arabian Companies Law 1965, Art 69. 
48 Jubran (n 33) 276.  
49 Dr Abdulaziz Al-Khayyat, Companies in Islamic Law, Fourth Edition, Resalah Foundation, 
Beirut, (1994), 247-248. 
50 Al-Khatib Al-Shirbiny, Mughni al-Muhtaj ila Ma'rifatil Ma'ani alfadh al-Minhaj, Dar AlKutub 
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51 Hafiz Aurangzeb, Al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya, Dar AlKutub AlElmiah, Beirut, (2000), part 3 p 589. 
52 Mansour El-Bahouty, Kashaf Al-Qina'a ean Matn Al-Eqna'a, Dar AlKutub AlElmiah, Beirut, 
(2001), part 3 p 473. 
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4.6 Duty not to participate in any business competitive with that of the 
company. 
The SACL 2015 stipulates that the director may not participate in any business 
that would compete with the company, or compete with the company in any of 
the branch activities that it carries out. The commitment to non-competition, in 
general, has got great attention from many studies, given the problems and 
legal difficulties it raises, the most important of which is that this commitment 
represents a restriction of the freedoms of work and contracting. The legal 
jurisprudence has sought to reconcile this obligation with the freedoms of work 
and contracting, by proposing criteria by which the scope of the obligation to be 
non-competitive can be determined.53 
Therefore, the prohibition against non-competition is not always permanent, as 
a company's director may avoid this ban by obtaining authorisation to compete 
the company by following the procedures stipulated in SACGR 2019. The 
director must inform the board of directors of the competitive business that s/he 
has or wishes to do and prove this declaration shall be recorded in the minutes 
of the board of directors meeting. The concerned director may not participate 
in voting for the resolution to be adopted in this respect, whether it is in the 
board of directors or the shareholders' meetings.54 Marqis notes that the duty 
not to participate in any business competitive with that of the company is an 
obligation to refrain from an act (non-competition). This duty is always 
considered as a commitment to achieve a result, and it is not sufficient to exert 
an effort or a certain level of care in order to achieve this.55 
The phrase "participate in any business competitive with that of the company" 
as stated in Article 72 of the SACL 2015 is general, as it includes all types of 
competition, so includes trading in one of the types of company activity, by 
establishing a company or a sole proprietorship or the ownership of a controlling 
percentage of shares or stakes in a company or any other entity engages in 
 
53 Reda El-Sayed Abdel-Hamid., Trade Law, Dar Al-Nahdhat Al-Arabia, Cairo, 2001, Part 1 p. 
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54 SACL 2015, Art 72; SACGR 2019, Art 46. 
55 Marqis, Suleiman., Explaining the Civil Law, Second edition, Law and Economy, Cairo, 1992, 
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business activities that are similar to the activities of the company or its group. 
Also included in these businesses competitive is accepting membership in the 
board of directors of a company, an entity that competing with the company or 
its group or managing the affairs of a company or any other entity competing 
with the company or its subsidiaries, regardless of the form and size of this 
company or the entity competing, except for managing the affairs of the 
subsidiary companies. Also included in the concept of business competition, 
the director acting as an overt or covert commercial agent for another company 
or entity competing with the company or its group.56 Because the competition 
of the company leads intentionally or unintentionally to exploit the information 
and secrets of the company stated in Article 74 of the SACL 2015 that it is not 
permissible to use what has come to their knowledge by reason of their position 
to achieve an interest for themselves or their relatives or others. 
The SACL 2015 also indicated that the penalty resulting from the breach of the 
duty not to participate in any business competitive with that of the company is 
reasonable compensation for the damages incurred by the company as a result 
of the breach of this duty.57 In the former Saudi Arabian Companies Law 1965,58 
the penalty for breaching the duty not to participate in any business competitive 
with that of the company was reasonable compensation or considering the 
operations performed by the director for her/his own account conducted for the 
company. The choice would be for the company to choose between the two. It 
should be noted that SACGR 2019 stipulate that in the event that the general 
assembly rejects to grant or renew the authorisation granted to the director to 
compete with the company, the director must present her/his resignation within 
a period specified by the general assembly, otherwise the director is deemed 
terminated by the force of law unless s/he decides to withdraw from the 
competition of the company.59 In the judgment declared by the Commercial 
Court,60 the respondent (a director) is obligated to return the property (building), 
which is the subject of the company's competition, the activity of the company 
 
56 SACGR 2019, Art 47. 
57 SACL 2015, Arts 72 and 74. 
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is to buy or rent buildings and re-rent them as residential units. The company 
claimed to the director that after the expiry of the company lease contract for 
the building (the subject of the dispute), the director rented the building for his 
own account, and the rent was not renewed for the company’s account. The 
company considered that as competing with the company’s activity. Whereas, 
the former Saudi Arabian Companies Law 1965 stipulated that the penalty for 
the competition with the company is the choice between equity compensation 
or considering the operations done for the company account, which the plaintiff 
chose the second option. Accordingly, the court judged that. 
However, the problem with the duty not to participate in any business 
competitive with that of the company is that it does not specify the range of time 
or place. The director may practice activity for the same type of company 
activity in another city, so is this participate considered as competition or not. 
Because the director may participate in any business competitive in another 
city, and after the development of her/his business, s/he resigns and competes 
with the company in the same place and time. In addition, the Saudi Arabian 
legislature does not stipulate that the time limit in non-competition be specified 
after the directors leave their position in the company. While the Saudi Arabian 
Labor Law 2005 stipulates that if the nature of the work allows an employee 
(director) to get to know the clients of the employer, the employer may stipulate 
in the appointment contract that the employee (director) must not compete with 
the company after the end of the contract. The validity of this condition must be 
written and determined in terms of time, place and type of work, and the 
duration of the ban on competition must not exceed two years from the end of 
the relationship between the two parties.61 It should also be noted that the duty 
not to participate in any business competitive with that of the company is not 
subject to some professions even if it is formed in the form of a professional 
company such as lawyers, engineers, accountants, doctors, and other 
professions.62 
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A question is also raised about the validity of the authorisation from the general 
assembly. If the company is sold and the members of the general assembly 
become different, does the former authorisation from the former shareholders 
become valid or need to issue another authorisation? Originally, the rights, 
responsibilities and liabilities arising from the agreements concluded by the 
company are transferred from the seller to the buyer.63 Saudi Arabian laws do 
not provide explicit prevision for the transfer of these rights and liabilities from 
the seller to the buyer, except that the principles of law in general and Islamic 
law agree on that. Unless otherwise specified in the contract of sale. 
The question also arises whether the directors’ commitment not to compete 
with the company is a personal commitment that s/he undertakes alone or 
extends to other people as members of her/his family. Al-Qalyoubi64 holds in 
this matter that the directors’ commitment not to compete with the company is 
a personal commitment that s/he shoulders only without her/his family. 
However, assuming this leads to evading the duty not to compete indirectly. In 
Saudi Arabian law, this is not explicitly stated. In practice, it is left to the judge’s 
discretion when there is a dispute about this matter and looking into the 
circumstances of the case; because the principle in Islamic law is a person is 
not bound by any obligation unless s/he obliges herself/himself to do so.65 
In Islamic law, the agent’s acts must be in accordance with the condition of the 
principal and the power granted, the agent shall never betray, nor does the 
agent acts for her/his own fortune. The agent, while performing the agency, is 
bound by the provisions of the Sharia that do not harm the principal. The 
prophet Muhammed (PBUH) said, "There should be neither harming nor 
reciprocating harm".66  
 
63 Al-Qalyoubi (n 62) 302-304. 
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4.7 Duty not to accept benefits from third parties 
In the context of the conduct of integrity and propriety, SACGR 2019 states that 
directors must not accept a benefit, in particular gifts from another party who 
has business dealings with the company. It is excluded from the application of 
this duty if it is unreasonable to consider the acceptance of benefit (gifts) leads 
to a conflict of interests and duties.67 The acceptance of benefits (gifts) by a 
director from a party may be considered a criminal offence and a breach of the 
duty. There is no explicit provision from the Saudi Arabian legislature linking the 
acceptance of gifts, by the director, to the crime of bribery, except elsewhere in 
another law, where the legislature linked the state employee’s acceptance of 
gifts to bribery.68 Otherwise, the acceptance of gifts from the director is subject 
to the discretionary authority of the judge, which depends on the provisions of 
Islamic law. 
In Islamic law, the basic principle of accepting gifts by workers is prevention 
and prohibition.69 So, in all that the workers benefit from in-kind or cash 
property, the facilities or any services that granted to them for their work other 
from other than the employer is not permissible.70 However, if the gift is caused 
by doing something, it is part of the meaning of bribery, and it must be rejected. 
The rule of that is what Ibn-Taymiyyah71 said if the person is removed from that 
position and s/he will be still given that gifts, so the position is not the reason 
for the gifts, then it is permissible to accept it as the gifts that are from family 
and friends; and if otherwise, the reason for the gift is her/his position, it is part 
of the meaning of bribery. Al-Shirbiny72 said, in the context of mentioning the 
reasons for the inadmissibility of gifts, one of them is the gift to the workers, as 
 
67 SACGR 2019, Art 49. 
68 The Saudi Arabian Civil Service Law 1976, art 12. 
69 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I'laam ul Muwaqqi'een 'an Rabb il 'Aalameen, Dar AlKutub AlElmiah, 
Beirut, (1991) part 3 p 114. 
70 Ibn Hajar Al-Asqalani, Fath al-Bari fi Sharh Sahih Al-Bukhari, Dar Al-Salam, Cairo, (2001), 
part 13 p 167. 
71 Ibn-Taymiyyah, Majmu al-Fatwa al-Kubra, King Fahd Printing Center, Medina, (2004), part 6 
p 157. 
72 Al-Khatib Al-Shirbiny, Mughni al-Muhtaj ila Ma'rifatil Ma'ani alfadh al-Minhaj, Dar AlKutub 
AlElmiah, Beirut, (1994), part 3 p 558. 
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it is forbidden for them to accept the gift from those who do not usually gift it 
before they were in the position. 
However, the director may accept gifts in Islamic law provided that the company 
(the employer) authorises the director to accept the gifts after the gift is 
disclosed and its amount. This is based on the saying of the prophet 
Muhammad,73 "whoever we have employed on work, must s/he bring what was 
given a little or much, and what we give him/her from that, s/he takes". This is 
express in the fact that it is permissible for the workers or employees to accept 
gifts because of their work if they are permitted from their employer (the 
company). Ibn Hajar74 said regarding what is prohibited from workers ’gifts, this 
is prohibited if the employer (the company) does not authorise it. Because it is 
forbidden only to cut off the causes of dishonesty and prevent the causes of the 
corruption of jobs and business. Therefore, the directors often are safe from 
being accused of dishonesty and corruption if the employer knows and 
authorises the gifts. 
SACGR 2019 stipulate that accepting gifts that are forbidden are those gifts 
that may lead to a conflict of interest. As for what the worker or employee 
benefits from all kinds of gifts, if the custom is tolerance to accept it, then it does 
not enter into what is prohibited from the gifts of workers and employees.75 This 
is fully consistent with Islamic law as mentioned above where is prevented the 
acceptance of gifts only to prevent dishonesty, corruption and harm. 
As for the hospitality offered to directors, some scholars of Islamic law stated 
that what is increased on the familiar usual hospitality due to the position is 
attached to the gifts of employees and workers that is prevented to be 
accepted.76 Some Islamic law scholars set a condition for accepting gifts by 
workers, after disclosing them and obtaining permission. This condition is that 
the worker (director) must reward the person who gifted her/him with the same 
 
73 Muslim ibn Al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, Dar AlKutub AlElmiah, Beirut, (2006), par 3415. 
74 Ibn Hajar (n 70) 167. 
75 SACGR 2019, art 49. 
76 Ibn-Taymiyyah (n 71) part 4 p 174-175. 
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value of the gift because if s/he does so, the worker (director) will void the effect 
of the gift and remove its power.77 
4.8 Duty to act in the interests of the company and consider the interests 
of the stakeholders. 
The SACL 2015 and the Corporate Governance Regulations 2019 implicitly 
state for the duty to act for the interests of the company in more than one place 
by imposing duties on directors to avoid conflicts of personal interests with the 
interests of the company as well as imposing penalties on directors in the event 
of acting against the interests of the company.78 
SACGR 2019 also provide that the company director must take into account 
the interests of stakeholders when managing the company.79 The OECD has 
confirmed that considering the interests of stakeholders is a high ethical 
standard that is certainly in the company's long-term interest, making it more 
credible and trustworthy.80 Taking into account the interests of the company's 
employees is also among the interests that directors must take into account 
when managing the company.81 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
state that mechanisms to enhance the performance of employee participation 
should be allowed in the context of corporate governance such as the 
representation of staff on boards and in governance processes and the 
mechanisms of sharing of profits, pension commitments and others related to 
performance enhancement. This incorporating implies its importance as the 
employee is the human capital of the company and is of value to the company 
and not just a tool that manages the company's financial assets. The powers of 
the director include setting development and incentive programmes for the 
employees of the company, listening to their opinions and discussing them in 
decisions affecting them functionally or health and safety issues in the 
 
77 Al-Shafi‘i, Muhammad., Al-Umm, Dar Al-Maarifah, Beirut, (1990), part 2 p 63. 
78 SACL 2015 arts 31, 72, 74 and 211; SACGR 2019, arts 21, 43, 49 and 86. 
79 SACGR 2019, arts 83 and 86.  
80 G20/OECD, ‘Principles of Corporate Governance’ (2015) 
<https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf> accessed 30 
January 2020; Annotations to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf> accessed 30 
January 2020. 
81 SACGR 2019, arts 83(4) and 84. 
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company.82 Employees may also be granted shares in the company or a 
percentage of the profits made by the company and other matters that benefit 
the employees.83 This may be a good reason to retain qualified employees or 
boost morale as this will result in long-term company benefits. 
The director must also take into account the interests of suppliers and 
customers in terms of strengthening the company's relationships, which is 
important for achieving long-term gains.84 Economic studies have confirmed 
that customer loyalty to the brand reduces marketing costs and stabilises the 
volume of production and sales, thereby increasing operating profits.85 
Directors should take into account the social contribution of the company, 
whether these social initiatives are provided to employees of the company in 
particular or to society in general.86 This is by directors establishing social 
programs and determining the necessary methods for proposing social 
initiatives by the company in the field of social work.87 Perhaps the purpose is 
to promote good relations with society. The company can participate in 
community planning and problem solving. This enhances the company's long-
term reputation and creates loyalty and satisfaction from society (the 
consumers). 
Finally, corporate governance stipulates that managers must consider the need 
to act with integrity towards shareholders, and protect their rights to ensure 
equality and fairness among them.88 This means not favouring one shareholder 
or group of shareholders over the rest, especially if some shareholders are 
weaker than others. 
4.9 Duty to be a liquidator upon the dissolution of the company 
One of the duties of the director stipulated in the SACL 2015 is to be a liquidator 
for the company.89 This is upon the dissolution of the company, the directors 
 
82 G20/OECD (n 80). 
83 SACGR 2019, art 85(2). 
84 SACGR 2019, art 83(3). 
85 Cerioni (n 62) chapter 3, 13-14. 
86 SACGR 2019, art 83(5). 
87 SACGR 2019, arts 87 and 88. 
88 SACGR 2019, art 4. 
89 SACL 2015 art 203. 
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will automatically be in the liquidator’s role until a liquidator is appointed for the 
company. In this case, the directors take the provisions of the liquidators and 
their duties and the mechanism of work in the event that there is more than one 
director, so it is like there is more than a liquidator.90 Article 206 of the SACL 
2015 stipulates that if there are two or more liquidators, they must act jointly 
and their actions shall be valid only if made jointly unless the appointment 
resolution or the authority that appointed them authorizes them to act 
individually. Whereas in UK law, a director cannot become a liquidator but 
rather the official receiver can become the company liquidator during any 
vacancy and continues in office until another person becomes liquidator.91 In 
addition, UK law requires liquidators to be only independent and qualified 
insolvency practitioners. Therefore, directors could not be liquidators of their 
own company, as this would create a conflict of interest.92 
However, the problem in the event that the resolution to appoint the director 
does not contain any provision to work as a liquidator in the event of the 
dissolution of the company. Perhaps the Saudi Arabian legislature intends this 
to continue to carry out the company's business until a liquidator is appointed, 
where in many cases the shareholders do not agree on the appointment of a 
liquidator, and the director will carry out the liquidator's work until a liquidator is 
appointed, either by the shareholders (voluntarily) or through the judiciary 
(Involuntary). Since it is one of the duties of the director to be a liquidator in the 
event of the company's termination and dissolution, it should be mentioned 
briefly what are the powers and duties of the liquidator. 
The SACL 2015 indicates that the liquidator's powers are determined by the 
company's articles of association or the resolution to appoint the liquidator, and 
all their acts are valid and binding on the company as long as it is within the 
powers granted to them.93 If the liquidator's powers are not determined, the 
SACL 2015 stipulates that the liquidator may conduct all business required for 
liquidation.94 Among the most important of these conducting business is the 
 
90 SACL 2015 art 206.  
91 Insolvency Act 1986, s 136(2)(3). 
92 See Re Ipcon Fashions Ltd, [1989] 5 BCC 733. 
93 SACL 2015 art 205(3). 
94 SACL 2015 art 207(1). 
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representation of the company before the judicial authorities and third party,95 
converting the company’s assets into cash, including the sale of movables and 
immovable property whether by auction or by any appropriate method ensures 
obtaining the highest price.96 The liquidator may not sell the company’s property 
in one lot nor offer it as a contribution in another company unless authorized to 
do that by the party that has appointed them.97 The liquidators also may not 
commence new operations unless they are necessary to perform pending 
tasks.98  
The SACL 2015 also provides that one of the duties of the liquidator is to pay 
off the company's debts if duly payable and to set aside the necessary sums 
for future payment they are undue or contested and then distribute among the 
shareholders any surplus.99 However, the SACL 2015 does not state the duty 
to refund the company's debts from others, which were expressly stipulated in 
the former Companies Law 1965,100 even though this duty is within the concept 
of conduct all business required for liquidation. 
The liquidators must also publish the resolution issued for their appointment 
and the restrictions imposed on their powers by the methods prescribed in the 
company's articles of association.101 The liquidators, within three months of 
commencing their work as a liquidator, must make an inventory of all the 
company's assets and liabilities. At the end of every financial year, the 
liquidators must prepare financial statements and a report on the liquidation 
operations.102 
Just as the duty to avoid conflicts of interest is one of the duties of directors, it 
is one of the duties of the liquidator. Article 211 of the SACL 2015 stipulates 
that the liquidator may not use the company's funds, assets or rights against 




97 SACL 2015 art 207(2). 
98 SACL 2015 art 207(3). 
99 SACL 2015 art 208(1)(3). 
100 The former Saudi Arabian Companies Law 1965, arts 222 and 223. 
101 SACL 2015 art 205(3). 
102 SACL 2015 art 209(1)(3). 
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the Saudi legislature does not address the matter of the liquidators selling the 
company's assets to themselves or to any member of their family. The Islamic 
law states that the agent is not permitted to sell the principal's money to 
herself/himself because it is not valid that s/he is the seller and buyer at the 
same time unless the principal has authorised.103 Also, Islamic law permits the 
agent to sell to a member of her/his family, provided that the sale is more than 
the value offered so that s/he is the highest price unless the principal authorises 
the sale otherwise.104 
Article 212 of the SACL 2015 states that the liquidator may not divulge the 
secrets of the company that has come to their knowledge by reason of their 
position, to other than the concerned authorities. The penalty for breach of this 
duty is made civil and criminal, imprisonment for a period not exceeding one 
year as maximum and penalised for not more than one million Saudi Riyals105 
or by either of these two penalties.  
The SACL 2015 also provides that the liquidators must take into account the 
need to act with integrity towards creditors, and protect their rights in a manner 
that ensure equality and fairness among them. This means not favouring one 
creditor or group of creditors over the rest.106 
Finally, Article 79 of the SACL 2015 states that the liquidator, after obtaining 
the approval of the ordinary general assembly, must institute a liability action 
against the company directors for wrongful acts that cause prejudice to the 
shareholders. However, the problem with this duty is that when the directors 
become the liquidators, it is unreasonable to expect that a suit will be brought 
against themselves! Basically, the liquidator’s function is to examine the 
directors’ work before dissolution the company, and if the liquidator was the 
director, then the purpose of the liquidator's function is negated. 
By examining this duty, and inferring the reason for enacting this duty on the 
director, it may be, as previously mentioned, that the Saudi Arabian legislator 
 
103 Al-Shirbiny (n 72) part 2 p224-225. 
104 Hafiz Aurangzeb, Al-Fatawa al-Hindiyya, Dar AlKutub AlElmiah, Beirut, (2000), part 3 p 589. 
105 1 USD = 3.75 Saudi Riyals, Fixed exchange rate. 
106 SACL 2015 art 211(E). 
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intended this to continue to carry out the company's business until a liquidator 
is appointed, where in many cases the shareholders do not agree on the 
appointment of a liquidator, and the director will carry out the liquidator's work 
until a liquidator is appointed, either by the shareholders (voluntarily) or through 
the judiciary (Involuntary). However, the administrative procedures for 
approving the director to be as a liquidator and the company's representative 
before the third party take much time to be approved their acts as a legal 
representative of the company. Therefore, the purpose of automatically 
appointing directors as a liquidator is not fulfilled in order to conduct the 
company's business until the appointment of the liquidator. 
Since the SACL 2015 does not determine a cut-off point before the company’s 
winding up for the directors’ duty to act in the interest of the creditors to be 
triggered, consequently, the directors will act in the interest of the company 
(shareholders) until the winding up of the company, and then the director may 
operate as ae liquidator if a liquidator is not appointed. This may create a state 
of uncertainty, such as if the directors knew that there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation, so they 
are caught between two options, of either acting in the interest of the company 
(shareholders) or acting in the interest of the creditors as considered they will 
be liquidators. Acting as a director means maintaining the company's assets; 
while acting as a liquidator means converting the company's assets into cash 
money. In the event that the directors knew that there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company would avoid going into dissolution or insolvent 
liquidation, and the price of the company's assets is high, will the director act 
as a liquidator and sell these assets at the best price, which will be in the interest 
of the shareholders and creditors after the liquidation, or the directors must wait 
for the company to be dissolved and be liquidated and then sell assets at the 
current price, which may decrease. 
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4.10 The evaluation of the Saudi Arabian law with respect to the directors’ 
duties. 
In this chapter, it has been dealt with the discussion of each issue in a detailed 
manner in its context; it will be briefly touched on the most important issues 
about the directors’ duties in Saudi Arabian law. Contrary to the former position 
in the UK (prior to CA 2006), directors’ duties in the former Saudi Arabian 
Companies Law 1965 were codified. One of the general reasons for codifying 
the duties of directors is to enhance the clarity of the law and make it easier for 
the responsibilities of directors towards others to be understood without the 
need for a legal consultant to interpret these duties. However, the general 
duties of directors in Saudi Arabian law are still not self-contained. These duties 
need recourse to the provisions of Islamic law to interpret them or to complete 
that which is non-stipulated. For example, in the need to resort to the provisions 
of Islamic law, in the interpretation and determination of the duty to exercise 
reasonable care, which was discussed in detail in para 4.3. 
Just as understanding the provisions of Islamic law is not so easy; the director 
needs sufficient knowledge and background to understand the Islamic law 
provisions. As the company directors must perform their duties as they see fit 
to achieve the company's purpose, but understanding these unclear or non 
stipulated duties will be a task that is very difficult especially for the directors 
who do not have a legal background or even a sufficient background on Islamic 
law. 
The directors’ duties are presented in a scattered and not explicit manner in 
many articles of the SACL 2015. Some of these duties are stated in the form of 
duties, while others are stated in the form of prohibitions against the director, 
while others are stated in the form of penalties if a director breached some 
prohibitions. The duties also are not fully stated in the SACL 2015, as some of 
these duties are stated in the SACGR 2019. The duties mentioned in the SACL 
2015 are scattered, some are stated in the companies section in general, some 
of the duties are stated in the section of the limited liability companies, and 
some duties are stated in the context of the joint-stock companies. Whoever 
sees this chaos in presenting the directors’ duties will assume that the 
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legislature, during dealing with one of the forms of companies, stated some 
duties for only the directors of this company regardless of the position of the 
provision (article) in the SACL 2015, which gives the impression that this duty 
is limited to only the directors of this company form or the legislature does not 
give the same interest and great importance in managing these companies. 
The SACL 2015 does not impose any duty on the directors to take into account 
the interests of creditors before the commencement of the winding up of the 
company. According to the provision of the SACL 2015, the director acts in the 
interests of the shareholders until the winding up of the company and then the 
function of the liquidator will be applied, who must take into account the need 
to act with integrity towards the creditors, and protect their rights to ensure 
equality and fairness among them. Failure to stipulate this duty in the corporate 
law may lead to a lack of trust between creditors and companies, especially in 
regard to large, long-term debt, or may lead to the need to provide extensive 
guarantees to creditors by companies. Even if  Islamic law maintains the rights 
of creditors, it would be worthy of the Saudi legislature to state a cut-off point, 
through which the directors must take into account the interests of creditors, 
rather than the interests of shareholders, and impose personal liability on the 
directors in the event that this duty is breached. 
In the absence of the duty to take into account the interest of creditors, which 
the Saudi legislature should have stipulated, the Saudi legislature stated in 
detail some overlapping duties, such as differentiation and stipulating the duty 
not to participate in any business competitive with that of the company and the 
duty to avoid conflict of interests. The duty not to participate in any business 
competitive with that of the company is included implicitly in the duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest. Despite the stipulation of the duty not to participate in any 
business competitive, the Saudi legislature does not determine the scope of 
time or place for competition. The SACL 2015 also does not stipulate that the 
period for non-competition be determined after the directors left their position in 
the company. 
Finally, as mentioned previously, one of the duties of the director stipulated in 
the SACL 2015 is to be a liquidator for the company where the circumstances 
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require. This is upon the dissolution of the company, the directors will 
automatically be in the liquidator’s rule until a liquidator is appointed for the 
company. This may create a state of uncertainty, such as if the directors knew 
that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into 
insolvent liquidation, so they are between two options, either acting in the 
interests of the company (shareholders) or acting in the interest of the creditors 
as considered they will be liquidators. Further, the administrative procedures 
for approving the director to be as a liquidator and the company's representative 
before the third party take much time to be approved their acts as a legal 
representative of the company. Therefore, the purpose of automatically 
appointing directors as a liquidator is not fulfilled in order to conduct the 
company's business until the appointment of the liquidator. 
4.11 The comparison of directors’ duties in the UK and Saudi legislation. 
As has been mentioned, the process of comparative study means examining 
the differences and similarities between the laws of different countries in 
different systems in the world. The importance of comparative law is that it helps 
to promote mutual understanding and dispel prejudice and misinterpretation in 
this world. It also provides a platform for legal intellectual exchange and helps 
to broaden the horizons of legislators worldwide. This study, in the previous 
chapters, has highlighted the directors’ duties in the UK and Saudi legislation. 
In this section, the study will compare the relevant legislation in Saudi Arabia 
and the like on the UK side, and highlight the similarities and differences in what 
needs to be clarified. It is worth mentioning that the aim of the comparative 
study is not to search for the best legal system, but the main purpose is to know 
more deeply the existing legal systems and thus develop what we have. 
One of the similarities between the UK and Saudi Arabian law is the codification 
of the directors’ duties, and that these duties are not self-contained despite 
codification. On the Saudi side, it is based on the provisions of Islamic law, and 
on the UK side, it is based on the provisions of common law for its interpretation. 
In general, the Saudi and UK legislators are consistent with framing the general 
duties of directors, the duty to act within powers granted, the duty to exercise 
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reasonable care, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest and to declare any 
personal interest and duty not to accept benefits from third parties. They are 
also implicitly consistent on duty to achieve the company’s purposes, which the 
UK legislature has expressed duty to promote the success of the company. 
Although the mechanism of the interpretation of some of these duties differs 
between UK law and Saudi law, depending on the interpretation of common law 
or interpretation of Islamic law. For example, the interpretation of the term 
"success" was based on common law on the UK side on several things to 
determine the meaning of "the company's success", such as achieving the 
objectives set by the company, the interpretation of directors of the company 
for success is a meaningful explanation and cannot be challenged, creating a 
long-term increase in the company's value, and what the constitution 
determines as a success of the company,107 and the interpretation of achieving 
the purposes depends on the level of care required that interpreted by the 
provisions of Islamic law. Therefore, the directors in both countries need to be 
aware of the provisions of common law on the UK side, or the provisions of 
Islamic law on the Saudi side, or the need for a legal consultant to explain this. 
As for the differences between the two sets of legislation, the UK legislature 
has stated all the duties in a separate chapter of the Act, called general duties 
of directors, and limited them between sections 171-177. The UK legislature 
has also clarified that the scope of these duties which are imposed on the 
current directors and the former directors of the company (a person who ceases 
to be a director), and the UK legislature has explained that the interpretation 
and the application of these duties are in the same way as under common law 
rules or equitable principles.108 While the Saudi legislator has presented the 
duties in a scattered and non explicit manner in many articles. Some of these 
duties are stated in the form of duties, while others are stated in the form of 
prohibitions against the director, while others are stated in the form of penalties 
if a director made some prohibitions. The duties also are not fully stated in the 
SACL 2015, as some of these duties are stated in the SACGR 2019. The Saudi 
Arabian legislature also does not clarify the scope of the application of duties if 
 
107 See (3.3.2 Duty to promote the success of the company) for further information. 
108 CA 2006, s 170. 
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it is to the current director only or the current director and former director; this 
is left to the judge's discretionary authority, which will rely on the provisions of 
Islamic law. 
In respect of the duty to exercise reasonable care, the UK legislature clarified 
the meaning of care is that "the general knowledge, skill and experience that 
may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out 
by the director in relation to the company",109 while the Saudi legislature does 
not explain this and left its interpretation to the Islamic law provision and the 
judge's discretionary authority. The UK legislature, when it stated the duty to 
avoid conflicts, made it clear that this includes the exploitation of the 
information, as also state that the director may breach the duty if permission to 
do so is obtained (including competition). While the Saudi legislature when state 
duty to avoid conflicts does not elaborate on that rather than that stipulating 
other duties that are included in this duty, such as the duty not to participate in 
any business competitive with that of the company and the duty to maintain 
confidentiality.  
In the duty not to accept benefits from a third party, the UK legislator stipulated 
the duty in greater clarity, including the cause of benefit and what is considered 
a breach of the duty and what is not considered a breach of the duty,110 which 
is fully consistent with the provisions of Islamic law. The Saudi legislature 
stipulates in general that it is not permissible to accept benefits from a third 
party unless it is not likely to lead to a conflict of interests. 
One of the fundamental differences between the duties of the director in Saudi 
and UK legislation is that the UK legislature requires the director to consider 
and act in the interest of creditors in certain circumstances,111 while the Saudi 
legislature does not stipulate this duty to directors and makes the duties all 
concentrated on the interest of the company and the shareholders. Although 
the provisions of Islamic law maintain the rights of creditors, this duty should 
have been included in the SACL 2015. The failure of the Saudi Arabian 
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legislator to stipulate this duty is one of the legal gaps in the SACL 2015. This 
indicates a degree of weakness in the Saudi Arabian legislation. This weakness 
must be recognised in order to promote the future legal reform in Saudi Arabia. 
One of the reasons for this weakness may be entirely relying on the provisions 
of Islamic law, and the familiarity of Saudi Arabian people with Islamic law 
provisions. However, the expansion of the commercial business in Saudi 
Arabia, the development of these forms of business and the entry of foreign 
investors, found that understanding the provisions of Islamic law is not an easy 
matter for everyone. In addition, one of the duties stipulated in SACL 2015 that 
does not feature in the UK Companies Act is the duty to be a liquidator upon 
the dissolution of the company. 
Given the directors’ duties in Saudi law it is clear that there is a great lack of 
clarification of the duties through the SACL 2015. These duties can only be 
clarified by making use of the provisions of Islamic law, as stipulating them in 
the form of legal provisions gives it more strength and makes it easier to be 
understood by the company directors. Also, many of the duties, as it has been 
mentioned, are stipulated in the Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance 
Regulation, but this regulation applies only to listed joint-stock companies and 
some of them are purely guiding articles (i.e non-compulsory). However, these 
duties stipulated in the Corporate Governance Regulation ultimately are in full 
conformity with the provisions of Islamic law, which means that the articles have 
the power to bind. 
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Chapter Five: The liability of company directors in UK law 
As already mentioned,1 a duty is the obligation to do something or not to do 
something. The duties give rise to obligations and may raise liabilities, so it can 
be said that the liabilities are the result of a breach of duty. This chapter deals 
with the laws of the United Kingdom in relation to the liabilities of the company 
director, which may be a result of a breach of duty, in order to compare them 
with the laws of Saudi Arabia in another chapter. 
5.1 Business Judgment Rule and Judicial Intervention 
Because not all decisions made by directors have good consequences for the 
company, its shareholders, stakeholders and other parties, therefore the 
imposition of duties on directors and hold them to the liabilities for breaching 
these duties a mechanism to guide them in the way they should exercise their 
powers to reduce the risk of their decisions. However, courts have often 
refrained to hold directors liable for undesirable consequences.2 This is 
because the courts are not willing to replace the directors' judgment by their 
own judgment.3 This attitude led to the establishment of the business judgment 
rule in the USA.4 This rule protects the directors from frivolous lawsuits about 
the way they conduct the company’s business by assuming that management 
is acting in the interests of the company. This rule states that if the acts of the 
director can be classified as a business judgment decision, then the director is 
presumed not to be liable for what has or has not been done. Therefore, it is 
worth analysing and investigating this rule to know if the legislation in the UK 
recognizes this rule or not; as this has a great impact on holding the directors 
liable for their decisions or not and the consequences of these decisions. 
Although this rule has not been officially recognized by legislation in the UK, but 
this rule has been recognized in a number of cases, such as in Birdi v 
Specsavers Optical Group Ltd,5 where the court held that the director's act was 
 
1 See (3.2 The directors' powers). 
2 J Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (Oxford: OUP 1993), p 94.  
3 See Hampson v Price’s Patent Candle Co (1876) 45 LJ Ch 437; Circle Petroleum (Qld) Pty 
Ltd v Greenslade [1998] 16 ACLC 1577. 
4 Through cases law in Delaware in the US, for example, see Cede and Co v Technicolor Inc 
634 A 2d 245 (1993); Re Caremark International (698 A 2d 959 (1996). 
5 [2015] EWHC 2870 (Ch). 
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in the interests of the company and there was no evidence of the existence of 
the motive of malice or improper motive and considered his act "that was a 
matter for his commercial judgment, which the Court will not second-guess". 
Also in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd,6 it is stated that the courts 
"will respect their "directors" judgment as to matters of management" in the 
event of exist bona fide. However, there has been no clear explanation of what 
could be considered as business judgment, although the definition of business 
judgment is important because the classification of a matter as a business 
judgment provides immunity to directors from liability for such decisions. 
In England, the determination of business judgment is not clear, since the 
courts do not use the term "business judgment" to indicate when the director's 
judgment will be respected.7 Instead, the courts use other terms such as 
"commercial judgment" or "commercial decision".8 The court stated in 
Merchantbridge & Co Ltd v Safron General Partner 1 Ltd,9 "They "the directors" 
made a business judgment... This was a commercial decision". 
The courts respect directors' exercise of discretion in the management of the 
company, which is expressed that directors’ judgments or decisions. 
"Judgments or decisions" in this context means the ability to make a decision 
based on experience and responsibility.10 This is completely consistent with 
what was stated in Re Brian D Pierson (Contractors) Ltd,11 Hazel Williamson 
QC said that "I must therefore give proper respect to Mr Pierson's “the director” 
evidence as to how his industry operates, and his judgement based on 
experience". In McKee v O'Reilly,12 the court considered that the expenditure 
on the refurbishment of the company’s office premises was sensible in terms of 
commercial, so Sir Donald Rattee said that it "seems to me to have been a 
 
6 [1974] A.C. 821. 
7 S Cairns, Changing the Culture of Financial Regulation: A Corporate Governance Approach 
PhD thesis, (2014) University of Liverpool 147. 
8 Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Langport Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch) at [754]. 
9 [2011] EWHC 1524 (Comm). 
10 Oxford and Cambridge dictionaries at: 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/judgement>; 
<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/judgment?q=Judgment> accessed on 12 
June 2019. 
11 [1999] B.C.C. 26. 
12 [2003] EWHC 2008 (Ch). 
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matter of judgment". In Singer v Beckett,13 Mr Justice Park said when the 
director decided not to pursue a broker for outstanding debts, it "as a matter of 
business judgment". 
The "judgment or decisions" may also mean that the final decision or a number 
of decisions leading to the final decision to do something. Decision-making is 
therefore not an isolated event; it consists of a series of processes that make 
the final decision.14 
Decision-making is part of a series of processes leading to a final decision.15 
Directors should carefully consider all aspects related to the final judgment, 
such as taking advice, due diligence and then making the decision. Accordingly, 
is it possible to say that the court may evaluate one aspect of the series of 
judgments leading to a final decision or are they all protected from scrutiny? 
This leads to the search for a mechanism through which courts can review the 
directors’ acts or their decisions, which would evaluate the exercise of directors’ 
discretion while ensuring that it does not impede the management of the 
company effectively. 
The judicial approach, in a review of directors' decisions, is based on the view 
that courts should not substitute decisions for directors' decisions and that 
directors' decisions should be generally immune from judicial review16 unless 
there is no reasonable director could have made, which known Wednesbury 
standard.17 Judicial intervention occurs in derivative suits or legal proceedings 
provided by the board of directors on behalf of the company against directors. 
However, the courts will not review the decisions of directors taken in good faith. 
With regard to the duty to act for proper purposes and the duty to enhance the 
success of the company, the court may intervene and repeal the authority 
 
13 [2007] 2 B.C.L.C. 287. 
14 Pettigrew, A. ‘Studying Strategic Choice and Strategic Change. A Comment on Mintzberg 
and Waters: ‘Does Decision get in the way?’’ Organization Studies, January 1990, Vol.11(1), 
pp.6-11 cited in Keay, A., & Loughrey, J. (2019). The concept of business judgment. Legal 
Studies, 39(1), 43-44. 
15 Ibid. 
16 See Howard Smith Ltd. Appellant v Ampol Petroleum Ltd. and Others Respondents [1974] 2 
W.L.R. 689. 
17 P. Davies and S. Worthington (eds), Gower and Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law, 
9th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), para.16-76; Mortimore, S. (2013). Company 
directors: Duties, liabilities, and remedies (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 259-262. 
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decision if it reaches an unreasonable conclusion that no reasonable authority 
can be made such that.18 Section 172 has been interpreted as the courts 
refraining from reviewing on an objective basis if the directors' decision was in 
the interest of the company in their own opinion.19 Problematic in the current 
Wednesbury standard is that it is very low because it is accountable only 
directors who act in bad faith or grossly negligent, so the role of s 172 is closer 
to being educational because s 172 leaves the explanation of what promotes 
the success of the company to the directors.20 
However, the courts cannot be prevented from interfering in the review of the 
board's decision-making process by adopting a research review when 
reviewing and evaluating whether directors have breached s 172 through 
heightened review.21 This approach has been adopted by the courts to 
intervene appropriately in other areas of corporate law,22 which can be used in 
relation to the decision-making process of directors in cases of breach of duties 
through the use of heightened review. The adoption of this type of review does 
not mean that judges are more experienced than directors in understanding 
risks but this does not preclude examination of the quality and the integrity of 
the decision-making process. This is the essence of the difference between the 
Wednesbury standard and heightened review. In heightened review, the courts 
do not scrutinise the decision or its results, but only review the decision-making 
process on objective and reasonable grounds for the matter to be examined, 
for example, having the required experience and the allocation of sufficient time 
and resources to consider matters before the decision is taken,23 adequate 
monitoring and supervision, discussion with shareholders about the matter and 
the like, which is consistent with the nature of the company and the type of 
 
18 See Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp 
[1948] 1 K.B. 223. 
19 Keay (n 40) chapter 3, 140. 
20 J Loughrey, (2013). Directors' Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial 
Crisis (ed). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 93. 
21 Lim, E. (2018). Judicial Intervention in Directors' Decision-Making Process: Section 172 of 
the Companies Act, Journal of Business Law, (2), 169-170. 
22 See Kershaw, David. (2012). Company law in context: Text and materials (2nd ed.). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 614–617; Lim (n 21) 171. 
23 See Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V.-C at 189 in Byng v London Life Association Ltd [1990] 
Ch. 170. 
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matter.24 This review by the courts has current benefit in maintaining rights and 
holding directors accountable if they are considered by the courts. As well as a 
future benefit through which the behaviour of directors in the decision-making 
process of the board is improved through the collection and examination of 
information carefully, and increase their participation with the shareholders 
through discussion with them before making any decision.25 
The argument that the court's review of the decision comes too late after the 
outcome is clarified, which does not consider the time circumstances at the time 
of the decision-making,  is refuted because the hindsight bias has a clear impact 
on the decision outcome, not on scrutiny the decision-making process.26 The 
argument that courts cannot evaluate experts’ evidence to prove that the 
decision-making process is flawed, is refuted because courts have the ability to 
evaluate expert testimony, a common practice.27 
In Roberts v Frohlich,28 the court scrutinised the decision-making process of 
the directors. The court found that the directors breached their fiduciary duty by 
not taking into account the interest of the company or its creditors by continuing 
the project for the subsequent development of the industrial and commercial 
units instead of suspending the performance despite the futility of the project. 
During the decision-making process, directors did not take into account the 
advice received about the risks of continuing the project and its futility, the 
required amount for the contractor exceeded that provided by the bank for the 
development facility and directors were unable to obtain funding from an agreed 
source in the past. Mackie and others29 comment on this case that, the 
directors’ views of the company’s prospects were perhaps overly optimistic and 
 
24 See House of Commons Treasury Committee, Banking Crisis: Reforming Corporate 
Governance and Pay in the City Ninth Report of Session 2008–09 (12 May 2009) (London: 
Stationery Office, 2009) (the Banking Crisis Report), paras 78–79. 
25 T. Payne et al., "Corporate Board Attributes, Team Effectiveness and Financial Performance" 
(2009) 46 Journal of Management Studies 46; M.A. Eisenberg, (1999). Corporate Law and 
Social Norms. Columbia Law Review, 99, 1253. 
26 Eisenberg (n 25). 945, 961. 
27 F. Gevurtz, "The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion" 
(1993) 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 287, 305–312. 
28 [2012] B.C.L.C. 407. 
29 Mackie, F, Davies, R and Townsley, A., Directors’ liability: the case of directorial responsibility 
following Roberts v Frohlich., June 2011, Insurance and Reinsurance Review, Edwards Angell 
Palmer & Dodge, 10. at <https://www.lexology.com/r.ashx?l=9AXSDHE> accessed on 5 
December 2020. 
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not entirely realistic. It was clear the loan conditions could not be met, and with 
no alternative avenue for funding, the decision to authorise further development 
was irrational and based on “wilful blindness... a deliberate decision not to 
enquire or consider lest an unpalatable truth be exposed”. At this point, the 
judge held “the only honest thing to do was to stop the development”. 
According to the Leeds Project on Business Judgment and The Courts,30 after 
analysing a number of law cases, the results show that directors’ decisions are 
not protected from judicial scrutiny or review, and directors are not immune from 
liability. The law assesses directors’ decisions through the process-based 
classification of the directors’ behaviour in context. Where the judges got 
involved in a systematic review of the directors’ business judgment, which 
includes the matter of substantive decision, and a review of judgment 
processes. Imposing liability is more likely when the process goes wrong. This 
means, for example, in the event of the absence of a process. The irrational 
processes in the directors’ acts, such as recklessness, blind optimism, and 
refusal to accept reality also support the imposition of liability. 
Directors have a tendency to assume greater project risk more than others do 
because the nature of the business world is based on a great deal of trust, 
speculation and risk.31 Most business judgment cases are related to risk 
decisions.32 Perhaps the reason is that the difference between the acceptable 
risks to which a businessman is exposed and the unacceptable risks is not 
always clear.33 The essence of directors’ business judgment involves 
evaluating the trade-off between risk and return. Taking on more risk often 
means achieving higher returns. However, all parties must be aware of this risk 
before entering into the transaction, with the possibility that the return could be 
different than expected.34 
 
30 Project of Business Judgment and the Courts. This inter-disciplinary project between the 
School of Law, Leeds, and the Management School, Liverpool, available at 
<https://essl.leeds.ac.uk/dir-record/research-projects/268/business-judgment-and-the-courts> 
accessed on [15 June 2020]. 
31 Overend & Gurney Co v Gibb (Thomas Jones) (1871-72) L.R. 5 H.L. 480 at 495. 
32 See ASIC v Rich [2009] NSWSC 1229. 
33 See Facia Footwear Ltd (In Administration) v Hinchliffe 1997 WL 1102751. 
34 See Chandler, Chancellor In Re CITIGROUP INC. Shareholder Derivative Litigation 964 A.2d 
106 (2009) available at: https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/collages/4274 [accessed June 2019]. 
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The question is whether all decisions of directors are considered business 
judgment. The Australian Corporations Act 2001 defines business judgment as 
a decision was taken on the conduct of a company’s business operations.35 
While in the United States it is any business decision taken in good faith and 
rational.36 Eisenberg37 argues that every business decision is unique, thus, it 
cannot be determined. However, the English courts' approach is different from 
that, some decisions were classified as business judgments. The courts 
recognized that business judgments involve transactions with third parties. 
Thus, English courts use the term "commercial judgment"38. However, business 
judgments have been applied to a wide range of other decisions in England, 
such as the decision to lay off employees to reduce costs for the interest of the 
company.39 The Australian Companies and Securities Law Review Committee 
believes that business judgments are applied to decisions relating to the 
company's goals and budget, raising or changing capital, and to obtaining or 
providing credit.40 However, this does not mean that the business judgement 
rule has been adopted in the UK, but the variants have been adopted in 
Malaysia, Australia and South Africa. The directors will be protected in 
Australia, when they have acted in good faith in a matter in which they have no 
conflict of interest, have been properly informed and acted rationally in the 
company's interest. In South Africa the directors will be also protected when 
they have acted in good faith in the interest of the company, avoided a conflict 




35 Australian Corporations Act 2001, s.180(3). 
36 See Re Caremark Intern. Inc. Deriv. Lit. 698 A.2d 959 (1996) available at: 
https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/1996/13670-3.html [accessed June 
2019]. 
37 M.A. Eisenberg, "The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers" (1990) 51 U. Pitt. L. 
Rev. 964. 
38 Cobden Investments Ltd v RWM Langport Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch) at [754]. 
39 F&C Alternative Investments (Holdings) Ltd v Barthelemy [2011] EWHC 1731 (Ch). 
40 Company Directors and Officers: Indemnification, Relief and Insurance Report No 10 (1990), 
para 81. 
41 Milman, D. (2013). Governance of distressed firms (Corporations, globalisation and the law 
series). Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub. 124-132. 
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5.2 Directors’ liability 
5.2.1 Breach of fiduciary duty 
It has already been mentioned in this research that the term “director”   includes 
all those who hold the position of director by any name called.42 The benefit of 
this is that all those covered by this definition will be personally liable for the 
acts and decisions of the company in case of breach of duties. This may be a 
good reason to prevent using corporate directors from being a company director 
so that there is no chain of command in management, which may lead to 
evasion from the consequences of decisions taken.43 The fiduciary duty is owed 
by all directors, even if not formally appointed, for the interest of the company 
except in the case of insolvency, the duty is in the interest of the creditors.44 
However, the director-elect as the director of the company who has not yet 
taken up the position does not owe the fiduciary duty as well as the director of 
the holding company for its subsidiaries if it has an independent board.45 
The fiduciary obligation arose as a legal principle in English equity rules.46 The 
term “fiduciary” applies to a large number of persons in legally recognised 
commercial relations, such as that between a director and a company, which in 
turn gives authority over the interests of others, which may be vulnerable to 
misuse. To protect the vulnerable party, the law imposes a fiduciary duty on the 
party that has the power.47 
The term “fiduciary obligation” is due to a relationship of trust and confidence. 
Millett LJ48 held that a fiduciary is a person who has undertaken to act for or on 
behalf of another person in a particular matter in a relationship of trust and 
confidence. The fiduciary duty is characterised as a single-minded loyalty 
obligation. Thus, a fiduciary must act in good faith and not make a profit by their 
 
42 CA 2006 s 250. 
43 Jason (n 31) chapter 2; Secretary of State v Hall [2006] EWHC 1995 (Ch); Re Hydrodan 
(Corby) Ltd [1994] B.C.C. 161. 
44 CA 2006 ss 170 and 172; See DPC Estates Pty Ltd v Grey (1974) 1 NSWLR 444. 
45 See Lindgren v L and P Estates Ltd [1968] Ch 572. 
46 See Lord Herschell in Bray v Ford [1896] A.C. 44 HL at 51. 
47 See J. Velasco, "Fiduciary duties and fiduciary outs" (2013) 21 George Mason Law Review 
157, 159-161. 
48 See Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18. 
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trust and not put themselves in a situation where their duty to their principal may 
conflict with their own interest and they must act for the interest of the 
principal/company, not for their personal interest, unless expressly stated 
otherwise.49 The fiduciary duty seeks to strengthen loyalty and trust and also to 
prevent dishonesty.50 
In this context, it is worth mentioning the extent to which the fiduciary obligation 
can be modified in a fiduciary’s contract with the principal. The opponents argue 
that the modification of fiduciary duties may render them useless as an 
organisational mechanism created to create a balance of power in a 
relationship of mutual trust and confidence, where the fiduciary has the power 
and the control on the interests of the company. This is to prevent the 
occurrence of disloyal behaviour.51 The other view, as it is known that freedom 
of trade must be respected so that traders can manage their trade in the manner 
they deem appropriate, because of the relationship between the two parties to 
the trade is subject to legal agreements between them, when an agreement is 
negotiated with informed consent, it can modify the level of trust and confidence 
in the relationship between the parties.52 Therefore, not all self-interested 
behaviour is non-loyalty. 
The breach of the fiduciary obligation involves several cases in that the fiduciary 
is considered a breach of the fiduciary duty. Therefore, Millett LJ53 determines 
fiduciary duties as the duty to act in good faith, the duty of non-profit, the duty 
to avoid conflicts of interest, the duty not to act for personal benefit or by a third 
party without informed consent. Of cases of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
duty to act in the interest of the company and for the proper purpose. In general, 
directors are required to act in what they consider to be in the interest of the 
company as a whole. If the motives of directors are intact, they will usually be 
immune from the liability in respect of acting in the interest of the company. 
 
49 Lord Herschell, Bray v Ford [1896] A.C. 44 HL at 57. 
50 Hudson, A., Equity and Trusts 9th Edition (Routledge: London, 2017) Ch 14, 621. 
51 Atkins, Matthew, What is the purpose of the ongoing use of fiduciary duties in English 
business law, with particular reference to breaches of duty in relation to bribery, secret profits, 
conflicts of interest and unconscionability?, PhD thesis, (2018), Lancaster University, 114-115. 
52 See Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205. 
53 See Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18. 
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Nevertheless, when acting for the improper purpose or the purpose was not 
conferred, the courts will intervene.54 
It has been mentioned in (3.3 Duty to promote the success of the company) 
that it is not easy to define good faith exactly because of the different contexts 
in which it arises,55 notwithstanding its widespread use. This is either because 
it is assumed that everyone knows what it means or because its widespread 
use has created an unclear and inconsistent understanding of what it means.56 
On this, Nowicki57 says that the problem lies in the fact that ‘importing a 
definition of good faith into the context of director conduct from other areas of 
law is not ideal, because most definitions of good faith are context-specific’. 
However, courts have adopted a method of interpretation of 'good faith' by 
contrast, such as the absence of malice and lack of intent to harm. They also 
often explain what ‘bad faith’ is in the case at hand rather than getting involved 
in the interpretation of good faith.58 The act in good faith in the interest of the 
company includes disclosure as part of this duty as in British Midland Tool v 
Midland International Tooling,59 the directors of the company have started to 
establish a competitive business for their company in which they work. The 
court held this to be a breach of the fiduciary duty. It also held that the duty to 
act in the interest of the company includes the duty to inform the company of 
any actual or threatened activity that may harm the interests of the company. 
In Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassih,60 the court held that the director was obliged 
to disclose as part of acting in the interest of the company, which it was 
described as a duty of loyalty. The director could not fulfil his duty of loyalty 
unless he informed the company of his plans to obtain a contract for himself. 
Also in Allnutt v Nags Head Reading Ltd,61 a director was removed due to his 
participation with a local competitor company, which the directors considered it 
as a conflict of interest and a breach of his duties as a director. The director 
 
54 See Peterson J in Piercy v S. Mills & Co. Ltd [1920] 1 Ch 77; Buckley J in Hogg v Cramphorn 
[1967] Ch. 254. 
55 Sealy (n 52) chapter 3. 
56 Juenger (n 53) chapter 3. 
57 Nowicki (n 54) chapter 3. 
58 See Re Walt Disney Co Derivative Litigation 906 A.2d 27 (2006). 
59 [2003] EWHC 466 (Ch). 
60 [2004] EWCA Civ 1244. 
61 [2019] EWHC 2810 (Ch). 
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brought a suit in court alleging unfair dismissal and age discrimination. Those 
claims were rejected, then he issued the present claim, in the Chancery 
Division, for unfair prejudice under s 994 of the CA 2006, he sought the 
remaining shareholders purchase his shares at a price to be fixed by the court 
and compensation for the loss of his office. The director argued that there was 
no actual conflict and that it was implicitly approved. However, at the trial, the 
judge found that he was and is still involved in the strategy, investment and 
marketing of the other company. The judge, therefore, concluded that the 
director's participation in the competing company was clearly conflicted with his 
duties as a director of the company. This conflict was not at any time agreed by 
his fellow directors or shareholders. Therefore, his claim was rejected 
accordingly. The court also decided that it cannot be said that he acted honestly 
and reasonably to the extent that a breach of his duty ought to be excused. He 
made no real effort to remedy his conduct through disclosure. 
Determining the meaning of the proper purpose is controversial. The concept 
of the proper purpose may be undefined in the company's constitution or the 
interpretation of this concept may be disputed. The proper purpose is related 
to, inter alia, the activity of the company, the shareholders’ objective, the intent 
of directors, the motive behind the decision and consideration of the best 
interests of the company and others.62 In the considering of the duty to take into 
account the best interests of the company stipulated in s 172 of the CA 2006, 
an issue arises not only whether the director acts honestly or not, but whether 
the action taken is within the purpose conferred and in the interest of the 
company. In Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd,63 the court held that 
directors abused their fiduciary duty in allotment of shares for a purpose 
unrelated to management or other appropriate considerations. 
Jonathan Parker J in Regentcrest Ltd v Cohen,64 says that the duty that is 
imposed is a subjective duty, and not in the court’s own consideration 
(objectively), so the challenge of the act or omission is in the interests of the 
company or not, depends on the mental state of the director, whether the 
 
62 CA 2006, ss 171 and 172; for the further see (3.3.1 Duty to act within powers). 
63 [1974] A.C. 821. 
64 [2001] 1 B.C.L.C. 80 at 105b. 
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director honestly believed that his act or omission was in the interest of the 
company. Thus, the director's task is to persuade the court that s/he honestly 
believed it was in the best interests of the company. The court will not replace 
the directors' judgment by its own judgment, but the appropriateness of the 
director's acts will be raised by the courts.65 
There is a slight overlap between the duty to act in the interest of the company 
and the duty of care. However, failure to take appropriate steps to consider the 
interests of the company and its creditors may amount to disloyalty and thus 
breach of duty to act in good faith for the interests of the company. While if 
directors act in good faith for the interest of the company and for proper 
purposes they will not be liable for breach of the fiduciary duty but may be liable 
for breach of duty of care.66 There is also an overlap between the duty to act in 
the company's interest and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. Avoiding 
conflicts of interest and profits is, in fact, promotion of the duty to act in the 
interest of the company. In a study on the limits of the fiduciary duty of directors, 
Lim67 finds that the duty to avoid unauthorised profits subsumes into the duty 
to avoid conflicts of interest in general, whether directors get self-interest or not. 
He suggests that the courts interpret the term "reasonably be regarded as 
likely" in section 175 by three things: that the company has considered the 
opportunity on an informed basis, the opportunity was within the scope of the 
company's activity, and the opportunity was a mature business opportunity.68 
5.2.2 Breach of duty owed to creditors 
5.2.2.1 Wrongful Trading 
The beginning of the use of the term wrongful trading is due to the Report of 
the Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice known as 
the Cork Report, where it states that the fraudulent trading provision had very 
 
65 This topic has been addressed in detail in (Business Judgment Rule and Judicial 
Intervention).  See para 5.1 above. 
66 See Leslie Kosmin Q.C. in Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd 
[2002] EWHC 2748 (Ch) at 83. 
67 Lim, E; “Directors’ fiduciary duties: a new analytical framework.” (2013) 129 LQR 242-244. 
68 Gibbs, D; “The absolute limit of directors’ fiduciary liability for conflicts of interest: the 
director’s perspective” (2015) 36 Comp. Law. 231. 
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inadequacies in dealing with irresponsible trading, such as applying the burden 
of criminal proof to civil proceedings.69 Cork Report was concerned that 
unsecured creditors were not adequately protected and felt that compensation 
should be available to those who suffered a loss due to unreasonable behaviour 
or fraudulent acts.70 The fraudulent trading provision failed to rein in directors 
who incurred losses when their companies faced financial difficulties.71 
Therefore, the Cork Report recommended that a new provision be enacted to 
provide civil proceedings for unreasonable trading, where only the application 
of the burden of civil proof, which strips directors of the benefits of limited liability 
when they see the insolvency is coming and do nothing to stop it or preserve 
the interests of the creditors.72 
Section 214 of Insolvency Act 1986 can be described as a provision that aims 
to control the company's activities by requiring directors to take some action to 
stop their companies from becoming insolvent,73 and directors must participate 
in stricter monitoring of the company's interests. All of these to prevent directors 
from placing all trade risks on creditors. It does not understand that this 
provision is to punish the directors to the insolvency of their companies but to 
address the situation that directors can do better towards the company to 
protect the interests of creditors effectively. 74 Lewison J75 says that 
"... there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid an 
insolvent liquidation? .... it depends on rational expectations of what the 
future might hold. But directors are not clairvoyant and the fact that they 
fail to see what eventually comes to pass does not mean that they are 
guilty of wrongful trading". 
 
69 Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice (Cork Report), Cmnd 8558, 
HMSO (1982) at para 1776-1780. 
70 Cork Report at 1777. 
71 Ibid, at 1776-1778. 
72 Ibid, at 1777. 
73 Yeung, K, 'Private enforcement of competition law' in McCrudden C (ed), Regulation and 
Deregulation, Policy and Practice in the Utilities and Financial Services Industries Oxford 
University Press, (1999) p 40. 
74 See Vinelott J in Re Purpoint Ltd [1991] BCLC 491 at 499; Re Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd 
(In Liquidation) [2007] B.C.C. 937 at 41. 
75 Re Hawkes Hill Publishing Co Ltd (In Liquidation) [2007] B.C.C. 937 at 950(41). 
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Liquidators and also administrators may take action against directors when they 
involved in so-called wrongful trading. This action is taken in order to obtain 
some contribution from directors towards the payment made to creditors who 
have not recovered what they were owed to by the company.76 This action 
begins in accordance with s 214 of Insolvency Act 1986 if the company's assets 
are insufficient to pay its debts, and its directors knew or should know that there 
is no reasonable possibility that the company will avoid entering into insolvent 
liquidation.77 
It was originally allowed only for to liquidators to start proceedings, unlike some 
other jurisdictions allowing other parties to start proceedings. For example, in 
Ireland, the receiver, the examiner, the creditor, the shareholder and the 
liquidator can initiate proceedings.78 The Cork Report supported the view to 
grant administrators and administrative receivers and the liquidators the 
authority to take proceedings.79 However, the administrator's role is limited to 
recommending that the company be moved from the administration to 
dissolution if s/he believes that the company does not have sufficient assets to 
distribute to its creditors.80  The downside to not allowing administrators to 
initiate proceedings the fact that the only way to promote creditor interests is to 
push for liquidation rather than administration. While if the administrator can 
take proceedings, the company can be placed in administration and the 
company may still be able to be rescued.81 After the Small Business, Enterprise 
and Employment Act 2015 came into force, it also allowed administrators to 
bring a claim for wrongful trading.82 
It should be noted that s 214 does not specify the conduct and activities that 
constitute wrongful trading. This implies the inclusion of all activities involving 
 
76 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214.   
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the conduct of directors in their management of the company. Griffin83 believes 
the type of behaviour included in s 214 involves paying munificent dividends, 
selling off company assets undervalued, paying excessive remuneration and 
incurring obligations that the company cannot meet.  Sealy84 says that the 
formulation of the provision is very broad, the liability includes incompetence, 
ignorance and indifference. Section 214 of Insolvency Act 1986 also does not 
provide guidance to liquidators on how to act before the start of proceedings. 
However, Park J85 was irritated by the lack of communication of the liquidators’ 
solicitors with the directors for a long time and the commencement of 
procedures by the liquidators before the limitation period elapses. Because the 
liquidator is the plaintiff, the burden of proof is thrown on him/her first and then 
comes the director’s defence. The liquidator must prove four things to claim for 
the personal directors’ liability in wrongful trading. First, the company must have 
entered into an insolvent liquidation, which means the company at the time of 
winding up was its debts and liabilities exceeding its assets.86 The considered 
insolvency here is the insolvency in the balance sheet, not with regard to cash 
flow.87 Second, to claim for the directors’ liability in wrongful trading, the 
respondent must be a director.88 The wrongful trading claim applies only to the 
director, unlike some jurisdictions, the liability is imposed on every officer in the 
company in general.89 This is what the Cork Report recommended that to hold 
any person the liability of wrongful trading if s/he is a party to the execution of 
the company's wrongful activities.90 Thirdly, the liquidator must prove that the 
director at a time prior to the commencement of winding up was aware or ought 
to have concluded that there was no reasonable possibility of avoiding the 
company's entry into the insolvent liquidation.91 Thus, the considered test here 
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is both the objective and subjective tests together. The lack of qualities or 
experience of a director would not be a protection from liability because 
ignorance is not an excuse.92 Courts will also take several considerations and 
factors as to whether there is a reasonable prospect or not to avoid insolvent 
liquidation such as creditors pressure, withdrawal of support from banks, loss 
of contracts, inability to obtain new contracts.93 Fourthly, the liquidator must 
establish that the director knew or ought to know at a specific time that there 
was no reasonable prospect of avoiding the company's entry into the insolvent 
liquidation.94  Oditah95 says that the term "reasonable prospect" is ambiguous. 
In many cases, it is difficult to look into the future of the company and determine 
whether liquidation is the fate of the company. In this case, if directors continue 
trading, they will be liable. In Re Continental Assurance Co of London plc,96 
Park J said that: 
“closed their eyes to the reality of the company’s position, and carried on 
trading long after it should have been obvious to them that the company 
was insolvent and that there was no way out for it. In those cases the 
directors had been irresponsible, and had not made any genuine attempt 
to grapple with the company’s real position”. 
The most difficult thing facing the liquidator is to prove and determine a specific 
time for the director's knowledge the fate of the company is going to the 
insolvent liquidation.97 In Manolete Partners v Ellis,98 the wrongful trading claim 
was for the increase in the deficiency of the (company) BFS’ assets against 
unsecured claims in the period January 2015 to February 2016. It is contended 
that if BFS (the company) had been liquidated in January 2015 the net 
deficiency would have been much less than in the liquidation as happened. 
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Manolete alleged that the director (Mr Ellis) on 16 December 2014 knew or 
ought to have known that there was no reasonable prospect that BFS would 
avoid going into insolvent liquidation and should have initiated an orderly 
winding up. Mr Ellis (a director) submitted that all these claims were without 
substance. He made, among others, the following points. Mr Ellis’ functions in 
BFS were limited to that of a non-executive director; thus, there is no point in 
the history of BFS when it can reasonably be said that Mr Ellis ought so to have 
concluded there was no reasonable prospect that BFS would avoid going into 
insolvent liquidation. Hurst & Co’s Addendum “Independent Accountants 
Report” stated that BFS would not be trading from an insolvent position 
because “although the projections record a negative balance sheet position 
until the year ended 31 March 2018, cash-flow projections forecast that BFS 
will be able to meet its liabilities as they fall due”. The judge held that the director 
(Mr Ellis) did not know that there was no reasonable prospect of BFS avoiding 
insolvent liquidation. Accordingly, the wrongful trading claim fails. 
Directors must maintain the company's financial position and be cautious. 
However, excessive caution, may not benefit the creditors, such as an 
immediate cessation, which may be considered as a breach of duties towards 
the company and shareholders.99 Section 214 of Insolvency Act 1986 provides 
that a director is not liable for wrongful trading when the court is satisfied that 
the director has taken every step to minimise the potential loss to the company's 
creditors, after s/he knew that there is no reasonable prospect that the company 
would avoid going into insolvent liquidation.100 In this context Park101 J said that 
The directors are in trouble to make a difficult decision when the company is 
suffering financially, when they decide to close down or enter into liquidation or 
instead continue trading in the hope of improvement. If they decide to continue 
trading and things are going to reverse what is planned and expected and the 
company eventually ended up liquidating, they may find themselves liable for 
wrongful trading; and if they decide to close immediately they may be under 
pressure from shareholders and risk of criticism. In Re Brian D Pierson 
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(Contractors) Ltd,102 Hazel Williamson QC said that every step is mentioned in 
s 214 are the steps taken by directors in order to preserve assets or claims for 
the creditors' benefit, even if they fail to achieve this. In this regard, Sealy103 
suggests that guidelines should be established on what directors should do in 
these cases. Because the words "every step" is ambiguous, because it is likely 
to be strict, the defence is almost impossible because no conduct can be 
accepted that is less than the best. But Goode104 believes that "every step" is 
interpreted by s 214 and is meant by every step taken by a reasonably diligent 
person. 
Directors' asking for professional advice may also be included in the meaning 
of every step. Courts consider directors who seek professional advice and if the 
advice is not heard, directors are likely to have large difficulty defending.105 
However, it should be noted, that directors following professional advice, it does 
not absolve them entirely of liability, they must exercise independent 
judgment.106 Business termination may be one of the right steps directors can 
take, although it may reduce or stop the financial flow on the company which 
may be considered detrimental to shareholders and creditors. However, if 
directors decide to terminate trading, it would be better to move the company 
to some formal insolvency proceedings such as administration or liquidation.107 
One of the best choices for directors is to place the company in administration 
to avoid wrongful trading liability. The administration process is characterised 
as allowing the assessment of the company's status without any attack and 
litigation, as all legal proceedings against the company will be suspended.108 
The problem with the placing company in the formal insolvency proceedings, 
whether it is administration or liquidation, is that the directors' fear of personal 
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liability may hasten the company's end so that the company may not be ended 
or even in need of rescue, and the company may be able to continue.109 
Directors may resort to many things, which cannot be enumerated, that may be 
considered as steps aimed at reducing loss such as contacting creditors to 
inform them of the company's situation.110 The resignation may also be the last 
resort directors for extricating themselves from liability for wrongful trading, 
especially when they cannot find any response to their advice and 
recommendations on the preservation of the interests of creditors if they believe 
that the company is going to insolvent liquidation.111 
The commentator van Zwieten112 argues that paying some creditors while not 
paying others, or paying some creditors and acquiring some new creditors, 
during the period before the commencement of the insolvent liquidation does 
not impose personal liability against directors. This is because imposing liability 
on trading after directors know or ought to know that there is no reasonable 
prospect to avoid insolvent liquidation would not enable trading, because 
trading will require the payment of certain liabilities and the incurring of others. 
However, there are some cases in which directors can be personally liable with 
respect to the payment of certain creditors before others. The first is when 
directors incur the company a new debt for the purpose of repaying an old debt 
in circumstances they know they will not be able to repay the new debt when it 
is due. The second is when directors use the company's assets to pay some 
creditors over others in order to obtain some indirect benefits for themselves. 
Commenting on moratorium in the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 
2020, Parry and Gwaza113 say, "directors can be held liable for wrongful trading 
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in the case where the company which obtains the moratorium has passed the 
point of no return during the tenure of this moratorium". 
It should be noted that the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, 
which puts in place measures to amend insolvency and company law to meet 
the challenges caused by the impact of coronavirus (COVID-19). One of these 
measures, there is a temporary suspension, retrospectively from 1 March 2020 
until 30 September 2020, of the UK's wrongful trading provisions. However, this 
suspension is only for eligible companies.114 On 26 November 2020, the 
Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (Coronavirus) (Suspension of 
Liability for Wrongful Trading and Extension of the Relevant Period) 
Regulations 2020 came into force. These Regulations have extended the 
wrongful trading liability suspension to begin on 26th November 2020 and to 
continue until 30th April 2021.  These Regulations (like the 2020 Act itself) do 
not protect against other forms of liability incurred during the COVID “amnesty” 
period. 
5.2.2.2 Fraudulent trading 
The criminalisation of the business of the company for the purpose of 
defrauding creditors began after the Greene Committee on Company Law 
Reform in 1926 recommended that, a new provision should be included, namely 
that if it appears, in the course of the winding up of a company, any business 
of the company had been done with the intent of defrauding the creditors of the 
company, the court should, on the application of the liquidator or any creditor 
or contributory, declare that the directors are liable and shall be subject to 
unlimited personal liability.115 In 1928, s 75 of Companies Act 1928 was 
enacted, but there was leniency in which directors could be protected with 
limited liability. After the enactment of Companies Act 1929 s 275 criminal and 
civil liability and criminal and civil proceedings were imposed. The official 
receiver, liquidator, creditors and contributories may also initiate proceedings. 
The group of respondents was then expanded to include all parties to fraudulent 
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trading by enacting s 332 of the Companies Act 1948. Despite this, still there 
were inadequacies in dealing with irresponsible trading, such as the burden of 
criminal proof applied to civil proceedings, and applicants were required to 
prove dishonesty and real moral blame from the respondents.116 The Cork 
Report, therefore, recommended amending this provision and applying criminal 
liability only to fraudulent trading.117 The UK legislator took this proposal and 
enacted s 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986; which aimed to compensate those 
who have lost due to the actions of the persons involved in fraudulent trading. 
The conduct that constitutes fraudulent trading is the existence of the intention 
of defrauding creditors or the existence of a fraudulent purpose.118 Section 213 
of Insolvency Act 1986 does not interpret the meaning of these conducts, it 
leaves its interpretation to the courts. The fraudulent trading provision is broad 
enough to cover any business activity of the company that has been done and 
not only the activities of the company and what is within its purpose; it also 
covers all creditors and anyone else.119 Trading when there is no possibility of 
funds being present at the time of debt payment also constitutes fraudulent 
trading.120 Trading with the intent of fraud or the purpose of fraud can constitute 
fraudulent trading even if there is no loss;121 proof of loss is only for claiming 
contribution.122 
Proving fraudulent intent is a daunting task. This is due to the fact that the 
interpretation of the meaning of fraud stated in s 213 is difficult, and lies difficult 
to interpret because it has different meanings in different contexts.123 In order 
for a person to be liable for fraud, s/he must prove her/his involvement in 
dishonesty,124 which is involving real moral blame.125 Laddie J126 agreed, saying 
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that dishonesty was a decisive element in any actions under s 213. Also, he 
added said that acting dishonestly is the factor that distinguishes fraudulent 
trading from wrongful trading. 
In this regard, it is worth noting the court's consideration of the respondent's 
mental state. The court generally applies a subjective test to determine the 
respondent's state of mind and the intention of fraud at the time of the alleged 
fraudulent trading;127 if it is proved that the respondent was aware of the fraud 
- at the time of fraudulent trading - it means that the respondent was acting with 
dishonesty.128 However, in specific circumstances, the courts may consider 
objective factors and apply objective test, whether the court is able to deduce 
the respondent's state of mind through his/her actions and the circumstances 
surrounding the alleged fraudulent trading.129 In Re William C Leitch Bros 
Ltd,130 Maugham J considered that the state of mind could be deduced to 
determine the intent of fraud by applying the objective test by saying that if a 
company continues to (do) business and incur debt while directors know that 
there is no reasonable prospect of repayment of debt, this is generally an 
appropriate conclusion that the company is engaged in fraudulent activity. The 
Court of Appeal's view,131 on whether or not an objective test can be applied, 
was consistent with Maugham's view that in order to prove fraudulent trading, 
it must be established that there was a risk in which no one had the right to risk, 
which would cause detriment or prejudice to another.132 However, the 
Australian High Court opposed this and held that the intent of the respondent 
must be proven to his/her benefit or protection at the expense of creditors in 
order to hold him/her liable for fraudulent trading.133  
It is worth noting that s 213 stipulates that fraudulent trading procedures may 
only be initiated when the company is being brought in liquidation, it may be the 
reason for this is that the company before being in liquidation it may have hope 
in life and be solvent; it may be premature to initiate fraudulent trading 
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procedures.134 In order to impose personal liability on the person who engaged 
in fraudulent trading, the liquidator must prove three elements; first, the 
company's liquidation business was done with the intention of defrauding 
creditors or for any other fraudulent purpose; second, the respondent's 
involvement in the execution of the business;135 third, knowledge of the 
fraudulent activity. It is not required for knowledge of fraudulent activity to know 
all details of fraud or how it is committed, it is enough just knowing that the 
company intends to conduct fraudulent action.136 
As for those involved in fraudulent trading, as already mentioned, by enacting 
s 332 of Companies Act 1948, the respondents' group was extended to cover 
all parties involved in fraudulent trading; then enacting s 213 of Insolvency Act 
1986 to confirm this, whether they are current or former directors, officers or 
others from within or outside the company provided that there is an intention to 
defraud creditors; unlike wrongful trading, which applies only to directors,137 as 
in Re Daystreet15 Ltd (In Liquidation),138 commenced proceedings against 
seven respondents were engaged in fraudulent trading. The first and second 
Respondents were the directors of the Company. The third to seventh 
respondents are companies. But Keay argues, by inferring what is stated in 
Morris v Banque Arabe Internationale d'Investissement SA,139 that those who 
execute the orders will not be liable and that the liability lies with those who 
organise the business, mostly directors and senior managers.140 However, 
each case must be assessed based on the facts and circumstances 
surrounding it. The court in Re Maidstone Building Provisions,141 held that the 
company secretary was not liable for failing to inform the directors that the 
company was insolvent and that trading should be cessation. While in R v Waite 
(Arthur Frank),142 the company secretary was convicted on counts of fraudulent 
trading. As the liability lies with persons within the company, it also includes 
 
134 R. Williams, 'Fraudulent Trading' (1986) 4 Company & Securities Law Journal 14, 17. 
135 Insolvency Act 1986, s 213. 
136 Morris v Bank of India [2004] 2 B.C.L.C. 236 at 243. 
137 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214.  
138 [2020] EWHC 1140 (Ch). 
139 [2002] B.C.C. 407. 
140 Keay (n 81) 34. 
141 [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1085. 
142 [2003] EWCA Crim 1560. 
The liability of company directors in UK law 
152 
persons outside the company,143 for example, in Bank of India v Morris,144 the 
bank was held liable for fraudulent trading because it facilitated the company 
part of its liquidation operations. In Re Gerald Cooper Chemicals Ltd,145 the 
creditor was liable, where he knew that his debt was paid as a result of fraud 
committed.  
Finally, while individual creditors were able to initiate fraudulent trading 
procedures under s 332 of Companies Act 1948, but this was not valid 
anymore. The court can no longer compensate a particular creditor for losses 
incurred as a result of fraudulent trading. Rather, applications are made through 
liquidators under s 213, and applications are collective where the liquidator 
seeks to compensate the creditor's general body.146 Keay147 argues it has 
become more equitable than before, as a single creditor was able to take 
his/her dues directly after fraudulent trading application, but this could lead to 
the respondent being in a destitute situation that is unable to pay other 
creditors. This is with respect to the private right to fraudulent trading. As for the 
public right, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, under s 124A of 
Insolvency Act 1986, may wind up a company that engages in fraudulent 
activities that affecting consumers for the public interest; and the initiation of the 
directors’ disqualification order procedures in accordance with s 10 of Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 for breach of s 213 of Insolvency Act 1986. 
5.2.3 Liability for negligence to the company and third party 
Unlike other duties, the duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence is 
not a fiduciary duty in terms of enforceability in the same way of any other 
fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors. Therefore, the breach of the 
duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence could be attributed to 
negligence.148 It can be said that the concept of care in common law has been 
developed through passing stages. The beginning of its development was 
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largely in 1932 in Donoghue v Stevenson,149 the duty of care was applied 
despite the absence of relationship or prior interaction and was not constrained 
by privity of contract. The neighbour principle was adopted and intended as 
explained by Lord Atkin150: 
“There must be and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to 
a duty of care... The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in 
law you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question: Who 
is my neighbour? ... You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or 
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your 
neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? ... persons who are so 
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have 
them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind 
to the acts or omissions that are called in question”. 
Because of the difficulty of applying the neighbour principle to some cases, it 
has been adopted Anns test, where there is an adequate relationship of 
proximity or neighbourhood between the plaintiff and the respondent and the 
negligence of the respondent is likely to cause harm to the plaintiff.151 A 
frequent criticism of the Anns test152 led to the emergence of the so-called 
three-stage test, based upon Lord Oliver's summary in Caparo Industries plc v 
Dickman,153 The harm which occurred is a reasonably foreseeable result of the 
defendant's conduct; there is an adequate relationship of proximity or 
neighbourhood between the plaintiff and the respondent; It is fair and 
reasonable to impose liability. 
Prior to 1986 negligence was not clearly defined with regard to the relationship 
between the director and the company.154 There were several concepts such 
as negligence as a state of mind as opposed to deliberate action, there is no 
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desire or for a certain result, which is more like carelessness.155 Another 
example Supreme Court of New York stated in Bayer et al. v. Beran et al.156 
that: 
"…it is only in a most unusual and extraordinary case that directors are 
held liable for negligence in the absence of fraud, or improper motive, or 
personal interest". 
Hence, negligence was linked to fraud, improper motivation or personal 
interest. At that stage, there was a lack of clarity in the concept of neglect, 
although the link between them is misfeasance. After the 1986 legislation, 
negligence in this context was intended to breach the duty to exercise 
reasonable care, skills, and diligence. Negligence is defined as a breach of the 
duty of care by the failure of the director to exercising reasonably expected from 
someone professional in their position and considering the knowledge, skill and 
experience that they actually have.157 In Williams v Natural Life Health 
Foods,158 Lord Steyn said: 
"The touchstone of liability is not the state of mind of the defendant. An 
objective test means that the primary focus must be on things said or done 
by the defendant or on his behalf in dealings with the plaintiff. Obviously, 
the impact of what a defendant says or does must be judged in the light 
of the relevant contextual scene. Subject to this qualification the primary 
focus must be on exchanges (in which term I include statements and 
conduct) which cross the line between the defendant and the plaintiff".   
It should be noted that breach of duty of care may result from gross negligence, 
ordinary neglect or even inactivity. Therefore, Baron Rolfe J believed in Wilson 
v Brett,159 there is no difference between negligence and gross negligence. 
However, after the enactment of s214 of Insolvency Act 1986 and s174 of CA 
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2006, directors have become liable for negligence, regardless of such 
distinction; the subjective and objective tests were applied together to 
determine the level of care required. Therefore, it is difficult to identify all cases 
that lead to liability for negligence, but instead, the courts have been given the 
discretion to determine negligence through the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the nature and functioning of the company. It should be noted that, 
in some cases, the director may be held liable for negligence despite the 
existence of fraud and the company goes into insolvency, in Contex Drouzhba 
Ltd v Wiseman,160 a director of a company was personally liable in the tort of 
deceit in making an implied representation that the company was able to pay 
for goods to be supplied and in this time he knew the company was insolvent 
and unable to pay. Because the director signed a document in his personal 
capacity containing assuring a creditor as to the company solvency, ss.213 and 
214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 cannot affect the case. 
Claims of misfeasance against directors by liquidators may also be arisen in 
accordance with s 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which often includes a claim 
that the director has misapplied or retained any money or other property of the 
company, or been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of any duty in relation to 
the company. 
5.3 The consequences of breach of the duties 
5.3.1 Return of property and Account of profits 
The company director may be ordered to return the company property to the 
company in case of taking its property by breach of duties while s/he shall hold 
the property in trust for the company.161 Account of profit claims is often 
involved in breaching the duties stated in ss 175-177, duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest, duty not to accept benefits from third parties and duty to declare 
interest in proposed transaction or arrangement. When a company director has 
benefited from an unauthorised profit by breaching the duties, this profit is 
confiscated to the company.162 This is to deter the directors and not to 
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compensate the company for the loss, as the company compensation may be 
greater than the profit realised by the director.163 
The liability to account for profits is a personal liability of the defaulting fiduciary. 
The directors are liable for the account of profits regardless of whether the 
company has suffered or lost.164 This is an aspect of the fiduciary obligations of 
the account as part of its oversight of the trust asset.165 Also, when it is proved 
that there is a transfer of property or payment to a director, the evidence lies on 
the director to prove that the transfer the payment was proper.166 The fiduciary 
is treated as if the unauthorised profit is given to his/her company and as a 
consequence of the breach of duty, the director is liable to account for the 
highest value of assets in the intervention period in the case of the fluctuates of 
the asset value.167 In Fairford Water Ski Club v Cohoon,168 a director was 
accountable to the company for the profit he had made. The directors failed to 
declare the nature of their interest in the management agreement that they must 
have declared the interest they had in a transaction or arrangement with the 
company. 
However, the director is not liable to account for profits that are not related to 
the breach of duties.169 A fiduciary is liable to account for profits made by 
themselves or through a company and s/he has a fundamental interest and not 
for profits made by third parties.170 In addition, the profits made jointly by other 
persons are not subject to confiscation unless the other person is aware of the 
breach of duty and may be liable.171  
In this regard, it is worth considering the issue of diverting business 
opportunities into the director's own business. Can the court assess the profit 
proportion related to the diverted opportunity and confiscating exactly what has 
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been obtained or is there another opinion? Lewison J in Ultraframe UK Ltd v 
Fielding,172 holds that the profits for which an account is ordered must be linked 
to a reasonable relationship with the breach of the duty; and it is important to 
determine what was obtained exactly, for example, order an account limited in 
time; or limited to profits derived from particular assets or customers. In 
Warman International Ltd v Dwyer,173 the High Court of Australia held in the 
case of a director who diverted part of the company's business to his own 
company, that the account of profit should be limited to the first two years of 
operations. 
5.3.2 Equitable compensation 
Return of property and confiscation of profits from a director who breached 
duties may not be sufficient to redress the damage suffered by the company 
due to the director's breach of his/her fiduciary duty. Therefore, the court may 
award equitable compensation for any loss not compensated by the account of 
profit.174 Equitable compensation is therefore awarded in order to redress the 
loss caused by a breach of duty which can be realised later.175 In Fairford Water 
Ski Club v Cohoon,176 the return of property was not possible because of the 
limitation period, but the directors were accountable to the company for 
equitable compensation for the loss. The claim related to the transfer of a plot 
by the lake from the company to a director. The plot transfer was made at a 
significant undervalue. The judge considered that was a breach of duty to 
promote the success of the company. The House of Lords explained in Target 
Holdings Ltd v Redferns,177 that it does not apply the principles of the common 
law to causation and quantification, the fundamental principle in common law 
is two principles for compensation. The act of wrongful defendant must cause 
the damage complained of; the plaintiff must be placed in the same position 
and, if s/he does not make the mistake, s/he is entitled to compensation.  
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While Lord Browne-Wilkinson178 argued that liability and redress are based on 
the breach of duties and the causation between breach of duty and damage 
(loss). It is also not all breach of duty cases that entail compensation, for 
example, unauthorised profitable investment is not awarded compensation, 
even if there is a breach of duty to act within powers or breach of duty that is 
done with the consent of the beneficiaries. Lord Browne-Wilkinson's opinion 
has been criticised that compensation is binding due to breach of contract and 
not only the existence of damage (loss). Where the contracting party has a 
primary obligation to implement its contract and a secondary obligation to pay 
compensation on the case of not complying with the contract.179 
5.3.3 Rescission of a transaction 
The transaction of a company that has occurred due to a breach of fiduciary 
duty is voidable in accordance with the option of the company and may be 
rescinded.180 The rescission of a transaction involves each party returning to 
the other what was transferred in the transaction. Nor can the plaintiff be 
granted restitution from the defendant without being able to give a counter-
restitution to the defendant.181 Also, upon rescission of the contract of sale of 
property made by a director, the director must return all the profits that s/he 
made through the transaction; the declining value of the property does not 
constitute an obstacle to rescission the transaction.182 In Fairford Water Ski 
Club v Cohoon,183 the transaction was voidable because of the company's 
assertion that its directors had no power to pay the annual management charge 
that it had never agreed to. However, in some circumstances where the 
transaction cannot be rescission, such as the resale of the property to another 
party.184 It is also, the transaction was made with someone who is non-fraudster 
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(has good faith), the rescission may not be possible depending on the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction.185 
In this regard, it should be noted that a personal claim can be made against 
third parties when the director breached his/her fiduciary duty. This is in two 
categories. First, if the third party dishonestly assisted a director to breach the 
fiduciary duty, the third party may be personally liable to pay compensation to 
the company.186 In order to impose this personal liability must be proved three 
elements, namely, the director breach of the fiduciary duty;187 the defendant 
assisted the director to breach the duty;188 the defendant acted in bad faith.189 
The second category, if the third party receives property as a result of the 
director's breach of his/her fiduciary duty, the third party may be liable for the 
payment of compensation to the company.190 In order to impose this personal 
liability three elements must be proved. First, there was a disposal of the assets 
of the company by breach of fiduciary duty.191 Second, there was a beneficial 
receipt from the defendant of assets that are traceable as assets of the 
company.192 Third, it must be shown the defendant's knowledge that the assets 
are a result of a breach of the fiduciary duty.193 
5.3.4 Injunctive relief 
The injunction in English law is an important remedy. It is a court order that 
compels a party to do or refrain from ordering or freezing funds or assets. The 
aim is to direct the conduct of another party to curb damage.194 The court has 
broad powers to grant an injunction against the directors guilty of actual or 
threatening breach of duty.195 However, it must be established that there are no 
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other remedies other than the injunction to remedy the damage.196 An injunction 
may prevent the directors from conducting any acts such as curbing the 
directors from continuing a business that contains a breach of duty or prohibits 
the exploitation of information. This injunction may operate permanently, or 
temporarily for a specified period.197 The injunctions may be granted after the 
court is satisfied that there is a real risk of harm in the absence of the 
injunctions.198 
5.3.5 Receivership 
A receivership is one of the possible remedies in English law for breach of duty. 
The High Court may by order to appoint a receiver in cases in which it appears 
to be fair to do so.199 The receivership is used to solvent companies as a 
temporary measure to protect the company or to preserve the interests of the 
stakeholders in the subject matter of the dispute. However, the court will remain 
very careful in using this remedy "receivership" with respect to the solvent 
companies. This is because appointing a receiver for a solvent company means 
damaging the company's reputation. An injunction is often used because it is 
less harmful to solvent companies.200 
It should be noted that receivership has an impact on the directors' powers and 
duties, as it places directors in a subordinate position. The point of a secured 
creditor appointing a receiver is not for that receiver to receive directions from 
the directors, but instead to give directions. The receiver may remove the 
directors at any time and appoint someone to take over their duties. The 
receiver may also perform those duties. Therefore, it can be said that the 
receiver takes the place of the directors and be responsible instead of the 
directors for the management of the company's affairs even when the receiver 
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allows the directors to run the business under his/her leadership.201 Lord 
Halsbury202 expressed the view that the court "practically removes the conduct 
and guidance of the undertaking from the directors appointed by the company 
and places it in the hands of a manager and receiver". 
5.3.6 Criminal sanctions 
Of the consequences of a director breaching fiduciary duty or duty of care is 
that the director may be criminally liable for acts that have been occurred during 
the company's operations. The criminal liability of directors arises from the 
criminal liability of the company. The criminal liability of the directors can also 
be established directly without prosecuting the company. The examples of 
directors’ personal criminal liability as a result of a directors’ breach of fiduciary 
duty or a duty of care are many, among them, the directors’ criminal liability 
under the Bribery Act 2010, which includes three categories of offences; 
Offences of bribing another person or relating to being bribed or bribery of 
foreign public officials.203 The offence of false accounting can lead to the 
personal liability of the director if s/he aims dishonestly to gain for 
herself/himself or others or cause loss to others, or destroy, defaces, conceals 
or falsifies any account or any record or document presented or required for 
any accounting purpose. It is also misinformation in the provision of information 
or counterfeiting is a reason for personal criminal liability.204 In addition, if the 
company commits fraud through its acts, the director may be criminally liable if 
the fraud is committed with his/her consent or connivance with another.205 
Under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and the Corporate Manslaughter 
and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, a director may be liable for a wide range of 
offences, including the criminal liability of directors for deaths or accidents 
occurring during the operations of the company when the director is consent or 
connivance with another or negligent in relation to the criminal act.206 
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5.3.7 Disqualification 
One of the consequences of the directors’ breach of the duties is disqualifying 
him/her for a specified period from being a company director. The entry of a 
director into illegal transactions is a sufficient reason for disqualification as a 
director on the basis of unfitness.  In view of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, the disqualification of directors can be classified as 
disqualification due to misconduct and unfitness.207 
The misconduct in question includes conviction a person of an indictable 
offence in respect of the company or a continuing default with respect to the 
provisions of the companies’ legislation or commission of fraudulent trading 
during the liquidation of the company and participation in wrongful trading.208 
As for disqualification due to unfitness includes the conduct of a person as a 
director of a company is unfit to be concerned in the management of a company 
or a breach of fiduciary or other duties of directors or mismanagement of the 
company in non-compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act.209 This 
is because the breach of the duties mentioned in the CA 2006, is considered to 
be either misconduct such as breaching the duty not to accept benefits from 
third parties; or unfitness such as breaching the duty to exercise reasonable 
care, skill and diligence.210 In Re Noble Vintners Ltd,211 the Secretary of State 
applied for a compensation order against a disqualified director under s 15A 
and s 15B of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. The director was 
subject to a disqualification order under s 6 of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 for the maximum 15 years. That order was established 
on his misappropriation of more than £559,000 from an insolvent company. The 
instant application was the first time the secretary of state had brought a case 
under the compensation regime introduced by s 15A and s 15B of the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986. The commentator van Zwieten212 says this 
case can rightfully be described as a "radical" change and it is the first case to 
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interpret the new provisions. One of the effects of the change is that there is 
now a straightforward way to recover compensation in relation to losses caused 
to unsecured creditors by directors who self-interestedly perform a "mini-
liquidation" in the lead up to the insolvency proceedings commencement. The 
new CDDA regime provides new complexity in every case where directors are 
at risk of personal liability under the Insolvency Act 1986 and the CA 2006. The 
compensation can now be obtained under the CDDA, the Insolvency Act 1986 
and the CA 2006, the compensation can now be ordered for a select group of 
creditors, alternatively in favour of the class. 
5.4 Elimination and limitation of liability  
5.4.1 Relief from liability by the ratification of directors' acts 
Directors owe fiduciary duty to the company. Fiduciary obligations are imposed 
on directors to act with care and skill, avoid self-dealing and exercise the 
absolute good faith and fairness in the management of the company's affairs in 
the interests of the company.213 Fiduciary duties for directors have been 
developed more stringent providing guidelines for the enforcement of these 
duties. However, this legislation also recognises that directors are subject to 
business judgment mistake and negligence, which allowing members to relieve 
directors from liability arising from breach of duties by ratification.214 
Under s 239 of the CA 2006, the company may ratify the acts of the directors 
by the company members, for the conduct of the director, amounting to 
negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust with respect to the 
company.215 This ratification makes the directors more safe from the company's 
actions or derivative suits. Therefore, directors do not need to certify if they act 
according to the powers conferred. The ratification also includes the former and 
current directors and shadow director.216 In order to ratify directors' conduct, 
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there are three ways. Either by written resolution or by a resolution passed at a 
meeting or by unanimous assent. 
Ratification through a resolution, if it is written, is required that the member is 
eligible to vote so that the director is not a member or any other member 
connected to the director.217 Where the resolution is passed at a meeting, it 
shall be required to obtain the necessary majority vote regardless of the votes 
in favour of the resolution by the director if s/he is a member or any other 
member connected218 to the director.219 It is also possible to ratify the acts of 
the directors by a resolution taken unanimously by the company members if 
they authorise or ratify the behaviour of the director.220 
However, for directors to be safe from company actions or derivative actions, 
the members must fully understand all related circumstances and disclosure is 
clear and explicit; the court will also have the discretion to assess the 
circumstances surrounding the consent and ratification of the members.221 
There are some cases where the conduct of directors cannot be ratified, given 
the state of the company, which differentiates between a solvent company and 
an insolvent company. The director acts in the solvent company in the interest 
of the members, while in the insolvent company (or near insolvency), the acts 
of the director is in the interest of creditors,222 and members do not have the 
ratification authority.223 The absence of honesty and good faith is also an 
obstacle to the ratification of the conduct because the ratification may endanger 
the company's solvency or cause a loss to creditors.224 
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5.4.2 Relief from liability by the court 
If a director is found not to have complied with the fiduciary duty or the duty of 
care, and the company has not ratified the breach, he or she may be excused. 
This is in the case where a claim is brought against a director for negligence, 
default, breach of duty or breach of trust, the court has discretion in granting 
relieve from liability.225 However, in order for a director to be relieved of liability 
by the court, three things must be proven. First, the director acted honestly. 
Second, the director acted reasonably. Third, the director, having regard to all 
the circumstances of the case, ought fairly to be excused; with these three 
requirements, the court may relieve the director from liability in whole or in part 
and on conditions it deems proper. 226 
In practice, the court requires a strong persuasion for relieving the director from 
the liability, who has obtained a personal benefit through breach of duty.227 
Therefore, the act of the director honestly is subject to the subjective test; unlike 
the director's reasonable act which is subject to the objective test. In this regard 
Buckley J. said in Re Duomatic Ltd,228 whether a director acted reasonably or 
not that,  
"he 'the director' was acting in the way in which a man of affairs dealing 
with his own affairs with reasonable care and circumspection could 
reasonably be expected to act in such a case". 
Strangely enough, the director can be proved to have acted reasonably and is 
relieved from liability for negligence, if it was not gross, "breaching the duty to 
exercise reasonable care."229 However, this has limits, it cannot be said that a 
director acted reasonably, who did not pay attention to all the affairs of the 
company.230 However, there are cases in which the director cannot be relieved 
from liability; the relief does not apply to the director under the liability of s 214 
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of the Insolvency Act 1986, known as wrongful trading.231 As well as that stated 
in s 216 and 217 of the Insolvency Act 1986, known as the restriction on the re-
use of the name of the company.232 In Guinness plc v Saunders,233 a director 
was not relieved from liability to the company which was paying directors' 
remuneration wrongly, even if the director acted honestly and reasonably, but 
he exceeded the powers, as the board of directors had the power to pay award 
remuneration only according to the company's articles. Also, in Re System 
Building Services Group Ltd (In Liquidation),234 the sole director was also the 
sole shareholder. While still a director, he purchased from the company, acting 
by its liquidator, a property at a price what he knew to be a substantial 
undervalue without regard to the interests of the creditors as a whole. The 
director had acted entirely out of self-interest and failed to have regard to the 
interests of the creditors as a whole. His application for relief from liability under 
s.1157 of the CA 2006 was refused as his act was unreasonable. 
It is also if any director who believes that s/he has a reason that a claim will be 
or might be brought against him/her in respect of negligence, default, breach of 
duty or breach of trust, s/he may apply to the court for relief.235 
Often, trying to get relief would be unsuccessful. For example, the court may 
find that there is no reasonableness,236 or that the relief will make the director 
enjoy a benefit at the expense of creditors.237 
5.4.3 Insurance against directors' liabilities 
Insurance may be a good way that directors can rely on to protect themselves 
from personal liability. It can also be the only means available to relieve 
themselves of liability when the members of the company are unwilling to ratify 
the acts of the directors and the court is not convinced that they should be 
exempted from liability as a result of negligence, default, breach of duty or 
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breach of trust.238 Companies usually purchase insurance for the benefit of 
directors to attract them and retain them in their positions, because managing 
a daily business may be surrounded by risk.239 Therefore, the purpose of 
insurance is to indemnity for liability incurred by individuals as a result of being 
in the position of director regardless of the type of director.240 Under the CA 
2006, a company may insure against the liability of the directors associated with 
negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust with respect to the 
company.241 Directors may also decide to purchase and maintain insurance at 
the company's expense for any relevant director in respect of any related 
damage.242  
Directors' liability insurance is often called "D&O", which is liability insurance 
payable to company directors as indemnification for losses or defence costs if 
the insured suffers such losses as a result of legal proceedings against wrongful 
acts.243 The first marketing of this type of insurance for directors was in the 
1930s by Lloyd's to protect directors from liability from shareholder claims.244 
D&O insurance is a product subject to price fluctuations, diversity in terms and 
conditions, scope and size of coverage which is always there is a maximum 
amount of liability insurance coverage and duration of coverage. The insurance 
contract, therefore, relies on these terms and trade circumstances, which is 
negotiable.245 However, in general, intentional illegal, fraudulent and criminal 
acts, wrongful profits, and wrongful trading are not covered by the insurance 
policy. The consequences of financial problems that the insured had previously 
aware before commencement coverage or breach of duty for personal benefit 
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are often excluded from insurance coverage.246 Therefore, the insured must 
disclose material facts before contracting. 
5.4.4 Indemnification against directors' liabilities 
An indemnity clause is a contractual provision that gives benefits to the 
contracting parties, allowing parties to manage the risks associated with the 
contract. Because the indemnity enables one party to be protected against 
liability arising from the actions of the other party, by paying one party the losses 
incurred by the other.247 Indemnity is used in a wide variety of contexts and 
there is no general rule as to when the indemnity will be made, depending on 
the circumstances of the contract.  
Nothing in the past has prevented the indemnity of directors' liabilities at all. In 
Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd,248 it was stated in the company's 
articles of association that the company could not sue the director for any loss 
or damage that could be caused by the execution of duties relating to the 
company unless there was dishonesty. Also in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Co Ltd,249 the director was not liable for negligence for the same reason, the 
company's articles of association contain that the company could not sue the 
director for any loss or damage. However, the indemnity provisions were 
subsequently voided by statute. Section 232 of the CA 2006 now stipulates that 
any provision by which the company provides an indemnity for the company 
director against any liability incurred by him/her in respect of negligence, 
default, breach of duty or breach of trust in relation to the company shall be 
considered void.250 Perhaps the reason for the invalidation of the indemnity 
provisions is that it prevents the liquidator from suing the director for 
negligence.251 
However, there are two exceptions to the invalidation of the indemnity provision, 
namely qualifying pension scheme indemnity provision and qualifying third 
 
246 See Re Produce Marketing Consortium (In Liquidation) Ltd, [1989] B.C.L.C. 520. 
247 CA 2006 ss 232(2), 234(2). 
248 [1911] 1 Ch. 425. 
249 [1925] Ch. 407. 
250 CA 2006 s 232(2). 
251 See Neville J in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd, [1911] 1 Ch. 425. 
The liability of company directors in UK law 
169 
party indemnity provision.252 This requires that the indemnity be against the 
liability incurred by the director to a person other than the company or an 
associated company in respect of negligence, default, breach of duty or breach 
of trust in relation to the company.253 The indemnity also must not be against 
any liability incurred by the director for the payment of a fine imposed in criminal 
proceedings or a sum payable to a regulatory authority for non-compliance with 
any requirement of a regulatory nature.254 The indemnity also must not be 
against any liability incurred by the director in defending criminal proceedings 
in which s/he is convicted.255 The qualifying third party indemnity provision has 
more requirement which is the indemnity must not be against any liability 
incurred by the director in a civil proceeding brought by the company or an 
associated company, in which it has been judged against the director.256 
5.5 The evaluation of the UK law with respect to the directors’ duties and 
liabilities 
One of the most fundamental aspects of CA 2006 is codifying the general duties 
of the company's directors. Prior to the enactment of this law, the duties of 
directors were not codified in a written law but rather left their interpretation and 
application to the provisions of common law.257 The reason for considering 
codification again was that those company's directors, especially in small 
companies, who do not have a permanent legal consultant, were struggling to 
understand and apply the provisions of common law and equitable principles to 
their duties towards the company, because these principles and provisions are 
wide and complex.258 The stakeholders also faced difficulties in estimation the 
scope of directors' responsibilities.  Therefore, the purposes of codifying the 
duties of directors was to enhance the clarity of the law and make it easier for 
 
252 CA 2006 ss 234, 345. 
253 CA 2006 ss 232(2), 234(2). 
254 CA 2006 ss 234(3)(a), 235(3)(a). 
255 CA 2006 ss 234(3)(b), 235(3)(b). 
256 CA 2006 ss 234(3)(b)(ii). 
257 Parkinson (n 1) chapter 1. 
258 Ibid. 
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the responsibilities of directors towards others without the need for a legal 
consultant to interpret these duties.259  
However, the general duties after the codification are still not self-contained. 
These duties need recourse to common law provisions and equitable principles. 
This contradicts the claim that the purpose of codifying general duties is to 
facilitate understanding and awareness of the directors' duties. Because 
recourse to common law and equitable principles requires the assistance of a 
legal consultant to interpret these duties. For example in the need to resort to 
common law provisions, the interpretation of the meaning of the term ‘company 
success'. Can it be interpreted by achieving the objectives set by the company, 
or directors' interpretation of directors is a meaningful explanation and cannot 
be challenged, provided that they act in good faith? This needs recourse to the 
provisions of common law, which has been discussed in Chapter Three.260 
Leaving the factors listed in s 172 of CA 2006 to the discretion of the directors 
may be an excuse for directors to breach their duties towards the members 
under the pretext of acts in the interest of the stakeholders and to maintain the 
company's reputation. One of the ambiguous things is not to determine the 
minimum amount of declaration interest in the case of receiving a benefit from 
a third party, especially in matters where courtesy such as luxury hospitality by 
a third party. In other words, there is no de minimis rule on such a personal 
benefit that must be declared, and the benefit can be non-financial such as an 
honorary position or degree. 
Finally, in wrongful trading, liquidators and administrators are only allowed to 
initiate proceedings, unlike in some other jurisdictions that allow other parties 
to initiate proceedings. Other parties should be enabled to initiate such 
proceedings as the Secretary of State, through the court after proving that at 
least a creditor has been harmed by wrongful trading. This empowerment for 
other parties will help to deter directors from engaging in wrongful trading. 
However, s 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986 addresses this problem, as it 
authorised the court, on the application of the official receiver or the liquidator, 
 
259 Parkinson (n 1) chapter 1; Arden (n 6) chapter 1. 
260 Keay (n 60) chapter 3, 15-16. 
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or of any creditor or contributory, to examine the claim that the director has 
misapplied or retained any money or other property of the company, or been 
guilty of any misfeasance or breach of any duty in relation to the company. In 
practice liquidators prefer to go down this misfeasance route rather than using 
wrongful trading, as it is difficult to win a wrongful trading case.
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Chapter Six: The liability of company directors in Saudi Arabian law 
and Islamic law. 
6.1 Directors’ liability 
The legislation in Saudi Arabia imposes general duties on directors, to guide 
them in the way that they should function to reduce the risks of their decisions, 
which may have unwanted consequences for the company, shareholders, 
stakeholders and other parties. The legislation also seeks to prevent the 
directors from using the position for their personal interests or for any other 
considerations that are not in the company's interests or are not within the 
purposes of the company. Accordingly, these broad powers of directors do not 
leave them free from liability in the event of non-compliance with the duties 
stipulated. This directors’ liability may be civil or criminal, according to the 
wrongful act committed. 
6.1.1 The civil liability 
Civil liability, in general, is a result of a breach of the obligation required by the 
directors. This liability is instituted because of breaching the provisions that are 
stipulated in the company’s articles of association, the general assembly’s 
decisions or the SACL 2015. It can be also because of mismanagement of the 
company's affair, the abuse of the granted power or as a result of negligence 
in the oversight of the company's business.1 
The civil liability of directors also has distinct characteristics, which is that the 
directors are jointly liable. Although the joint liability in commercial matters is 
presumed, the legislature has explicitly stipulated it for directors in order to 
enhance the protection of third party.2 The imposition of joint liability also 
enhances the activation of the monitoring of the directors and members of the 
board of directors on the company's business affairs. If a wrongful act is proven 
that has arisen the civil liability and the compensation, the aggrieved (affected) 
party has the right to sue to any director and claim compensation from her/him 
 
1 SACL 2015, art 78. 
2 SACL 2015, arts 12, 13, 78 and 165. 
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or from all members of the board of directors jointly.3 The damage that results 
from a unanimous resolution made by all directors is considered as a joint 
mistake, and therefore, the joint liability is against the directors regarding the 
compensation for the damage resulted from this unanimous resolution. The 
principle is that the joint liability should be equal between the directors, but the 
court may determine the percentage of each directors’ liability from the 
compensation according to the severity of the wrongful act s/he committed.4 
A characteristic of civil liability is that it may be an individual or joint liability. The 
SACL 2015 states that the liability of directors and members of the board of 
directors may be imposed on one director, without the rest.5 A wrongful act that 
is made by a director that caused damage to the company, shareholders or 
third party, which the rest of the directors are not related to this wrongful act, 
for example, divulging company secrets, therefore, the liability will be individual 
on the perpetrator of the wrongful act and not for other directors. The wrongful 
act may be made jointly, such as the resolution taken by the directors 
unanimously or by the majority. In summary, the directors are liable individually 
or jointly for the damage that results from mismanagement of the company’s 
affairs. The SACL 2015 states that directors shall be jointly liable for damages 
to the company, the shareholders, or third parties, arising from their 
maladministration of the affairs of the company, or their breach of the provisions 
of the SACL 2015 or of the articles of association of the company. Joint liability 
shall be assumed by all directors if the wrongful act arises from a resolution 
adopted unanimously. With respect to resolutions adopted by majority vote, 
dissenting directors shall not be liable if they have expressly recorded their 
objection in the minutes of the meeting. Absence from the meeting during which 
such resolution is adopted shall not constitute cause for release from liability, 
unless it is established that the absentee was not aware of the resolution, or, 
on becoming aware of it, was unable to object to it.6 
 
3 Hayaa Al-Muribidh, The liability of company board members within the framework of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabian law, Dar Alfikr wAlqanun, Mansoura, (2016), 180-181. 
4 Fahmy (n 25) chapter 4, 25. 
5 SACL 2015, arts 12, 13, 24, 31, 32, 71, 72, 73, 74, 211, 212 and 213. 
6 SACL 2015, art 78(1). 
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In Islamic law, as has been mentioned above, the director is considered as an 
agent. Therefore, directors should be honest and trustworthy. In the event of a 
claim of the negligence against an agent, the burden of proof shall be on the 
principal. In general, Islamic law is consistent with Saudi Arabian law, the 
agents may face civil liability if they neglect or violate the limits of their granted 
powers.7 
6.1.1.1 The nature of civil liability of directors 
The purpose of civil liability is to compensate the aggrieved (affected) party for 
the damage that s/he sustained as a result of the directors' breach of an 
obligation. The basis of liability in law is making a wrongful act, and it means 
deviation in conduct that is a breach of legal obligation.8 The nature of the civil 
liability of the directors differs according to the difference of those who prove 
this liability in facing them, and then the legal basis on which the relationship 
linking the directors with those who have been proven liable (affected) differs. 
The civil liability is either a contractual basis or tortious (default) basis. The 
liability with a contractual basis lies with the directors in the face of the company, 
because the relationship of the directors to the company is caused by the 
appointment contract. The liability with a contractual basis arises because of 
exceeding the powers granted in the appointment contract, in the law or the 
company's articles of association, or because of acts tainted by lack of 
goodwill;9 or not to exercise reasonable care, which has already been 
mentioned in duty to exercise reasonable care. 
As for the liability with a tortious (default) basis, which is so-called an obligation 
not to hurt others, this liability arises from a wrongful act that is due to acts that 
involve bad faith or fraud or those acts arising from a breach of the general 
duties or a breach the prevision of the company's articles of association.10 It 
may also be due to negligence or abuse of power so that the wrongful act does 
 
7 Al-Humam (n 4) chapter 4 part 8 p 126. 
8 Marqis, (n 55) chapter 4, 107. 
9 Tiemah Al-Shamrii, the board of directors of the joint stock company, Kuwait Foundation for 
the Advancement of Sciences, Kuwait, (1995), 145. 
10 Fahad Al-Khudair, civil liability of the members of the board of directors of the joint-stock 
company, First edition, Law and Economy, Riyadh, (2012), 93-94. 
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not reach the degree of criminal liability. The liability hold does not require that 
the damage be deliberate. This liability is often faced with shareholders and the 
third party.11 
In general, civil liability arises under three conditions, and the liability is 
excluded by the absence of any of these conditions. These three conditions are 
focused on the wrongful act, the damage and the causal relationship between 
them. First, the wrongful act, which is a condition for the establishment of civil 
liability, whether this wrongful act is due to the director's breach of her/his duties 
stipulated in the appointment contract, the company's articles of association or 
the law. Whether the wrongful act is by doing something which is considered 
as a breach of duties or omission doing something that must be done. 
Therefore, the director's concealment of the fact of the company’s financial 
position by submitting misleading reports is considered a wrongful act because 
it is against the law and may be considered as criminal liability.12 
In this regard, a question arises as to what kind of wrongful act arises civil 
liability, is it a grave wrongful act (culpa lata) or any wrongful act regardless of 
its gravity (culpa levis). The Saudi Arabian legislature does not specify the 
wrongful act whereby the civil liability of directors arises. There are those who 
argue that the wrongful act that gives rise to the civil liability is the grave 
wrongful act (culpa lata).13 While there are those who argue that the gravity of 
the wrongful act has no effect on the emergence of civil liability against 
directors, so all wrongful acts, whether grave (culpa lata) or not (culpa levis) 
establish the civil liability.14 
In all cases, it is considered an impediment the civil liability claim is that the 
absence of the existence of the wrongful act from the director. In the judgment 
declared by the Saudi Arabian commercial court,15 a civil liability claim instituted 
 
11 Abdul-Wadud Yahya, the general theory of law, Institute of Public Administration, Riyadh, 
(1986), 156. 
12 See SACL 2015, art 211(a); Zaki Mahmoud Jamal Al-Din, Civil Liability Problems, Cairo 
University Press, Cairo, (1998), 527. 
13 Fahd Al-Habbini, the responsibility of the members of the board of directors of the joint stock 
company for their decisions, the National Library of Kuwait, Kuwait, (2012) 201-202. 
14 Al-Muribidh (n 3) 185. 
15 The Saudi Arabian Commercial Court, 940/TG/7 (2007). 
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by one of the shareholders against the company’s board of directors was 
rejected. The shareholder claimed to abolish the resolutions of the ordinary 
general assembly and compensate him for the damage that he had suffered 
because he was not invited by the board of directors to attend the general 
assembly. The respondent defended that the failure to invite the shareholder is 
due to his lack of proof of his ownership of shares in the company at the time 
of the general assembly meeting, even though this condition is publicized and 
published. Therefore, the court held that the respondent performed his duty in 
accordance with the law and there is no negligence in the performance of the 
duty, and since the claim for compensation is required from the shareholder to 
prove the wrongful act, which was no proof before the court, therefore, the 
liability claim was rejected. 
The second condition is the occurrence of damage. It is not sufficient to prove 
the wrongful act committed by the director to establish civil liability. Rather, this 
wrongful act must lead to damage to the company, shareholders or the third 
party. The burden of proving the damage rests with the aggrieved (affected) 
party. The damage is of two types, material damage, which is the violation of 
the financial interest of the aggrieved (affected) party, and it is required that it 
be actual, that is, the damage is firmly certain even in the future, and that merely 
alleging the possibility of the damage is not sufficient for the liability to be 
arisen.16 The second type of damage is moral harm, and it violates non-financial 
interests, such as the violation of reputation and dignity.17 
The occurrence of damage results in the necessity of compensation from the 
one who caused it. The compensation for material damage is not problematic, 
whether for legal or Islamic law scholars.18 As for the compensation for moral 
damage is subject to dispute among Islamic law scholars, about the possibility 
of the judge’s discretionary power to assess the compensation for moral 
damage and its denial because of the difficulty or impossibility of assessing the 
 
16 Amr El-Feky, The Legal Encyclopedia of Civil Responsibility, Dar Al-Kutub Al-Qanuniah, 
Egypt (2002), 43-44. 
17 Al-Muribidh (n 3) 189. 
18 Hassan Akoush, Contractual and default liability in the civil law, Second Edition, Dar Al-Fikr 
Al-Hadith, Beirut, (1997), 245. 
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moral damage.19 As for the laws, most Arab legislatures have adopted the 
compensation for moral harm, although there is a dispute over the details of the 
kinds of moral damage that are compensated for.20 For example, it is stated in 
Malik v BCCI,21 about the moral damage that the House of Lords considered 
that it is wrong in the event of a wrongful dismissal that the award of 
compensation does not include compensation for the manner of the dismissal, 
for the injured feelings, or for the loss that the employee may suffer from the 
fact that the dismissal itself makes it more difficult to obtain a new job. Nor did 
any Lord say that it is not permissible for an employee to recover the financial 
loss for the damages caused to her/his employment prospects caused by a 
breach of contract. Or, in the event of breach of contract cases, compensation 
can never be awarded for loss of reputation. In addition, the House of Lords in 
Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc,22 held that a former employee could recover 
damages for the financial losses incurred as a result of the negligence of the 
employer in preparing a reference that affected her/his reputation. Lord Steyn 
said that proving stigma compensation is difficult, but these difficulties do not 
change the legal principles that allow to claims for financial losses arising from 
a breach of contract for consideration. 
The third condition is the causal relationship between the wrongful act and the 
damage. There must be a direct relationship between the wrongful act made by 
the director and the damage to the company, the shareholder or the third party. 
This is a condition for the emergence of civil liability against the directors. This 
relationship does not exist if the damage is due to an external cause that the 
director has no control over, such as force majeure or the wrongful act is from 
a third party provided that the director does not have a relationship with them 
based on the delegacy and the like.23 In the judgment declared by the Saudi 
Arabian Commercial Court,24 the court rejected the claim of civil liability and 
 
19 Wahbah Al-Zuhaili, the theory of liability in Islamic jurisprudence, Second edition, Dar Al-Fikr, 
Jordan, (1998), 23. 
20 Abdul-Razzaq Al-Sanhouri, Civil Law Explanation, Second Edition, Dar Ehya Al-Turath Al-
Earabi, Beirut, (1997), part 1, page 866. 
21 [1997] UKHL 23. 
22 [1995] 2 AC 296 
23 Redha Wahdan, Disputes attributable to damages in the compensation claim, the Journal of 
Justice, v 54 (2012), 150-184, 172. 
24 The Saudi Arabian Commercial Court, 29/TG/1 (1991). 
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compensation, as there was no causal relationship between the acts of the 
directors and the damage. It has been proven that the damage claimed for 
compensation was due to the wrongful act of the aggrieved (affected) party and 
the wrongful act of the third party, and the director has no related to this 
wrongful act. 
However, the causal relationship between the wrongful act and the damage in 
practice has several problems regarding the multiplicity of causes and the 
sequence of results. The problem is that there may be multiple causes and that 
the damage did not happen based on one cause, but the combination of all 
these causes caused the damage, and if one of these causes did not exist, the 
damage would have not happened. Will be the liability, in this case, be based 
on all causes or on some causes? This is based on two theories, which are the 
theory of equivalent or equal causes and effective cause theory.25 The theory 
of equivalence of causes is based on the premise that each factor is involved 
in causing the damage so that without each factor the damage would not have 
been, and that every factor would be an equal legal cause to the other causes. 
However, this theory has been criticized as extending the concept of causation 
significantly.26 The second theory is the effective cause theory, and this theory 
differentiates between secondary and productive causes. If there are multiple 
causes, the productive (fundamental) cause is considered to be the cause of 
the damage and establishing for the liability.27 
With respect to the problems of the sequence of results, it is contrary to the 
aforementioned theories, which are the theory of equivalent or equal causes 
and effective cause theory. This theory assumes that one cause had caused 
several damage sequentially from each other. It has been agreed that the 
liability of the one who made the wrongful act is limited to the direct damages 
resulting from the wrongful act itself, while the liability for the indirect damage 
to the wrongful act does not arise. This is because the sequential results are 
 
25 Abdel-Rashid Maamoun, The causal relationship in civil liability, First Edition, Dar Al-Nahdhat 
Al-Arabia, Cairo, (1998), 10. 
26 Maamoun (n 25) 10. 
27 Anwar Sultan, Sources of Commitment, Dar Al-Thaqafata, Jordan, (2010), 379. 
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not related to the wrongful act with a sufficient causal relationship.28 The 
determination of these direct damages or not and the possibility of avoiding 
sequence damages or not depends on the circumstances of the incident and 
the judge's discretion. 
In the event that these three conditions are all met (wrongful act, damage and 
the causal relationship), civil liability arises against the directors. 
6.1.1.2 The directors' liability in the face of the company. 
The SACL 2015 stipulates in more than one article the directors' liability to 
compensate the company for all damages incurred as a result of 
mismanagement of the company's affairs.29  Although the company has the 
right to dismiss the director in the event of a breach of duties, the dismissal 
does not relieve directors of the liability in the face of the company.30 The 
company has the right to hold directors accountable against decisions and 
conduct that are harmful to it, such as gross negligence in management, 
wasting its money, or damaging its commercial reputation, and breaching the 
provisions of the company's articles of association or the SACL 2015 and the 
relevant legislation.31 The principle is to institute the liability action by a decision 
of the general assembly and appoint a representative to pursue the case on 
behalf of the company. If a judgment is passed on the insolvency of the 
company, the institution of this action shall rest with the receiver, and upon the 
dissolution of the company, the liquidator shall pursue the case after obtaining 
the approval of the ordinary general assembly.32 However, due to the possibility 
that the general assembly or its representatives may not play their role in 
instituting the liability action, the Saudi Arabian legislature has recognised the 
need to preserve the rights of shareholders and the third party. The SACL 2015 
stipulates that a shareholder shall have the right to institute a liability claim 
against the directors and the board of directors on behalf of the company, 
 
28 Maamoun (n 25) 15; Marqis, Suleiman., Reasons for exemption from civil liability, Huquq Al-
Qahirah,  Cairo (1996), 240. 
29 See for example, SACL 2015, arts 12,13, 24,31, 32, 71, 72, 73 and 74. 
30 SACL 2015, arts 74 and 100(3). 
31 SACL 2015, art 74. 
32 SACL 2015, art 79. 
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except that this prosecution has conditions, which is that the shareholder had 
suffered personal damages and that the company’s right to institute the 
prosecution is still valid and that s/he shall notify the company of her/his 
intention to do so.33 
6.1.1.3 The directors' liability in the face of the shareholder. 
The wrongful act of the directors may result in damage to one or some 
shareholders without affecting the rest, such as if directors or the board of 
directors refused to hand over one of the shareholders her/his share of the 
profits or prevent her/him from the right to look at the necessary information, so 
the shareholder who was aggrieved (affected) in this case will have to claim 
directors or the members of the board to compensate her/him for the damage.34 
This prosecution in such a scenario is called the shareholder’s personal claim, 
which aims to the reparation of the damages that shareholder incurred without 
the company.35 
This is close to the reflective loss principle in the UK law, which is the loss of 
individual shareholders that are inseparable from the company's general loss. 
Lord Bingham in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co,36 summarised the reflective loss 
in three propositions: 
"(1) Where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty owed to it, 
only the company may sue in respect of that loss. No action lies at the suit 
of a shareholder suing in that capacity and no other to make good a 
diminution in the value of the shareholder's shareholding where that 
merely reflects the loss suffered by the company... (2) Where a company 
suffers loss but has no cause of action to sue to recover that loss, the 
shareholder in the company may sue in respect of it...(3) Where a 
company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty to it, and a shareholder 
suffers a loss separate and distinct from that suffered by the company 
caused by breach of a duty independently owed to the shareholder, each 
 
33 SACL 2015, art 80.  
34 SACL 2015, art 78.  
35 Al-Jabr (n 1) chapter 4, 342. 
36 [2002] 2 AC 1. 
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may sue to recover the loss caused to it by breach of the duty owed to it 
but neither may recover loss caused to the other by breach of the duty 
owed to that other”. 
In Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd,37 the court held that the reflective loss 
principle did not bar the appellant creditor, who was not also a shareholder, 
from bringing claims against the respondent owner of the companies who 
had acted in breach of duty by stripping the companies’ assets, causing the 
creditor to suffer loss. Regarding the problem of possible double recovery 
against the defendant in respect of the loss suffered by the creditor and the 
loss suffered by the companies there is a mechanism available to the extent 
that the creditor sues the defendant and obtains a recovery from him for the 
judgment sum, the defendant can be subrogated to the creditor’s rights 
against the companies or allowed a right of reimbursement in respect of 
them. Generally, the Supreme Court took a restrictive view of the reflective 
loss rule. 
6.1.1.4 The directors' liability in the face of the third party. 
Directors' wrongful acts may result in damage to a third party, such as signing 
forged instruments without verification of their authenticity or acting exceeding 
the granted power of the director or the board of directors that the stakeholder 
knows that this is exceeding the director granted power; therefore, the liability 
claim shall be only in the face of the director.38 The third party acting in good 
faith may institute the liability action in the face of the company itself because 
the company shall be bound by all the acts performed by its directors and its 
board of directors.39 In the judgment declared by the Saudi Arabian commercial 
court40 that it is for the plaintiff to claim on behalf of the company for 
compensation for the damage caused due to the wrongful act of its director, 
and the company has the right to institute the liability action in face of the 
director for the compensation due to negligence and default in his function. 
 
37 [2020] UKSC 31. 
38 SACL 2015, art 77. 
39 Ibid. 
40 The Saudi Arabian Commercial Court, 11/TG/4 (1988). 
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In Islamic law, the third party that has dealt with the agent (director) may 
institute civil liability proceedings against the agent; and the agent is not entitled 
to exempt of the liability on the pretext that s/he is an agent of the principal 
(company).41 The third party has the option to institute the prosecution against 
the agent or the principal directly if the transaction was within the powers 
granted to the agent. Then the relationship will be direct between the third party 
and the principal in order to preserve the rights of the third party; this is by 
making the option for the third party to raise the liability action in the face of the 
principal or the agent or all of them as a joint liability.42 This is in the case that 
the third party had known about the agency contract between the agent and the 
principal when the transaction was done with the agent. In the event that the 
third party did not know about this relationship between the agent and the 
principal during the transaction, the third party has nothing but to raise the 
liability in the face of the agent.43 
It should be noted that, in the context of a civil liability claim, it might be difficult 
to estimate some of the directors’ acts and know whether they constitute 
mismanagement or not. Not all decisions made by directors have good 
consequences for the company, as it is well known that the function of the 
director is based on commercial risk. The Saudi Arabian courts will respect 
directors' exercise of discretion in the management of the company, which is 
known as Business Judgment Rule. The directors' decision-making is part of a 
series of processes leading to a final decision, which is not an isolated event. 
The directors should carefully consider all aspects related to the final judgment, 
such as taking advice, due diligence and then making the decision. Accordingly, 
the court will take into account whether reasonable care was exercised and all 
aspects related to the final decision. If the decision is taken in a reasonable 
manner, the directors cannot be held liable for any damage as a result of this 
decision.44 
 
41 Muhammad ibn Abidin, Radd Al-Muhtar ala Al-Durr Al-Mukhtar, Second edition, Dar Al-Fikr, 
Beirut, (1992), part 1 p 224. 
42 Al-Sanhouri (n 23) chapter 4, part 1, p. 232. 
43 Mansour El-Bahouty, Sharah Muntaha Al-iradaat, First edition, Resalah Foundation, Beirut, 
(2001), part 2 p 308. 
44 See Al-Jabr (n 1) chapter 4, 340. 
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6.1.2 Criminal liability 
The civil liability against directors may be insufficient to deter directors from 
some wrongful practices. The Saudi Arabian legislature has adopted criminal 
liability against some of the directors ’acts, and it has emphasised the 
punishment against them, because civil penalties may not prevent the director 
from committing a wrongful act, and may not fit the gravity of the act. 
Accordingly, the Saudi legislature is seeking to protect the companies, 
shareholders, and the third party from wrongful conducts that may be made by 
directors to fulfil personal interests due to dishonesty and abuse the position, 
the legislature imposed criminal liability against some of the directors ’acts that 
take place while performing their duties.45 The SACL 2015 stipulates the 
criminalisation of many wrongful practices by directors, which would violate the 
integrity, trust, protecting companies, shareholders and third party, and 
imposing the appropriate penalties against these practices.46 The directors’ 
criminal liability derives from one of two things, either through the criminal acts 
that criminal law has criminalised against members of society or through the 
provisions on criminal liability in the SACL 2015 and relevant legislation. 
It is known that the natural person is the one who commits acts that constitute 
an offence punishable by the laws, and is subject to criminal liability, but the 
criminal liability is unlike civil liability, it does not extend to other directors who 
did not contribute to the commission of the criminal act.47 As for the legal person 
is like a natural person, acquiring rights and has obligations. However, the 
dispute is on whether the legal person (companies) would face criminal liability 
or no. Some jurisdictions48 have adopted the criminal liability against the legal 
person (companies), that equated a natural and legal person with criminal 
liability, but it replaced the prison sentence with a fine penalty in the event of a 
judgment of criminal liability against the legal person (companies). The SACL 
2015 adopted the criminal liability of a legal person, since if the prosecution 
 
45 Ali Al-Waeli, Governance of Saudi Joint Stock Companies and its Role in Reducing Financial 
Crime, Master dissertation, (2010), Prince Nayef Arab University for Security Sciences-
Department of Criminal Justice, Riyadh, 33. 
46 SACL 2015, arts 211, 212, 213, 214, 2015 and 216. 
47 Samiha Al-Qaliubi, Commercial Companies, Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabia, Cairo, (2008), 999. 
48 For example SACL 2015. 
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cannot be instituted against the offender who committed one of the violations 
stated in the SACL 2015; the public prosecution may institute a case against 
the company to adjudge the company with the fine stipulated for such 
violation.49 While some jurisdictions do not adopt criminal liability against the 
legal person as is the case in the Egyptian Criminal Law, the Egyptian 
legislature has not adopted criminal liability against companies.50 Perhaps the 
justification for this is that legal persons are not criminally liable for the criminal 
misdeeds of their representatives. The legal person also cannot commit an 
offence for lack of criminal will. In addition, it is inconceivable to apply the 
sentence of imprisonment for a legal person.51 
In general, criminal liability arises under two conditions, and the liability is 
excluded by the absence of any of these conditions. The first condition, which 
is a material condition which is performing the criminal act or omission doing 
the obligation, and all of these are criminalized with a criminal penalty by law.52 
The second condition is a moral condition and it relates to the psychological 
and motivating aspect of the perpetrator of the offence, which is the presence 
of the criminal intent to commit the criminal act, for example, divulging the 
company secrets with the intent to obtain personal interests, or intentionally 
divulging the company secrets with the will of the perpetrator and not through 
an external force such as the company emails hacked or company database 
hacked.53 
The SACL 2015 identifies a number of acts that give rise to criminal liability and 
imposed criminal penalties against their perpetrators. It is possible to 
 
49 SACL 2015, art 217. 
50 See the Egyptian Criminal Law 1937 amended 2003, there is no provision in the Egyptian 
Criminal Law that establishes criminal liability for the legal person, as the legislature limits 
criminal liability to the natural person. 
51 Rana Al-Eutur, Criminal liability for the legal person, Damascus Journal of Economic and 
Legal Sciences, v 2, (2006), 341-424, 343. 
52 Abdelrahman Al-Rashoud, Criminal Liability for Distributing fictitious profits in Joint Stock 
Companies in Saudi Arabia, Master dissertation, (2014), Prince Nayef Arab University for 
Security Sciences-Department of Criminal Justice, Riyadh, 61. 
53 Muhammad Swailem, Corporate Governance in Arab and Comparative regulation, Dar Al-
Nahdhat Al-Arabia, Cairo, (2010), 406-410. 
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summarize these acts in which the director may make as a result of occupying 
the position.54 
The offence of making false statements or omitting including some data 
deliberately in the company's financial statements or in the reports of the 
general meeting. The SACL 2015 stipulates that this act is criminalized where 
it is stated without prejudice to any more severe penalty stipulated for in any 
other law, liable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years and a 
fine not exceeding five million Saudi Arabian Riyals55 or by either of these two 
penalties.56 Any director, official, auditor, or liquidator who knowingly includes 
false information in the financial statements or in the reports prepared by him 
for the shareholders or the general meeting; or who omits essential facts from 
such statements or reports with the intention of concealing the financial position 
of the company from the shareholders or third parties.57 Whoever willfully 
inserts in the articles of association, bylaws, or other of the company’s 
documents or in the incorporation license application form or in the documents 
attached to the incorporation application form, false information contradicting 
with the provisions of the SACL 2015; and whoever knowingly signs or 
distributes such documents.58 This is also can be considered as a breach of the 
principle of disclosure and transparency contained in the corporate governance 
regulations.59 
The offence of divulging company secrets should be noted. As formerly 
mentioned, it is the duty of the director to maintain confidentiality. What is meant 
by this is that the company secrets that the directors have information about 
because of their positions only, which without their positions in the company 
they would not have known this information.60 Included in the scope of the 
commitment of the director not to divulge the secrets of the company outside 
the general assembly meeting. As for the information that the laws require 
placing at the disposal of shareholders in order to inform them of the information 
 
54 See SACL 2015, arts 211, 212 and 213. 
55 1 USD = 3.75 Saudi Riyals, Fixed exchange rate.  
56 SACL 2015, arts 211 and 212. 
57 SACL 2015, arts 211(a).  
58 SACL 2015, arts 212(f). 
59 SACGR 2019, art 89. 
60 SACL 2015, art 74. 
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about the company before a period of the general assembly meeting or that 
information permitted by the laws to be published, it does not fall within the 
meaning of this duty, are not considered in the meaning of this duty.61 Although 
the breach of the duty to maintain confidentiality arises the civil liability,62 the 
legislature has doubled the liability for the breach of the duty to maintain 
confidentiality by joining criminal liability to the civil liability against every 
employee (including the director) who divulges to non-concerned authorities the 
secrets of the company that have come to her/his knowledge in the course of 
duties.63 
The Saudi legislature also combined the civil and criminal liability in the offence 
of knowingly misusing the company’s funds and misusing the powers granted 
against the company's interests. The civil and criminal liability will arise against 
any director, official or board member who knowingly misuses the company’s 
funds or misuses her/his powers or votes of such power in a manner that 
conflicts with the company’s interest for personal interests or in favour of a 
company or person; or benefit from a project or deal in which s/he has a direct 
or indirect interest.64 
The offence of not calling the general assembly meeting when the losses of the 
company amount to half of the paid-up capital or if fails to publish such 
information in accordance with such losses.65 In addition, the Saudi legislature 
considered that the director misuses the company for purposes other than that 
for which the company was designated, is an offence that arises the criminal 
liability.66 It is noted that the Saudi legislature stipulates the moral condition for 
criminal liability, which is the existence of criminal intent, knowledge of the 
incident and motive for committing the criminal act with the phrases “with the 
intention”, "knowingly misuses" and the phrase “deliberately” or mentioning the 




63 SACL 2015, art 212(b). 
64 SACL 2015, art 211(b)(c). 
65 SACL 2015, art 211(d). 
66 SACL 2015, art 211(i). 
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the director may be criminally liable, according to other laws that may relate to 
the position of director, 
6.2 The consequences of breach of the duties 
6.2.1 Return of property and account of profits 
The company directors may be ordered to return the company property to the 
company in case of taking its property by breach of duties while they shall hold 
the property in trust for the company.68 Account of profit claims is often involved 
in breaching some of the directors’ duties, duty to avoid conflicts of interest and 
to declare any personal interest,69 duty not to participate in any business 
competitive with that of the company70 and duty not to accept benefits from third 
party.71 If a company director had benefited from an unauthorised profit by 
breaching these duties, this profit is confiscated to the company. This is to deter 
the directors from exercising these wrongful acts and should be note that profits 
confiscated and return the company property are not to compensate the 
company for the loss, as the company compensation may be greater than the 
profit realised by the director.72 
Consequently, the court may, at the request of the affected party (the 
company), rule to return the property and account of profits as a result of the 
directors breach of their duties. In the judgment declared by the Commercial 
Court,73 the respondent (a director) is obligated to return the property (building), 
which is the subject of the company's competition, the activity of the company 
is to buy or rent buildings and re-rent them as residential units. The company 
claimed to the director that after the expiry of the company lease contract for 
the building (the subject of the dispute), the director rented the building for his 
own account, and the rent was not renewed for the company’s account. The 
company considered that as competing with the company’s activity. Therefore, 
 
68 SACL 2015, arts 24, 31, 71 and 72. 
69 SACL 2015, arts 31 and 71. 
70 SACL 2015, arts 31 and 72. 
71 Sharia “Islamic” jurisprudence principle "Al'asl Bara'at Althimah" which means each person's 
liability is innocent until proven otherwise; The Saudi Arabian Corporate Governance 2019, art 
49. 
72 SACL 2015, art 218. 
73 The Saudi Arabian Commercial Court, 10/TG/1/7 (2013); 213/TG/2/1 (2014). 
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the court held that the operations done by the director were for the company 
account. However, logically, the directors are not liable to account for profits 
that are not related to the breach of the duties.  The directors are liable to 
account for profits made by themselves or through a company and they have 
an interest.74 In addition, the profits made jointly by other persons are not 
subject to confiscation unless the other person is aware of the breach of duty 
and may be liable.75 
In Islamic law, the general rule is that every act of an agent (director) that has 
exceeded the granted powers or with negligence, the agent is liable for that 
conduct. Whether by compensation or other remedies. The compensation in 
Islamic law is either in-kind or monetary. In-kind compensation is the restoration 
of the situation as it was before the damage, if possible.76 
6.2.2 Equitable compensation 
Return of property and confiscation of profits from a director who breached the 
prescribed duties may not be sufficient to redress the damage suffered by the 
company due to the director's breach of his/her fiduciary duty. Therefore, the 
court may award equitable compensation for any loss not compensated by the 
account of profit.77 
The Saudi Arabian legislature does not specify a specific mechanism to 
compensate for the damage but rather left that to the judge's discretionary 
power to consider the circumstances of the case and the provisions of the 
Islamic law. Here a question arises as to the amount of compensation due to 
the affected party. In general, the amount and the type of compensation in the 
civil liability cases against directors according to the damage to the affected 
party. The general rule in assessing compensation is that if the compensation 
is stated by the legislature, the judges are obligated to compensation as in the 
manner of the legal provisions. If there is a legal provision that determines the 
amount of compensation for the damage, the judges are obliged by this legal 
 
74 SACL 2015, art 71(2). 
75 SACL 2015, art 74. 
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provision, and they do not have discretionary authority to determine the 
compensation.78 Since the Saudi Arabian legislature does not specify the 
amount of compensation for the damage caused due to the wrongful acts of the 
directors, the judges have discretion in assessing the appropriate 
compensation. 
However, the judge's discretionary power to fix the compensation, as Al-
Sanhouri79 and Wahdan80 argue, is restricted by some of the principles that 
have been agreed upon judicially in accordance with the provisions of Islamic 
law, and among these principles we should note the following. First, the 
compensation is to the extent of the damage, according to the opinion of those 
with experience in that. Second, the judge does not have to award 
compensation for more than what the claimant (the affected party) claim, even 
if the claim compensation is less than the damage that in the discretion of the 
judge and the experts. Third, the compensation is related to the damage itself 
not to the gravity of the wrongful acts. For the wrongful act that is not grave 
(culpa levis), which leads to grave damage, the compensation must be 
estimated on the damage, not estimated on the wrongful acts caused; and the 
grave wrongful act (culpa lata) that causes minor damage the compensation 
would be for the amount of damage regardless of the grave wrongful act. In 
addition, the financial position of the director should not be taken into account 
in the amount of compensation, so the compensation is not increased if the 
director is affluent or insured on their liability. Fourth, the affected person may 
not obtain more than one sum of compensation for one damage, so no matter 
how many perpetrators made the wrongful act, the compensation is for the 
damage. 
The damage, whether or not it occurred, is of three types. First, the damage 
has already occurred. Second, the damage that its causes have occurred, but 
its effects have not yet occurred, and it will happen in the future certainly. Third, 
the potential damage, which its causes have occurred, but its effects are not 
 
78 Redha Wahdan, The practical problems in the compensation claim before the Saudi Arabian 
judiciary, the Journal of Justice, v 46 (2010), 75-88, 78. 
79 Al-Sanhouri (n 20) chapter 4, part 2, p. 971. 
80 Wahdan (n 78) 80-81. 
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certain to happen in the future.81 Saudi Arabian law has adopted the same 
approach as Islamic law. The compensation is estimated on the damages that 
have already occurred or the damages that are certain to happen in the future. 
As for the potential damage that is not certain to happen in the future, it will not 
be compensated because the consideration is in the occurrence of the damage, 
not in the expected damage.82 
As already mentioned, the compensation is in the event of occurrence a 
wrongful act, the damage and the causal relationship between them.83 The 
compensation for moral damage is subject to disagreement among Islamic 
scholars, about the possibility of the judge’s discretionary power to assess 
compensation for moral damage, and its denial because of the difficulty or 
impossibility of assessing the moral damage.84 
In the judgment declared by the Commercial Court,85 the respondents (two 
directors) were liable to pay compensation to the shareholders for the damages 
incurred by the company due to their negligence in the company's 
management. Where the respondents committed financial violations such as 
paying incentives and bonus for the company employees including themselves 
despite not achieving profits in the activity of the company, but the source of 
these incentives and bonus was from the sale of the company's assets. It had 
been also proven that there were differences and inconsistencies in the 
company's accounts and budget and that there are deficiencies in the 
company's internal monitoring process. Accordingly, the court ruled the 
directors liable for negligence in the company's management and they are liable 
to pay compensation to the company. This is supported by the judgment 
declared by the Commercial Court,86 against the defendant (the director) to 
compensate the plaintiffs (shareholders) for the loss resulting from negligence 
in the company's management. Where a large number of goods were lost in 
relation to the size of the company and the short period of its operation, the 
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court held that it usually does not lose such a number (percentage) of the 
goods, except in the case of negligence. 
In Islamic law, as previously mentioned, if civil liability is established against an 
agent, then the agent is obligated to pay in-kind compensation, which is to 
restore the situation as it was before the damage, if possible. If it is not possible, 
in-kind compensation, then monetary compensation is another remedy that is 
resorted to in this case.87 
6.2.3 Rescission of a transaction 
The transaction of a company that has occurred due to a breach of duty to 
declare any personal interest, violating the grant of loans or violating the 
provisions of debt instruments or financing instruments is voidable in 
accordance with the options of the company and may be rescinded.88 The 
rescission of a transaction involves each party returning to the other what was 
transferred in the transaction. Also, upon rescission of the contract of sale of 
property or any transactions made by a director, the director must return all the 
profits that they made through the transaction.89 However, in some 
circumstances where the transaction cannot be rescission, such as the resale 
of the property to another party.  It is also the case where the transaction was 
made with someone who is non-fraudster (has good faith), rescission may not 
be possible depending on the circumstances surrounding the transaction.90  
In the judgment declared by the Saudi Arabian commercial court,91 the director 
of the company sold part of the company’ shares to herself, provided that the 
value of the shares be paid from future profits. It is evident that selling in this 
way is nothing more than being in a non-interests of the company and the 
shareholders, but rather is in consideration of the interests of the buyer (the 
director), and by claiming the shareholders to revoke this transaction (selling 
the shares), then the court ruled to nullify the sale, as it is exceeded the granted 
 
87 El-Bahouty (n 43) part 2 p 306-307.  
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89 SACL 2015, art 71(2). 
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power of the director and in breach of the duty to act in the interests of the 
company. Also, in the judgment declared by the Saudi Arabian commercial 
court,92 the board of directors set aside a yearly sum to support the defaulters 
of the tenants, and as this violates art 30 of the SACL 2015 (Donations). This 
is considered by the court as exceeding the power of the board of directors and 
mismanagement of the company's affairs, and therefore the court annulled the 
support decision and obligated the board of directors to compensate for what 
was paid. 
In this regard, it should be noted that a personal claim could be made against 
third parties when the directors breached their duties. This is if the third party 
dishonestly assisted a director to breach their duties, the third party may be 
personally liable to pay compensation to the company. Or if the third party 
knows that such directorial acts are not within the limits of the board's 
competence, the third party may be liable for compensation to the company.93 
In Islamic law, if the agent acts in a manner that does not benefit the principal, 
then this act is considered non-binding for the principal; some Islamic law 
scholars argue that the wrongful act is void even if it is authorised later by the 
principal. While some scholars believe that, the act is void unless it is authorised 
later by the principal.94 
6.2.4 Removal of directors 
In SACL 2015, the removal of directors from their position has also ways and 
circumstances. This removal depends largely on the type of company and the 
circumstances of a director. In general partnerships, the removal of a director 
depends on two main things which are that the director is a shareholder in the 
company or not, and the appointment of the director is in the general 
partnerships’ articles of association or in a separate service contract. If a 
director is a shareholder and appointed in the articles of association, s/he has 
immunity against the termination except by a decision issued by the competent 
judicial authority at the request of the majority of shareholders. The removal of 
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a director in such manner shall entail the dissolution of the general partnership 
unless the general partnership’s articles of association provides otherwise.95 
While if the director is a shareholder appointed in a separate contract, s/he may 
be terminated by a resolution from the shareholders.96 Finally, with respect to 
general partnerships, if a director is not a shareholder, s/he may be terminated 
by a resolution from the shareholders, whether the director is appointed in the 
articles of association or in a separate contract.97  
In a limited liability company, the shareholders have full freedom to remove a 
director, whether the director is appointed in the company's articles of 
association or in a separate contract, without prejudice to their right to 
compensation due to removal.98 SACGR 2019 stipulate that the ordinary 
general assembly may dismiss all or any of the board members of directors at 
any time. The ordinary general assembly also, upon the recommendation of the 
board of directors, may terminate the membership of absent members of the 
board of directors from attending three consecutive meetings without a 
legitimate excuse.99 
The removal of the directors from their office at any time without a reasonable 
reason does not mean that the provisions of their contracts with the company, 
including compensation for dismissal, are not applied during the period of 
validity of their contracts. However, the dismissal due to the directors breaching 
their duties, whether, by the general assembly, the board of directors or the 
judicial authority exempt the company from the compensation of the dismissed 
director,100 rather, civil or criminal liability may arise against the director 
because of that breach of duties.101 
In the judgment declared by the Saudi Arabian commercial court,102 the 
shareholders wanted to dismiss the director due to many violations, including 
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not exercising reasonable care, the director's personal interests having 
conflicted with the interests of the company and a number of administrative 
violations. Whereas, the articles of association of the company stipulated that 
the dismissal of the director is by unanimous consent of the shareholders, which 
has not happened, as the director owns 1% of the company and naturally 
refuses to dismiss himself. Accordingly, the shareholders turned to the other 
option, which is to dismiss the director through the judicial authority. With the 
court having examined the aforementioned violations, the court ruled to dismiss 
the director without consideration to the rights stipulated in the appointment 
contract. 
It should be noted that claiming the dismissal of the directors in a manner that 
exempts the company from applying the provisions of the directors’ contracts 
with the company, including expulsion compensation during the period of the 
validity of their contracts, is not an easy matter. By examining the judicial 
judgments that were published between103 the years 2012-2016,104 all judicial 
rulings regarding claiming to the director dismissal, in a manner that exempts 
the company from applying the provisions of the directors’ contracts with the 
company, were rejected because there are not sufficient reasons that exempt 
the company from applying the provisions of directors’ contracts with the 
company. 
In Islamic law, a question arose as to whether the agent exceeded the powers 
granted or acted in a wrongful manner to the principal, so would the agency 
contract remain or be abolished? Islamic law scholars have two opinions. The 
first opinion, if the agent exceeded the powers granted or acted in a wrongful 
manner to the principal, then the agency contract is not invalidated, and if the 
agent is paid for their work, the principal is obligated to pay so. This is because 
the agency contract is authorising to act in accordance with the powers granted, 
and if the agents exceed it or act in a wrongful manner, they are liable for their 
 
103 After 2017, it has not published any new judicial judgments. Perhaps the reason for this is 
the new organisation of commercial courts as self-standing courts since October 2017. Where 
the administrative and commercial courts were in the past before 2017 merged into one court. 
It may take some time to publish judicial judgments. 
104 For example, see the Saudi Arabian Commercial Court judgments, 6755/Q (2015); 788/Q 
(2016). 
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acts; therefore, the wrongful act or exceeding the powers does not affect their 
position as agents.105 The second opinion, if the agent exceeded the powers 
granted or acted in a wrongful manner to the principal, the agency contract is 
automatically abolished unless the principal authorised the agent to continue, 
therefore the implications for that are that the agent does not deserve the pay 
for subsequent work and the subsequent acts of the agent are invalid.106 
6.2.5 Receivership 
A receivership in Saudi Arabian law is placing the disputed money in the hands 
of a person appointed by agreement of all concerned parties, or failing that the 
judge shall make the appointment of a receiver if no agreement is reached.107 
The judge may order placement under receivership if the party having an 
interest in the movable or immovable property presents reasonable cause that 
imminent danger is feared if the property remains in the hands of its 
possessor.108 Receivership shall end by agreement of all the parties concerned 
or by a court judgment. The receiver shall then return the property under his 
custody to the person chosen by the concerned parties or appointed by the 
judge.109 However, it must be established that there are no other remedies other 
than the receivership to remedy the damage. Because appointing a receiver for 
a company means destroying the company's reputation in the Saudi Arabian 
market and the unwillingness of traders to deal with it for fear of the company's 
unknown future. 
6.2.6 Criminal sanctions 
The potential imposition of civil liability against directors may be insufficient to 
deter directors from some wrongful practices. The Saudi Arabian legislature 
has adopted criminal liability against some of the directors ’acts; as the director 
may be criminally liable for acts that have been occurred during the company's 
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operations. The criminal liability against the director can be established directly 
without prosecuting the company.  
As it has been mentioned, SACL 2015 stipulates the criminalisation of many 
wrongful practices by directors, which would violate the integrity, trust, 
protecting companies, shareholders and the third party, and imposing the 
appropriate penalties for these practices.110 The directors’ criminal liability 
derives from one of two things, either through the criminal acts that criminal law 
has criminalised against members of society or through the provisions on 
criminal liability in the SACL 2015 and relevant legislation. The SACL 2015 
stipulates a number of acts that give rise to criminal liability and impose criminal 
penalties on their perpetrators. These acts in which the director perhaps make 
as a result of occupying the position are.111  
The offence of making false statements or omitting including some data 
deliberately in the company's financial statements or in the reports of the 
general meeting is to be noted. The SACL 2015 stipulates that this act is 
criminalized where it is stated without prejudice to any more severe penalty 
stipulated for in any other law, liable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
five years and a fine not exceeding five million Saudi Arabian Riyals112 or by 
either of these two penalties,113 against any director, official, auditor, or 
liquidator who knowingly includes false information in the financial statements 
or in the reports prepared by him for the shareholders or the general meeting; 
or who omits essential facts from such statements or reports with the intention 
of concealing the financial position of the company from the shareholders or 
third parties.114 The penalties will also be against whoever willfully inserts in the 
articles of association, bylaws, or other company’s documents or in the 
incorporation license application form or in the documents attached to the 
incorporation application form, false information contradicting with the 
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provisions of the SACL 2015; and whoever knowingly signs or distributes such 
documents.115  
One of the offences is the offence of divulging company secrets. The SACL 
2015 stipulates that this act is criminalized where it is stated without prejudice 
to any more severe penalty stipulated for in any other law, liable by 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding a year and a fine not exceeding one 
million Saudi Arabian riyals or by either of these two penalties.116 
The SACL 2015 also stipulates the criminalisation of knowingly misusing the 
company’s funds and misusing the powers granted against the company's 
interests. This act is criminalized where it is stated without prejudice to any 
more severe penalty stipulated for in any other law, liable by imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding five years and a fine not exceeding five million Saudi 
Arabian riyals or by either of these two penalties.117 
In addition, the offence of not calling the general assembly meeting when the 
losses of the company amount to half of the paid-up capital or if fails to publish 
such information in accordance with such losses, is liable by imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding five years and a fine not exceeding five million Saudi 
Arabian riyals or by either of these two penalties.118 Finally, the Saudi 
legislature considered that the director who misuses the company for purposes 
other than that for which it was designated, is an offence that arises the criminal 
liability, is liable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years and a 
fine not exceeding five million Saudi Arabian riyals or by either of these two 
penalties.119 
In addition, the director may be criminally liable, according to other laws that 
may relate to the position of director, such as those offences contained in Anti-
Forgery Law 2013, which stipulates that the penalty for forgery be by 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years and a fine not exceeding 
 
115 SACL 2015, arts 212(f). 
116 SACL 2015, art 212(b). 
117 SACL 2015, arts 211(b)(c). 
118 SACL 2015, art 211(d). 
119 SACL 2015, art 211(i). 
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one million Saudi Arabian riyals.120 Also, the bribery penalty stipulated in the 
Saudi Arabian Anti-Bribery Law 1992 is imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding ten years and a fine not exceeding one million Saudi Arabian riyals 
or by either of these two penalties.121 In addition, if the company commits fraud 
through its acts, the director may be criminally liable if the fraud is committed 
with his/her consent or connivance with another. If the fraud is committed by 
committing one of the offences stipulated in the Saudi Arabian Anti-Cyber 
Crime Law 2007, the penalty is imprisonment for a period not exceeding three 
years and a fine not exceeding two million Saudi Arabian riyals or by either of 
these two penalties.122 As for if the fraud is committed by committing one of the 
offences stipulated in the Saudi Arabian Anti-Money Laundering Law 2012, the 
penalty is imprisonment for a period not exceeding fifteen years and a fine not 
exceeding seven million Saudi Arabian riyals or by either of these two 
penalties.123 As for the legal person (the entity - the company), the penalty is a 
fine not exceeding fifty million Saudi Arabian riyals.124  
Finally, the directors may be liable for a wide range of offences, including the 
criminal liability of directors for offences stipulated in Electronic Transactions 
Law 2007, Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law 2009, Environmental Law 2001, Law 
of Chemicals Import and Management 2006, Electronic Transactions Law 
2007, Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law 2009, Environmental Law 2001, Law of 
Chemicals Import and Management 2006 and other relevant laws.125 
Islamic law recognises criminal punishment, establishing criminal punishment 
for the benefit of the community against those found to be criminally liable.126 
One of the criminal penalties recognised in Islamic law is imprisonment.127 The 
punishment for imprisonment is stipulated in the Noble Qur'an,128 and the 
 
120 The Saudi Arabian Anti-Forgery Law 2013, arts 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 13. 
121 The Saudi Arabian Anti-Bribery Law 1992, arts 1, 9, 10 and 11. 
122 The Saudi Arabian Anti-Cyber Crime Law 2007, art 4. 
123 The Saudi Arabian Anti-Money Laundering Law 2012, arts 2, 3 and 27. 
124 The Saudi Arabian Anti-Money Laundering Law 2012, art 31.  
125 See the Saudi Arabian Criminal Procedure Law 2013, art 112. 
126 Abdel-Qader Odeh, Islamic Criminal Legislation, 14th Edition, Al-Resalah Foundation, 
Beirut, (2001), Part 1, p. 609. 
127 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Al-Turuq Al-Hukmiah fi Al-Siyasah Al-Shareiah, International 
Islamic Fiqh Academy, Jeddah, (2008), p 101. 
128 The Noble Qur'an, Surah Al-Nisaa ayat 15. 
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Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) ordered the imprisonment of a person in some 
cases,129 as well as the companions after him.130 The Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH) also ordered the punishment of a fine in some cases.131 
6.3 Elimination and limitation of liability 
6.3.1 Relief from liability by the ratification of directors' acts 
Directors owe general duties to the company. These duties are imposed on 
directors to act to achieve the purposes of the company, avoid conflicts of 
interest and not to participate in any business competitive with that of the 
company and exercise the absolute good faith and fairness in the management 
of the company's affairs in the interests of the company.132 However, this 
legislation also recognises that directors are subject to business judgment 
mistake, which allowing only the general assembly or the shareholders to 
relieve directors from liability arising from breach of some of the duties by 
ratification; without granting the court any power to relieve directors from their 
liability.133 This is in contrast to the CA 2006 s.1157, which also grants the 
courts the discretion in granting relief to directors from their liability if they prove 
three things. They acted honestly, reasonably and having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case they ought fairly to be excused. Therefore, the court 
may relieve the director from liability in whole or in part and on conditions it 
deems proper. 
Under the Saudi Arabian Companies Act 2015, the company may ratify the acts 
of the directors by the company shareholders or the general assembly, for some 
of the conduct of the director, amounting to undertaking any acts beyond the 
scope the purposes of the company or participate in any business that conflicts 
with the interest of the company. This ratification makes the directors more safe 
from the company's actions or derivative suits. Therefore, directors do not need 
 
129 Sulayman Al-Azdi, Sunan Abu Dawood, Al-Maktabah Al-Eisriah, Beirut, (2000), 3629. 
(Known as Sunan Abu Dawood). 
130 Abu Bakr bin Abi Shaybah, The Book Classified in Hadiths and Athar, 1st Edition, Al-Rushd 
Library, Riyadh, (1988), part 1, p. 132. 
131 Sunan Abu Dawood (n 129) 1719. 
132 SACL 2015, arts 29, 31, 71, 72, 74 and 75. 
133 SACL 2015, arts 30, 31, 71 and 72. 
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to certify if they act according to the powers conferred.134 The Saudi Arabian 
Companies Act 2015, does not specify who would include in ratification, 
whether are the current and former directors or only the current directors. 
However, considering the aim of the ratification, which is making the directors 
more protected from the company's actions or derivative suits; it can be said 
that the ratification includes the former and current directors. 
In order to ratify directors' conduct, there are three ways. Either by the consent 
of the shareholders or by the ordinary general assembly or by virtue of an 
express provision in the articles of association of the company.135 In the case 
of a director who declares to the board of directors any direct or indirect interest 
that s/he may have in the transactions or contracts concluded for the company. 
Such declaration must be recorded in the minutes of the board meeting, and 
this director shall not participate in voting for the resolution to be adopted in this 
respect in the board of directors and the shareholders’ meetings. The chairman 
of the board of directors shall inform the ordinary general assembly upon 
convening, of the transactions and contracts in which any director has a direct 
or indirect interest. Such notification shall be accompanied by a special report 
from the company's external auditor.136 
Regarding the ratification of the directors ’acts due to a breach of the provisions 
of the company's articles of association, or because of the director’s default or 
negligence, or because of mismanagement of the company's affairs, the Saudi 
Arabian legislature prevents from certifying these acts. In the context of liability 
against director because of breaching the provisions of the company’s articles 
of association or due to director’s default or negligence or mismanagement of 
the affairs of the company; articles 78(2) and 165(3) of the SACL 2015, states 
that the ordinary general assembly's and the shareholders' ratification and their 
consent a to discharge the directors from their liability shall not preclude the 





136 SACL 2015, art 71(1). 
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6.3.2 Indemnification against directors' liabilities 
An indemnity clause is a contractual provision that gives benefits to the 
contracting parties, allowing parties to manage the risks associated with the 
contract. Because the indemnity enables one party to be protected against 
liability, by paying one party the losses incurred by the other.137 Indemnity is 
used in a wide variety of contexts and there is no general rule as to when the 
indemnity will be made, depending on the circumstances of the contract.  
The Saudi legislature stipulates in the SACL 2015138 and the former Saudi 
Arabian Companies Law 1965,139 that any provision, whether in the company's 
articles of association or in the appointment contract of the director or any 
subsequent agreement according to which the company provides an indemnity 
for the company directors against any liability incurred by them in respect of 
default, negligence, a breach of the provisions of the company's articles of 
association, or because of mismanagement of the company's affairs, or breach 
of trust in relation to the company shall be considered non-existent (void). 
Islamic law is consistent with Saudi Arabian law to prevent the indemnity of 
liabilities. If the agents (directors) are provided with an indemnity against any 
liability incurred by themselves in respect of their wrongful acts in relation to the 
principal (the company) this shall be considered void.140 
6.3.3 Insurance against directors' liabilities 
Insurance may be a good way that the company directors can rely on to protect 
themselves from personal liability. It can also be the only means available to 
relieve themselves of liability when the shareholders of the company and the 
general assembly are unwilling to ratify the acts of the directors that breached 
the duties. Companies usually purchase insurance for the benefit of directors 
to attract them and retain them in their positions, because managing a daily 
business may be surrounded by risk. Therefore, the purpose of insurance is to 
 
137 SACL 2015, arts 32, 78(1) and 165(2). 
138 Ibid. 
139 The former Saudi Arabian Companies Law 1965, arts 32, 76 and 168. 
140 Ibn Abidin (n 41) part 1 p 300. 
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indemnity for liability incurred by individuals as a result of being in the position 
of director.141 The insurance can also cover the court, tribunal and legal fees 
and other costs the company or the directors personally may incur as a result 
of such a suit. 
The SACL 2015 does not contain any provision regarding the directors' liability 
insurance, whether by permitting or prohibiting. Perhaps this is due to the fact 
that the idea of insurance on the liability of directors is considered somewhat 
new in the Saudi Arabian market. Directors' liability insurance is often called 
Directors and Officers liability insurance "D&O", which is liability insurance 
payable to company directors as indemnification for losses or defence costs if 
the insured suffers such losses as a result of legal proceedings against wrongful 
acts.142 D&O insurance is a product subject to price fluctuations, diversity in 
terms and conditions, scope and size of coverage which is always there is a 
maximum amount of liability insurance coverage and duration of coverage. The 
insurance contract, therefore, relies on these terms and trade circumstances, 
which is negotiable.  However, in general, intentional illegal, fraudulent and 
criminal acts and the acquisition of wrongful profits are not covered by the 
insurance policy. The consequences of financial problems that the insured had 
previously aware of before commencement coverage or breach of duty for 
personal benefit are often excluded from insurance coverage.  Therefore, the 
insured must disclose material facts before contracting.143  
6.4 Evaluation of the Saudi Arabian law with respect to the directors’ 
liability. 
The legislation imposes liabilities against the directors to reduce the unwanted 
consequences of their decisions for the company, shareholders, and third party, 
and it seeks to prevent the directors from using the position for their personal 
 
141 Stadermann F, Banis C. (2008). From 'Severability Clause' to 'Innocent Directors Clause' in 
Dutch D&O Policies. British Insurance Law Association. 19-20 available at 
<http://www.ph8.nl/upload/catalog/289/410245/5/From%20'Severability%20Clause'%20to%2
0'Innocent%20Directors%20Clause'.pdf> [accessed 14 April 2020]. 
142 Sprayregen JHM, Friedland JP, Ghasemi M. (2005). Directors & Officers Insurance. Thirty-
first Annual Southeastern Bankruptcy Law Institute, Atlanta, Georgia. Authors are affiliated with 
Kirkland & Ellis LLP, 1-2 available at < http://www.sbli-
inc.org/archive/2005/documents/395189.pdf > [accessed 17 April 2020]. 
143 See the insurance policy of UIB-Saudi and HISCOX. 
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interests or for any other considerations that are not in the company's interest 
or are not within the purposes of the company. However, the problem is despite 
the fact that the legislature emphasis the liability of directors through civil and 
criminal liability, but that the law should be clearer regarding the duties of the 
directors, which is the basis of liability and not to leave it to the provisions of 
Islamic law, or scattered in SACL 2015 and the Corporate Governance 
Regulations. 
As for the liability towards the company's creditors, the provisions of Islamic law 
impose liability against the directors regarding the debts of the company's 
creditors in the event of negligence, default or fraud. Undoubtedly, the Saudi 
Arabian law and judiciary are based on the provisions of Islamic law, and 
accordingly, the directors will be liable in relation to the debts of the company's 
creditors in the event of negligence, default or fraud. It is worth that the 
legislature to state the duty to take into account the interests of the creditors of 
the company at a specific point of the company's life, so the directors to be 
aware of it. 
Finally, as mentioned previously, one of the duties of the director stipulated in 
the SACL 2015 is to be a liquidator for the company. This is upon the dissolution 
of the company, the directors will automatically be in the liquidator’s rule until a 
liquidator is appointed for the company. Article 79 of the SACL 2015 states that 
the liquidator, after obtaining the approval of the ordinary general assembly, 
must institute a liability action against the company directors for wrongful acts 
that cause prejudice to the shareholders. However, the problem with this duty 
is that when the directors become the liquidators, it is unreasonable that a suit 
to be brought against themselves. Basically, the liquidator’s function is to 
examine the director's work before dissolution the company, and if the liquidator 
was the director, then the purpose of the liquidator's function is negated. 
6.5 The comparison of directors’ liabilities in the UK and Saudi legislation. 
As has been mentioned, the comparative study means examining the 
differences and similarities between the laws of different countries in different 
systems in the world. The importance of comparative law is that it helps to 
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mutual understanding and dispel prejudice and misinterpretation in this world. 
It also provides a platform for legal intellectual exchange and helps to broaden 
the horizons of legislators worldwide. This study, in the previous chapters, has 
highlighted the directors’ liabilities in the UK and Saudi Arabian legislation. In 
this section, the study will compare the relevant legislation in Saudi Arabia and 
the like on the UK side, and highlight the similarities and differences in what 
needs to be clarified. It is worth mentioning that the aim of the comparative 
study is not to search for the best legal system, but the purpose is to know more 
deeply the existing legal systems and thus develop what we have. 
One of the similarities between the UK and Saudi Arabian law is that the 
directors may face civil and criminal liability as a result of a breach of the duties 
imposed on them, whether by legislation, the company's articles of association 
or the appointment contract. In general, the Saudi Arabian and UK legislators 
are consistent with that it is of the consequences of the breach of the duties 
return of property and account of profits, equitable compensation, rescission of 
a transaction, receivership, removal of directors and criminal sanctions. They 
are also consistent, in general, on the directors may be relieved from liability by 
ratifying their acts, or by insurance against their liabilities. The Saudi Arabian 
and the UK legislature also correspond to prevent the indemnity of directors' 
liabilities at all. 
As for the differences between the two sets of legislation, we note the following. 
The UK legislature has explicitly stipulated civil liability for wrongful trading and 
criminal liability fraudulent trading in order to protect the company’s creditors. 
While the Saudi Arabian legislature does not address the protection of creditors 
by any legal provisions but rather left it to the provisions of Islamic law in 
protecting creditors. 
In the consequences of the breach of the duties, the UK legislator stipulates 
more broadly than the Saudi Arabian legislator on the consequences of the 
breach of the duties, as it the UK legislator stipulates on directors 
disqualification. Of the consequences of the director's breach of the duties in 
the UK law is disqualifying a person for a specified period from being a company 
director. In view of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the 
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disqualification of directors can be classified as disqualification due to 
misconduct and unfitness. In Saudi Arabia, there is no law for the 
disqualification of directors, but there are some regulations not to nominate for 
the position of the board of directors any person who has been convicted of an 
offence against honesty.144  There are also rules to form the boards of directors 
of the joint stock companies, in that they consist of persons who meet the 
conditions of expertise and adequacy of the honesty, in addition to not being a 
state employee, not being convicted of a crime, not being insolvent or bankrupt, 
not acting in a manner otherwise in financial markets, commercial business 
rules, not being a member of more than five listed companies, having scientific 
and practical experience, committed to the provisions of the laws, regulations 
and instructions, have sufficient time to work and having independent judgment 
and non-conflict of interest.145  It is worth the Saudi Arabian legislature to protect 
the Saudi Arabian market by enacting a law that is similar to the UK Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 to protect companies and the Saudi market. 
With regard to exempting directors from liability by ratifying their acts, the UK 
and Saudi Arabian legislators are consistent that the directors may be relieved 
from liability by ratifying their acts by the shareholders, in general. However, the 
UK legislator is broader in the exemption, which enacts another way to exempt 
directors from their liability by exempting through the court, which is not 
stipulated by the Saudi Arabian legislator. However, in order for a director to be 
relieved of liability by the UK court, three things must be proven. First, the 
director acted honestly. Second, the director acted reasonably. Third, the 
director having regard to all the circumstances of the case s/he ought fairly to 
be excused; so, the court requires a strong persuasion for relieving the director 
from the liability. In practice, proving these three things from the director may 
be sufficient not to be liable. 
 
144 SACGR 2019 art 65(2). 
145 Decree of the Saudi Ministry of Commerce and Investment, No 24233, 24/04/2016. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
Modern companies need directors having flexible powers and clearly defined 
duties as provided under contract and law. Recent financial scandals have 
demonstrated the importance of directors’ duties to ensure they manage the 
company's affairs properly; these crises were a result of many cases of fraud 
and mismanagement. Studies1 have proven that companies that enjoy enduring 
success have core values and a core purpose that remain fixed while their 
business strategies and practices endlessly adapt to a changing world. The 
directors’ duties in the UK and the KSA have been codified to enhance the 
clarity of the law and make it easier for the responsibilities of directors towards 
the company and others to be understood without the need for a legal 
consultant. It also aims to prevent fraud and mismanagement that causes 
corporate collapse. 
Returning to our research question this thesis sought to investigate and analyse 
the powers, duties and liabilities of the directors through a critical evaluation of 
the legal regulation of these matters in Saudi Arabia and UK legislation, and 
clarifying the similarities and differences between these bodies of legislation. 
This thesis also sought to find and provide solutions to perceived problems in 
the same context. 
7.2 Summary of findings 
7.2.1 Summary 
The main actor in the subject of this thesis is the company's director, who is the 
one who has been clarified in the CA 2006 as any legal person who holds the 
position of director by any name called. This includes shadow directors, de jure 
directors and de facto directors. In the SACL 2015, there is no explicit definition 
of a director. The SACL 2015 only recognises de jure directors and it does not 
provide expressly for shadow directors nor de facto directors but recently the 
 
1 See Collins (n 11) chapter 1. 
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Commercial Courts with a single case that implicitly recognises de facto 
directors.2 
With regard to the interaction between powers, duties and liabilities; a power is 
the ability that the law confers on a person to do something.  The duty is the 
obligation to do something or ought not to do something and a duty may restrict 
the exercising of powers. Directors are granted broad managerial powers that 
for the most part, the law does not see the need to itemise them.  Yet as for 
duties, they need to be itemised, because they give rise to obligations and may 
raise liabilities, so the liabilities are the result of a breach of duty. Of the 
directors' powers are, power to declare a dividend, power to litigate, power to 
appoint additional directors, power to make provisions for employees regarding 
the cessation or transfer of the company' business, power to forfeit shares, 
power to refuse to register a transfer of shares, power to circulate information 
to shareholders and power to borrow and give security. 3 
7.2.1.1 On the UK side 
In UK law, the directors’ duties can be summarized in the following way. First, 
duty to act within powers in accordance with the company's constitution and for 
the purposes so conferred.4 Second, there is a duty to promote the success of 
the company for the benefit of shareholders by taking into account all relevant 
considerations for the purpose of the success of the company.5 Third, there is 
a duty to act in the interests of the company's creditors in defined 
circumstances. This duty arises at the commencement of the actual insolvency, 
so-called insolvent liquidation, when the company has insufficient assets to 
repay its debts, other liabilities and the expenses of the winding up.6 Fourth, we 
note the duty to exercise independent judgment. Directors are responsible both 
for all their performed acts and for the actions that should have been performed. 
Therefore, the allegation of receiving instructions from others or allegation 
subjecting their powers to the will of others will not be a good defence for 
 
2 See (2.1.1 who is a director?).   
3 See (3.2 The directors' powers). 
4 See (3.3.1 Duty to act within powers). 




directors to evade any breach of fiduciary duty.7 Fifth, directors must consider 
the nature and manner of the company's business, in accordance with the 
circumstances surrounding it with what is not inconsistent with the company's 
constitution and the provisions of the directors’ contract appointment. The care 
standard that is adoption is the objective and subjective care standard 
together.8 Sixth, directors must avoid a circumstance, which has or can have a 
direct or indirect personal interest in conflict explicitly with the company's 
interests or is likely to conflict with the interests of the company.9 Seventh, 
directors must not accept a benefit from a party other than the company or its 
associated companies or their representative, because of their position.10 
Regarding the directors’ liabilities in UK law, the directors’ liabilities arise for 
several reasons. (1) Breach of fiduciary duty. (2) Breach of the duty to exercise 
reasonable care, which is so-called liability for negligence. (3) Breach of duty 
owed to creditors and this includes wrongful trading and fraudulent trading.11 
The consequences of breach of the duties can be summarized in the following. 
First, the director may be ordered to return the company property to the 
company.12 Second, the court may award equitable compensation for any loss 
not compensated by the account of profit.13 Third, the transaction of a company 
that has occurred due to a breach of fiduciary duty is voidable in accordance 
with the options of the company and may be rescinded.14 Fourth, the court may 
order that compels a director to do or refrain from ordering or freezing funds or 
assets.15 Fifth, the High Court may by order to appoint a receiver in cases in 
which it appears to be fair to do so.16 Sixth, the directors may be criminally liable 
for acts that have been occurred during the company's operations.17 Seventh, 
 
7 See (3.3.3 Duty to exercise independent judgment). 
8 See (3.3.4 Duty to exercise reasonable care, skills, and diligence). 
9 See (3.3.5 Duty to avoid conflicts of interest and to declare the interest in a proposed 
transaction or arrangement). 
10 See (3.3.6 Duty not to accept benefits from third parties). 
11 See (5.2 Directors’ liability). 
12 See (5.3.1 Return of property and Account of profits). 
13 See (5.3.2 Equitable compensation). 
14 See (5.3.3 Rescission of a transaction). 
15 See (5.3.4 Injunctive relief). 
16 See (5.3.5 Receivership). 
17 See (5.3.6 Criminal sanctions). 
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directors may be disqualified for a specified period from being a company 
director due to misconduct and unfitness.18 
With respect to the mitigation of the directors’ liabilities in UK law, it can be 
summarized that. First, the company may ratify the acts of the directors by the 
company members, for the conduct of the director, amounting to negligence, 
default, breach of duty or breach of trust with respect to the company.19 Second, 
the court has discretion in granting relief from liability in the case where a claim 
is brought against a director for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of 
trust.20 Third, insurance may be the only means available to relieve themselves 
of liability when the members of the company are unwilling to ratify the acts of 
the directors and the court is not convinced that they should be exempted from 
liability as a result of negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust.21  
7.2.1.2 On the Saudi Arabian side 
In Saudi Arabian law, the directors’ duties can be summarized in the following. 
First, there is a duty to act within powers in accordance with the company's 
constitution and for the purposes so conferred.22 Second, directors must 
exercise reasonable care during managing the company's business affairs. The 
care standard that is adoption is the objective and subjective care standard 
together.23 Third, directors may not disclose secret information related to the 
company that they acted for. The duty not to divulge secrets is limited to what 
the directors have known information about the company because of their 
positions.24 Fourth, there is a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. The director may 
not have a direct or indirect interest in the transactions and contracts that are 
concluded for the company’s account except with prior permission from the 
ordinary general assembly. The directors are also obliged to declare any 
interest they have in the transactions and contracts that are concluded for the 
 
18 See (5.3.7 Disqualification). 
19 See (5.4.1 Relief from liability by the ratification of directors' acts). 
20 See (5.4.2 Relief from liability by the court). 
21 See (5.4.3 Insurance against directors' liabilities). 
22 See (4.2 Duty to act within powers to achieve the purposes of the company). 
23 See (4.3 Duty to exercise reasonable care). 
24 See (4.4 Duty to maintain confidentiality). 
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company.25 Fifth, directors may not participate in any business that would 
compete with the company, or compete with the company in any of the branch 
activities that it carries out.26 Sixth, directors must not accept a benefit in 
particular benefits from another party who has business dealings with the 
company.27 Seventh, there is a duty to act in the interests of the company is 
implicitly stated in more than one place.28 Eighth, there is a duty to take into 
account the interests of the company's employees, suppliers and customers in 
terms of strengthening the company's relationships, social contribution of the 
company.29 Ninth, we have a duty to be a liquidator for the company upon the 
dissolution of the company, the directors will automatically be in the liquidator’s 
role until a liquidator is appointed for the company.30 
Regarding the directors’ liabilities in Saudi Arabian law, the directors’ liabilities 
arise for several reasons. (1) Breaching the provisions of the company’s articles 
of association, the general assembly’s decisions or the SACL 2015. (2) 
Mismanagement of the company's affair, the abuse of the granted power. (3) 
The negligent oversight of the company's business.31 
The consequences of breach of the duties can be summarized in the following. 
First, the director may be ordered to return the company property to the 
company.32 Second, the court may award equitable compensation for any loss 
not compensated by the account of profit.33 Third, the transaction of a company 
that has occurred due to a breach of duty to declare any personal interest, 
violating the grant of loans or violating the provisions of debt instruments or 
financing instruments is voidable in accordance with the options of the company 
and may be rescinded.34 Fourth, a director dismissal due to breaching duties 
with exempt the company from the compensation of the dismissed director.35 
 
25 See (4.5 Duty to avoid conflicts of interest and to declare any personal interest). 
26 See (4.6 Duty not to participate in any business competitive with that of the company). 
27 See (4.7 Duty not to accept benefits from third parties). 
28 See (4.8 Duty to act in the interests of the company and consider the interests of the 
stakeholders). 
29 Ibid. 
30 See (4.9 Duty to be a liquidator upon the dissolution of the company). 
31 See (6.1 Directors’ liability). 
32 See (6.2.1 Return of property and Account of profits). 
33 See (6.2.2 Equitable compensation). 
34 See (6.2.3 Rescission of a transaction). 
35 See (6.2.4 Removal of directors). 
Conclusion 
211 
Fifth, the judge may order the placement of the company under receivership.36 
Sixth, the directors may be criminally liable for acts that have been occurred 
during the company's operations.37 
With respect to the mitigation of the directors’ liabilities in Saudi Arabian law, it 
can be summarized that, first, the company may relieve directors from liability 
arising from breach of some of the duties by ratification, amounting to 
undertaking any acts beyond the scope the purposes of the company or 
participate in any business that conflicts with the interest of the company.38 
Second, the SACL 2015 does not contain any provision regarding the directors' 
liability insurance, whether by permitting or prohibiting. But insurance may be a 
good way that the company directors can rely on to protect themselves from 
personal liability.39 
7.2.2 The differences and similarities the UK and Saudi legislation 
The process of comparative study means examining the differences and 
similarities between the laws of selected countries with different legal systems 
in the world. It helps to promote mutual understanding and dispel prejudice and 
misinterpretation in this world. It also provides a platform for legal intellectual 
exchange. This section highlights the similarities and differences in the 
directors’ duties and liabilities in the UK and Saudi legislation. (See the 
schedule below). 
Duties UK SA 
Duty to act within powers Stated Stated 
Duty to promote the success of the company Stated Implicit 
Duty to exercise independent judgment Stated Not stated 
Duty to exercise reasonable care Stated Stated 
Duty to avoid conflicts of interest Stated Stated 
Duty to declare any personal interest Stated Stated 
Duty not to accept benefits from third parties Stated Stated 
 
36 See (6.2.5 Receivership). 
37 See (6.2.6 Criminal sanctions). 
38 See (6.3.1 Relief from liability by the ratification of directors' acts). 
39 See (6.3.3 Insurance against directors' liabilities). 
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Duty to maintain confidentiality - Stated 
Duty not to participate in any business competitive 
with that of the company - Stated 
Duty to take into account the impact of the 
company's operations on the environment Stated Not stated 
Duty to take into account the social contribution of 
the company Stated Stated 
Duty to take into account the interest of stockholders Stated Stated 
Duty to take into account the interest of creditors Stated Not stated 




The consequences of breach of the duties UK SA 
Return of property and Account of profits Stated Stated 
Equitable compensation Stated Stated 
Rescission of a transaction Stated Stated 
Injunctive relief Stated Not applicable 
Criminal sanctions Stated Stated 
Disqualification Stated Not applicable 
Removal of directors Stated Stated 
Receivership Stated Stated 
Elimination and limitation of liability UK SA 
Ratification by the company members Stated Stated 
Ratification by the court Stated Not applicable 
Insurance Stated Stated 
Indemnification Prohibited Prohibited 
Schedule (1) 
7.2.2.1 The similarities with respect to the duties of the directors 
First, the Saudi Arabian and UK legislators both are consistent with the view 
that the codification of the directors’ duties is the best way forward. This is 
because the codification of the directors’ duties enhances the clarity of the law 
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and make it easier for the responsibilities of directors towards others to be 
identified without the need for a legal consultant to interpret these duties.40 
Second, notwithstanding what was said above, the directors’ duties in the Saudi 
Arabian and UK legislation both are not fully self-contained despite codification. 
On the Saudi Arabian side, it is based on the provisions of Islamic law, and on 
the UK side, it is based on the provisions of common law for its interpretation. 
Therefore, directors in both jurisdictions need to be aware of the provisions of 
common law on the UK side, or the provisions of Islamic law on the Saudi side, 
or the need for a legal consultant. 
Third, the Saudi Arabian and UK legislators are consistent with the general 
duties of directors, duty to act within powers granted, duty to exercise 
reasonable care, duty to avoid conflicts of interest and to declare any personal 
interest, duty to take into account the social contribution of the company, duty 
to take into account the interest of stockholders and duty not to accept benefits 
from third parties. They also implicitly correspond on duty to achieve the 
company’s purposes, which the UK legislature has expressed as a duty to 
promote the success of the company. 
7.2.2.2 The similarities with respect to the liability of the directors 
First, the UK and Saudi Arabian courts will respect directors' exercise of 
discretion in the management of the company. Nevertheless, the courts will 
take into account whether reasonable care was exercised and all aspects 
related to the final decision. If the decision is taken in a reasonable manner, the 
directors cannot be held liable for any damage as a result of this decision. 
Second, the UK is consistent with Saudi Arabian law on that the company's 
directors may face civil and criminal liability as a result of a breach of the duties. 
Third, the Saudi Arabian and UK legislators correspond with the approach that 
the consequences of the breach of the duties may involve the return of property 
and account of profits, equitable compensation, rescission of a transaction, 
receivership, removal of directors and criminal sanctions. Fourth, the Saudi 
Arabian and UK legislators correspond, in general, on the point that directors 
 
40 See 3.1 Introduction of chapter three. 
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may be relieved from liability by ratifying their acts by the shareholders, or by 
insurance against their liabilities. Fifth, the Saudi Arabian and the UK legislature 
both prevent the indemnity of directors' liabilities at all. 
7.2.2.3 The differences with respect to the duties of the directors 
First, the mechanism of the interpretation of some of the duties differs between 
UK law and Saudi law, depending on the interpretation of common law or 
interpretation of Islamic law. For example, the interpretation of the term 
"success" was based on common law on the UK side on several things to 
determine the meaning of "the company's success", such as achieving the 
objectives set by the company, the interpretation of directors of the company 
for success is a meaningful explanation and cannot be challenged, creating a 
long-term increase in the company's value, and what the constitution 
determines as the success of the company, and the interpretation of achieving 
the purposes depends on the level of care required that interpreted by the 
provisions of Islamic law, whether is the care for the usual person(objective-
subjective standard) or the commitment to achieve the desired purpose. 
Second, the UK legislature has stated these duties in a single chapter in the 
Act, called general duties of directors, and limited them between sections 171-
177. While the Saudi legislator has presented the duties in a scattered and non 
explicit manner in many articles in the legislation. Some of these duties are 
stated in the form of duties, while others are stated in the form of prohibitions 
against the director, and others are stated in the form of penalties if a director 
made some prohibitions. The duties also are not fully stated in the SACL 2015, 
as some of these duties are stated in the SACGR 2019.  
Third, the UK legislature has clarified that the scope of the duties is both on the 
current director and the former director of the company (a person who ceases 
to be a director) depending on when the breach of duty occurred. In contrast, 
the Saudi Arabian legislature does not clarify whether the scope of the 
application of duties i is to apply to the current director only, or the current 
director and former director; this is left to the judge's discretionary authority, 
which will rely on the provisions of Islamic law. 
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Fourth, in duty to exercise reasonable care, the UK legislature clarified the 
meaning of care is that "the general knowledge, skill and experience that may 
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by 
the director in relation to the company", while the Saudi legislature does not 
explain this and left its interpretation to the Islamic law provision and the judge's 
discretionary authority, whether is the care for the usual person(objective-
subjective standard) or the commitment to achieve the desired purpose. 
Therefore, it can be said that the codification of this duty in the SACL 2015 from 
Islamic law needs more clarification in SA company law. It might be clarified as 
recommended and suggested in para 7.3.2 below (Eighth). 
Fifth, in the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, the UK legislature explains what 
includes in this duty and what does not apply to it or not infringed it. While the 
Saudi Arabian legislature does not elaborate on it, rather it stipulates other 
duties that are included in this duty, such as a duty not to participate in any 
business competitive with that of the company and duty to maintain 
confidentiality. As has been said above in the duty to exercise reasonable care, 
the codification of this duty in the SACL 2015 from Islamic law can be described 
as incomplete. 
Sixth, in duty not to accept benefits from a third party, the UK legislator 
stipulated the duty in greater clarity, including the cause of benefit and what is 
considered a breach of the duty and what is not considered a breach of the 
duty,41 which is fully consistent with the provisions of Islamic law. The Saudi 
Arabian legislature stipulates briefly that it is not permissible to accept benefits 
from a third party unless it is not likely to lead to a conflict of interests. 
Seventh, the UK legislature imposes on directors a duty to act in the interest of 
creditors in the event that the company has entered into insolvent liquidation or 
the director was aware of or ought to have concluded that there was no 
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid engaging in the insolvent 
liquidation before the company's winding up commencement. While the Saudi 
Arabian legislature does not stipulate this duty to directors and make the duties 
 
41 See CA 2006, s 176. 
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all concentrated on the interest of the company and the shareholders. 
Therefore, this duty has not been codified in the SACL 2015 from the Islamic 
law provisions, which maintain the rights of creditors.  
Eighth, the UK legislature imposes on directors a duty to exercise independent 
judgment, while the Saudi Arabian legislature does not stipulate this duty to 
directors although not recognised the shadow director and de facto directors in 
the face of the third party. 
Ninth, the UK legislature imposes on directors a duty to take into account the 
impact of the company's operations on the environment, while the Saudi 
Arabian legislature does not impose this duty on directors, nor even on the 
companies. 
Tenth, the Saudi Arabian legislature imposes on directors a duty to assume the 
role of a liquidator upon the dissolution of the company, while the UK legislature 
does not impose this type of duty on directors; rather the UK law requires 
liquidators to be only independent and qualified insolvency practitioners. 
Therefore, directors could not be liquidators of their own company, as this would 
create a conflict of interest. 
7.2.2.3 The differences with respect to the liability of the directors 
First, the UK legislature has explicitly stipulated civil liability for wrongful trading 
and criminal liability for fraudulent trading in order to protect the company’s 
creditors. While the Saudi Arabian legislature does not address the protection 
of creditors by any legal provisions but rather left it to the provisions of Islamic 
law and the judge's discretion in protecting creditors. 
Second, in the consequences of the breach of the duties, the UK law is 
disqualifying a person for a specified period from being a company director. In 
view of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the disqualification of 
directors can be classified as disqualification due to misconduct and unfitness. 
In Saudi Arabia, there is no law for the disqualification of directors, but there 
are some regulations not to nominate for the position of the board of directors 
any person who has been convicted of an offence against honesty. There are 
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also rules to form the boards of directors of the joint stock companies, in that 
they consist of persons who meet the conditions of expertise and adequacy of 
the honesty, in addition to not being a state employee, not being convicted of a 
crime and not being insolvent or bankrupt. 
Third, the UK legislator enables the court to compel the director to do or refrain 
from ordering or freezing funds or assets, which is so-called the injunctive relief. 
While the Saudi Arabian legislature does not adopt this type of legal remedy. 
Fourth, the UK legislator adopts a broader position in the directors' exemption 
from liability. The UK courts have discretion in granting relief from liability in the 
case where a claim is brought against a director for negligence, default, breach 
of duty or breach of trust. While this discretionary judicial pardon is not adopted 
by the Saudi Arabian legislator. 
Fifth, the Saudi Arabian legislation differs from the UK legislation in the 
directors’ exemption from their liabilities by ratifying their acts by the 
shareholders. in the Saudi Arabian legislation the directors’ exemption is limited 
to liability arising from breach of some duties, amounting to undertaking any 
acts beyond the scope the purposes of the company or participate in any 
business that conflicts with the interest of the company; and it prevents to ratify 
the directors ’acts due to a breach of the provisions of the company's articles of 
association, or because of the directors’ default or negligence, or because of 
mismanagement of the company's affairs. In the UK legislation allows the 
company members to ratify the director's acts, for the conduct of the director, 
amounting to negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust with respect 
to the company as long as the company is solvent. 
These differences between Saudi and UK law, and the legal drafting problems 
and the legal gap in Saudi Arabian law, indicates a degree of weakness in the 
Saudi Arabian legislation. This weakness must be recognised in order to 
promote the future legal reform in Saudi Arabia. One of the reasons for this 
weakness may be entirely relying on the provisions of Islamic law, and the 
familiarity of Saudi Arabian people whit Islamic law provisions. However, the 
expansion of the commercial business in Saudi Arabia, the development of 
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these forms of business and the entry of foreign investors, found that 
understanding the provisions of Islamic law is not an easy matter for everyone. 
The codification of Islamic law provisions and the enactment of laws in detail 
has been the subject of controversy for three reasons. First, codifying Islamic 
law provisions restricts the judge's discretionary power and is a subject of a 
long dispute among Islamic law scholars. Second, there were concerns that 
enacting laws in detail might lead to the introduction of what is conflicts with 
Islamic law provisions. Third, enacting laws in detail may lead to the disruption 
of commercial life if the laws are not continuously updated. Given the directors’ 
duties in the CA 2006, there is nothing to conflicts with Islamic law provisions, 
nor does it restrict the judge's discretion. It is worthy for the Saudi Arabian 
legislature to benefit from the UK experience in order to amend SACL 2015 in 
accordance with the recommendations and suggestions that I presented in this 
thesis.42 
7.2.3 Problems in the legal drafting of the duties of the directors in Saudi 
Arabian law 
Although the Saudi Arabian Companies Law was recently issued in 2015, there 
are many problems in the legal drafting of the duties of the director in the SACL 
2015 that the Saudi Arabian legislator does not address at the enactment of the 
law. These formulation problems can be summed up as follows. First, the duties 
are scattered with some in the SACL 2015, some in Corporate Governance 
Regulations 2019 and some in Islamic law. Second, these duties are stated 
within in the SACL 2015, different contexts of companies forms, some stated in 
the companies section generally, which means include all companies forms, 
but some of the duties are stated only in the section of the limited liability 
companies and some of the duties are stated only in the context of the joint-
stock companies, and the legislator does not state whether these duties for all 
companies forms or not. But initially, this gives the impression that such a duty 
that stated in a specific company form is limited to only the directors of this form 
of the company. However, after examining the rest of the articles and 
 
42 See (7.3 recommendations and suggestions, 7.3.2 On the Saudi Arabian side). 
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considering the penalties stated in articles 211 and 212 of the SACL 2015, it 
becomes clear that these duties are for all forms of companies. In detail, these 
legal drafting problems are. 
First, the duty to act within powers to achieve the purposes of the company. 
This particular duty is stated in the SACL 2015 when dealing only with the 
provisions of the general partnerships and the joint-stock companies without 
the rest of the companies’ forms, despite the fact that the legislator imposes in 
art 212 of the SACL 2015 a criminal penalty on all directors in all companies’ 
forms when directors breach this duty.43 
Second, the duty to maintain confidentiality. This duty is stated in the SACL 
2015 when dealing only with the provisions of the joint-stock companies without 
the rest of the companies, even though the legislator imposes in art 212 a 
criminal penalty on all directors in all companies’ forms when directors breach 
this duty.44 
Third, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. This duty is stated in the SACL 2015 
when dealing only with the provisions of the joint-stock companies without the 
rest of the companies, even though the legislator imposes in art 211 a criminal 
penalty on all directors in all companies’ forms when directors breach this duty. 
This duty is not expressly stipulated by the legislator, but rather implicitly and 
has been inferred from the concept of more than one article in the SACL 2015.45 
Fourth, the duty to declare any personal interest. This duty is stated in the SACL 
2015 when dealing only with the provisions of the joint-stock companies without 
the rest of the companies forms such as general partnerships and limited 
liability company, even though the legislator imposes in art 211 a criminal 
penalty on all directors in all forms of companies when directors breach this 
duty.46 
 
43 See (4.2 Duty to act within powers to achieve the purposes of the company) and (5.3.5 
Criminal sanctions). 
44 See (4.4 Duty to maintain confidentiality). 




Fifth, the duty not to participate in any business competitive with that of the 
company. This duty is stated in the SACL 2015 when dealing only with the 
provisions of the joint-stock companies without the rest of the companies forms, 
even though the legislator imposes in art 211 a criminal penalty on all directors 
in all forms of companies when directors breach this duty.47 
Sixth, duty to act in the interests of the company. This duty is stated in the SACL 
2015 when dealing only with the provisions of the general partnerships and the 
joint-stock companies without the rest of the companies, even though the 
legislator state in art 211 a criminal penalty on all directors in all forms of Saudi 
Arabian companies when directors breach this duty. This duty is not expressly 
stipulated by the legislator, but rather implicitly and has been inferred from the 
concept of more than one article in the SACL 2015.48 
7.2.4 A legal gap in the directors’ duties in SACL 2015 
Besides problems in the legal drafting of the duties of the director in SACL 2015, 
there are also legal gaps in the scope of directors’ duties in SACL 2015. These 
legal gaps lie in that the Saudi Arabian legislator does not state any definition 
of a director and does not address the shadow director issue, rather it does 
implicitly recognize the shadow directors and de facto directors. The Saudi 
Arabian legislator does not also state some of the duties in the SACL 2015 
despite the imposition of penalties for breaching these duties and these duties 
are recognised by the Islamic law provisions and the corporate governance 
regulations 2019. The problematic in the Corporate Governance Regulations 
2019 is that the scope of the application of the Corporate Governance 
Regulations is only to the listed joint stock company. In addition, some of the 
duties stated in the Corporate Governance Regulations 2019 are not mandatory 
to companies but rather a reference of being guiding, although the provisions 
of Islamic law impose these duties. These legal gaps are. 
First, the duty to exercise reasonable care. This duty is not stated by the Saudi 
Arabian legislator in the SACL 2015 as a duty as such, but the legislator 
 
47 See (4.6 Duty not to participate in any business competitive with that of the company). 




includes it in the form of penalties for negligence in article 213 on all directors 
in all forms of Saudi Arabian companies, and the Islamic law imposes the duty 
of care on directors. The Saudi legislator states duty to exercise reasonable 
care explicitly only in the Corporate Governance Regulations. Therefore, it can 
be said that this duty is inferred from the concept of article 213 of the SACL 
2015, the Islamic law provision and the Corporate Governance Regulations 
2019.49 
Second, the duty not to accept benefits from third parties. This duty is not stated 
by the Saudi Arabian legislator in the SACL 2015, although the Islamic law 
provisions, which the Saudi Arabian judiciary is based upon it, prevents 
directors from accepting benefits from the third party and the Islamic law 
provisions address in detail the types of benefits and the ruling on accepting 
them. The Saudi Arabian legislator provides duty not to accept benefits from 
third parties explicitly only in the Corporate Governance Regulations.50 
Third, the duty to take into account the interests of the stakeholders. This duty 
is not stated by the Saudi Arabian legislator in the SACL 2015, despite the 
Islamic law provisions, which the Saudi Arabian judiciary apply, and impose a 
duty to take into account the interests of the stakeholders. The Saudi Arabian 
legislator provides duty to take into account the interests of the stakeholders 
explicitly only in the Corporate Governance Regulations.51 
Fourth, the duty to be a liquidator upon the dissolution of the company. This 
duty is stated by the Saudi Arabian legislator in the SACL 2015, but the lacuna 
is that the Saudi Arabian legislator does not clarify the mechanisms of the 
directors' conduct during the period close to the preceding the company 
dissolution and being a liquidator, just as the legislator does not indicate a 
mechanism that how the liquidator will hold herself/himself accountable when 
s/he was a director. Because it is unreasonable to expect that a suit will be 
brought against themselves. Basically, the liquidator’s function is to examine 
the directors’ work before dissolution of the company, and if the liquidator was 
 
49 See (4.3 Duty to exercise reasonable care). 
50 See (4.7 Duty not to accept benefits from third parties). 




the director, then the purpose of the liquidator's function is negated. This may 
create a state of uncertainty, such as if the directors knew that there was no 
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent 
liquidation, so they are between two options, either acting in the interest of the 
company (shareholders) or acting in the interest of the creditors as considered 
they will be liquidators. Acting as a director means maintaining the company's 
assets; while acting as a liquidator means converting the company's assets into 
cash money. In the event that the directors knew that there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company would avoid going into dissolution or insolvent 
liquidation, and the price of the company's assets is high, will the director act 
as a liquidator and sell these assets at the best price, which will be in the interest 
of the shareholders and creditors after the liquidation, or the directors must wait 
for the company to be dissolution and be liquidated and then sell assets at the 
current price, which may decrease. Also, the legislator does not address the 
directors' interests when they act as liquidators in the event of insolvency and 
the impact of this on the creditors' interest when the directors themselves are 
shareholders or creditors.52 
Fifth, the duty to take into account the interests of creditors in certain 
circumstances. Unfortunately, the Saudi Arabian legislator does not impose any 
duty on the directors to protect the company's creditors by taking into account 
the interests of creditors in certain circumstances. Rather, the legislator makes 
the entire focus of the directors’ duties to act in the interest of shareholders. 
Despite this, the Saudi Arabian judiciary, based on the provisions of Islamic law, 
may hold the director the liability for the failure to protect the creditors. Failure 
to stipulate this duty in the corporate law may lead to a lack of trust between 
creditors and companies, especially in large long-term debt situations, or may 
lead to the need to provide extensive guarantees to creditors by companies. 
Even if Islamic law maintains the rights of creditors, it would be worthy of the 
Saudi legislature to state a cut-off point, through which the directors must take 
into account the interests of creditors, rather than the interests of shareholders, 
 
52 See (4.9 Duty to be a liquidator upon the dissolution of the company). 
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and impose personal liability on the directors in the event that this duty is 
breached. 
Sixth, the duty to take into account the impact of the company's operations on 
the environment while retaining the shareholders’ benefit as the ultimate 
objective of the company “shareholder wealth maximization is prioritized”. It is 
necessary for the Saudi Arabian legislator to enact a duty to consider the impact 
of the company's operations on the environment in order to encourage the 
companies to take care of the environment through compliance with ecosystem 
and health measures and encourage companies to disclose policies on 
business ethics and the environment. 
Seventh, determining the scope of the duty not to participate in any business 
competitive with that of the company requires clarification. As already 
mentioned, there are problems in the legal drafting of this duty; as well, there is 
a legal gap in this obligation. In this duty, the Saudi Arabian legislature does not 
determine the scope of time or place for competition. The Saudi SACL 2015 
also does not stipulate that the period for non-competition be determined after 
the directors left their position in the company. 
7.3 Recommendations and suggestions 
This thesis sought to investigate and analyse the powers, duties and liabilities 
of the directors through a critical evaluation of the legal regulation of these 
matters in Saudi Arabia and UK legislation, and clarifying the similarities and 
differences between these legislations. This thesis also seeks to provide 
recommendations and suggestion to try, as much as possible, to reach the best 
legislation in the same context to be clear and sufficient for better practice in 
the companies’ affairs management. 
7.3.1 On the UK side 
With regard to UK law. First, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest in s 175 of 
CA 2006, the legislator states, "This duty is not infringed if the situation cannot 
reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest". Lim53 
 
53 Lim, E; (n 67) chapter 5, 242-244. 
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suggests that the interpretation of the term "reasonably be regarded as likely" 
should be tested by three things: that the company has considered the 
opportunity on an informed basis, the opportunity was within the scope of the 
company's activity, and the opportunity was a mature business opportunity. 
Therefore, it is worth the UK legislator to consider adopting this or similar 
interpretation in the UK Company Law in order to be clear to the company's 
directors and legal advisors. 
Second, with regard to wrongful trading that is stated in s 214 of Insolvency Act 
1986, the legislator states, "The court shall not make a declaration...with 
respect to any person if it is satisfied that after the condition...was first satisfied 
in relation to him that person took every step with a view to minimising the 
potential loss to the company’s creditors".  Sealy54 suggests that guidelines 
should be established on what directors should do in these cases. Because the 
words "every step" is ambiguous and, because it is likely to be strict, then any 
defence is almost impossible because no conduct can be accepted less than 
the best. 
Third, in the duty not to accept benefits from third parties there is ambiguity in 
determining the minimum amount of declaration interest in the case of receiving 
a benefit from a third party. It is worthwhile for the UK legislature to give 
guidance to determine the minimum amount that must be disclosed, especially 
in matters where courtesy such as luxury hospitality by a third party. 
7.3.2 On the Saudi Arabian side 
With regard to the reform Saudi Arabian law, first, the Saudi Arabian legislator 
should bridge the aforementioned legal gap identified in para 7.2.4 above in the 
directors’ duties in the SACL 2015. 
Second, the Saudi Arabian legislator should solve the legal drafting problems 
in framing the directors’ duties in the articles that are mentioned above in para 
7.2.3 so as to be more explicit and clearer. 
 
54 Sealy (n 84) chapter 5, 492. 
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Third, it is worthy for the Saudi Arabian legislator to define who is a director of 
the company, and to recognize the idea of a shadow director and a de facto 
director. The provisions of Islamic law dealt with provisions close to a de facto 
director which the so-called (Mutatafil/Tufili)55 "interloper". 
Fourth, the Saudi Arabian legislator in the Companies Law should determine 
the scope of duty not to participate in any business competitive with that of the 
company by establishing a company or working in a company that is in the 
same business field as the previous company, which will lead, whether 
intentionally or not, to exploiting the information that has reached them because 
of their position. The legislator also should stipulate the period for direct non-
competition for six months from the end of their employment, with a commitment 
to duty to maintain confidentiality and not exploit what has come to their 
knowledge because of their position. 
Fifth, the Saudi Arabian legislator should impose a duty to take into account the 
interests of creditors in certain circumstances; it imposes personal liability on 
the directors in the event that this duty is breached. This is to protect creditors 
and to enhance confidence and trust between creditors and borrowing 
companies. 
Sixth, the Saudi Arabian legislator should impose duty to take into account the 
impact of the company's operations on the environment while retaining the 
shareholders benefits as the ultimate objective of the company. This is to 
encourage the companies to take care of the environment through compliance 
with ecosystem and health measures and encourage companies to disclose 
policies on business ethics and the environment. 
Seventh, the Saudi Arabian legislator should abolish the duty to be a liquidator 
upon the dissolution of the company that is stated in the SACL 2015. This duty 
may create a state of uncertainty in the mechanisms regulating the directors' 
conduct during the period close to the preceding the company dissolution and 
 
55 A person who becomes involved in a situation where they are not wanted or are considered 
not to belong such as sell what s/he not own. 
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being a liquidator. It is also unreasonable for a liquidator (director) to hold 
herself/himself accountable when s/he was a director. 
Eighth, the Saudi Arabian legislator should place all directors’ duties in the 
Companies Law in a chapter entitled General Duties of Directors, provided that 
the duties are for directors in all forms of companies, to be drafted as follows. 
Duty to act within powers to achieve the purposes of the company 
(1) A director shall enjoy full powers in the management of the company to 
achieve its purposes and represent the same before courts and arbitral 
tribunals and any third party unless the company’s articles of association restrict 
her/his power in this respect. 
(2) A director shall not undertake any of the following acts beyond the scope 
the company purposes, except with the consent of the shareholders or by virtue 
of an express provision in the company’s articles of association.  
(a) Donations, except for small and regular amounts. 
(b) A company guarantee to a third party. 
(c) Resorting to arbitration 
(d) Reconciliation regarding the company’s rights 
(e) Selling or mortgaging the company’s real property unless such sale falls 
within the scope of the company's purposes.   
(f) Selling or mortgaging the company’s place of business. 
Duty to act in the interests of the company 
(1) A director must act in a way that serves the interest of the company, develop 
it, and maximise its value, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) 
to, 
(a) The company's long-term interest, 
(b) The interests of the company's employees, 
(c) Strengthening the company's business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
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(d) The social contribution of the company, 
(e) The impact of the company's operations on the environment 
(f) Enhancing the company's long-term reputation, and 
(g) The need to act with integrity towards shareholders and protect their rights 
to ensure equality and fairness among them. 
(2) In the event that the company has entered into insolvent liquidation or the 
director was aware of or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company would avoid engaging in the insolvent liquidation 
before the company's winding up commencement, the director must act in the 
interests of creditors of the company. 
Duty to exercise reasonable care 
This means the care that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person 
with— 
(a) The general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in 
relation to the company, and 
(b) The general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has. 
Duty to maintain confidentiality 
(1) A director may not disclose the secret information related to the company 
for any purposes. 
(2) The secrets mean all the company's information that directors have known 
it because of their positions. 
(3) This duty is not infringed if- 
(a) A director discloses the company secrets inside the general meetings to 
discuss these secrets during this meeting. 
(b) The secrets are the information required by the laws to place it at the 
disposal of shareholders in order to inform them of the information about the 
company before a period of the general assembly meeting or that information 
permitted by the laws to be published. 
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Duty to avoid conflicts of interest  
(1) A director must avoid a situation in which has or may have, a direct or 
indirect interest that conflicts, or may conflict, with the interests of the company 
or compete with the company. 
(2) This applies to - 
(a) The exploitation of information that has come to their knowledge by reason 
of their position to achieve an interest for themselves or their relatives or third 
parties. 
(b) Conclude an agreement for their own benefit with the company. 
(c) Participate in any business that would compete with the company or 
compete with the company in any of the branch activities that it carries out. 
(3) This duty is not infringed- 
(a) If the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a 
conflict of interest or compete with the company; or 
(b) If the matter has prior permission from the ordinary general assembly, 
renewed annually. 
Duty to declare any personal interest 
(1) If a director of a company is in any way, directly or indirectly, interested in a 
transaction, contract or participate in any business that would compete with the 
company, or compete with the company in any of the branch activities that it 
carries out, s/he must declare the nature and extent of that interest to the other 
directors. 
(2)The declaration may be made in any manner considered from the company. 
(3) The declaration must be accurate and complete, and if not, a further 
declaration must be made. 
(4) The permission may be given to conditions- 
(a) A director must notify the board of directors any direct or indirect interest 
that he may have in the transactions or contracts concluded for the company. 
(b) Such notification must be recorded in the minutes of the board meeting. 
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(c) The conflicted director shall abstain from voting on the related decision in 
the board meeting and general assemblies’ meeting. 
(d) The chairman of the board informing the ordinary general assembly, once 
convened, of the transactions and contracts in which any director has an 
interest and the competing businesses that the member of the board is engaged 
in. 
(e) Such permission must be renewed annually. 
Duty not to accept benefits from third parties 
(1) A director of a company must not accept a benefit from a third party 
conferred by reason of his/her being a director” 
(2) A “third party” means a person other than the company, an associated body 
corporate or a person acting on behalf of the company or an associated body 
corporate. 
(3) This duty is not infringed if the acceptance of the benefit cannot reasonably 
be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest. 
(4) A director may accept a benefit that may lead to a conflict of interest if the 
company authorises it after his/her disclosure. 
Ninth, Although the two-tier board is often criticised for excessive formalities 
with regard to reporting to the supervisory board and the division between the 
managers and monitors, which may lead to a lack of information necessary to 
improve the performance of the company. It also increases the company's 
financial and time costs for the meetings between the supervisory and 
management boards. The two-tier board may be the ultimate solution in Saudi 
Arabia to the problem of directors or board of directors not complying with their 
duties and Corporate Governance. This is because the two-tier board is a useful 
mechanism in delegating the business to qualified directors. It also achieves 
greater transparency because of the balance of power between management 
and monitoring and enhanced response to stakeholders.56 This thesis argues 
that reforming the substantive law is much better through reforming the 
 
56 See (2.2.1 Board structure). 
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directors' duties and clarifying the liabilities that may be deterring to those who 
may think to breach the duties. The Ministry of Commerce should also tighten 
monitoring over the companies' management and ensure they comply with the 
provisions of the law and corporate governance. Theoretically, introducing a 
two-tier board structure is radical and may be a long-term solution. 
Tenth, the Saudi Arabian legislator should enact a law that is similar to the UK 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 to protect companies and the 
Saudi Arabian market, provided that its provisions do not contradict the 
provisions of Islamic law and human rights principles. The UK Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 can be used by Saudi Arabian legislator as 
legal transplantation, with some modifications needed. In the proposed Saudi 
Arabian law, the reason for disqualification a director should be as in the UK 
Act on the basis of misconduct and unfitness. Misconduct can be expanded to 
include a person’s conviction of any criminal offence during the past 5-7 years, 
being insolvent or bankrupt, contravention of the provisions of the financial 
markets and commercial business rules, non-compliance with the provisions of 
the laws, regulations and continuing default and negligence and the like. As for 
disqualification due to unfitness, the person’s conduct is unfit for the concern of 
the company’s management or the person’s physical or mental health is unfit 
for the company’s concern or for the public interest. The directors' 
disqualification also in the proposed law could be effected in two ways, either 
by the court or through the Minister of Commerce so-called administrative 
equivalent, which is voluntary without the need for judicial proceedings, with 
some privileges given to the Minister of Commerce, such as reducing the 
disqualification period. It is also possible to cooperate between countries ٍ Saudi 
Arabian and the UK and others in exchanging information about people 
disqualified from being a company director in order to protect the markets. 
7.4 Research contribution 
Returning to the research question which is “To what extent does the regulation 
of directors' powers, duties and liabilities work effectively?",, this thesis 
answered it by discussing the definition of the company director and the shadow 
director and other basic legal principles with respect to the directors in chapter 
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2. Next, the study investigated and analysed the directors' powers and duties 
through a critical evaluation of the legal regulation of these matters in chapter 
3 and 4. Then, the study investigated and analysed the directors' liabilities 
through a critical evaluation in chapter 5 and 6. This thesis also has been able 
to highlight the legal problems with respect to the duties of directors in Saudi 
Arabian law. This study highlighted and discussed the issues in legal drafting 
in para 7.2.3 and legal gaps with respect to the directors’ duties and liabilities 
in para 7.2.4 and provided some recommendations and suggestion in para 7.3 
that the study hopes to make legislation regarding the directors’ duties and 
liabilities more efficient and effective. In short, for the regulation to be “effective” 
means achieving the purpose of the codification of the duties of directors, which 
is enhancing the clarity of the law and to make it easier for the responsibilities 
of directors towards the company and others to be identified without the need 
for a legal consultant to interpret these duties. Given the issues in legal drafting 
in identified in para 7.2.3 and legal gaps with respect to the directors’ duties and 
liabilities noted in para 7.2.4 above, it can be said that the SACL 2015 does not 
work as effectively as expected with respect to the directors' powers, duties and 
liabilities. The change that has been introduced and related to the directors' 
powers, duties and liabilities is that increase of the civil and criminal procedures 
as fines and imprisonment against directors. The SACL 2015 was supposed to 
introduce the directors' duties more clearly than it is now and codifies what is 
stated in the Islamic law provisions, but the SACL 2015 did not make any 
changes regarding this type of claims. Therefore, it can be said that the 
codification of duties in SACL 2015 is incomplete. The study hopes to make the 
new legislation regarding the directors’ duties and liabilities more efficient and 
effective by the provided recommendations and suggestion. 
The researcher believes that this study makes a significant contribution to 
knowledge. This contribution can be highlighted by the following. First, during 
this study, this thesis found that SACL 2015 suffers from a lack of studies that 
dealt with the duties and responsibilities of company directors in a critical 
analytical manner. Also, as far as is known, there are no studies that deal with 
all of the directors’ duties, the consequences of the breach of duties and the 
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provisions of exemption from liabilities under Saudi Arabian legislation as is 
done in this study. 
Second, this thesis provided a comparative critical analytical study of the 
powers and liabilities of the company's directors in the legislation in Saudi 
Arabia and the United Kingdom and clarifies the similarities and differences 
between these legislation. 
Third, this study can be considered one of the first studies that include the entire 
spectrum of directors’ duties in Saudi Arabia under the SACL 2015, Corporate 
Governance Regulations 2019 and Islamic law provision, where this study 
gathered all the duties that many researchers overlooked. This is perhaps due 
to the lack of clarity and scatters the duties. 
Fourth, this thesis can also be considered the first study57 that combines the 
analysis of the powers, duties and liabilities of the company's directors in Saudi 
Arabian law and compares them with the UK law. 
Fifth, the thesis endeavours to broaden the understanding of the subject of the 
study to company directors, judges, academics, legal advisers and lawyers. 
Sixth, through evaluation and taking advantage of the legislation in the UK, this 
thesis has been able to highlight the legal problems with respect to the duties 
of directors in Saudi Arabian law. This study highlighted and discussed the 
issues in legal drafting and legal gaps with respect to the directors’ duties and 
liabilities and provided some recommendations and suggestion that the study 
hopes to make legislation regarding the directors’ duties and liabilities more 
efficient and effective.
 
57 According to the database in British library <https://ethos.bl.uk> and Saudi digital library 
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